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A duality developed wi thin geography after vareni~s · a:ccepte=d · ' ~he . cop~:r­
nican paradigm, because of the wish to search for law-like relationships. 
National geographies contributed their own cultural values. Geographers 
accepted the cross-cultural terms through translation without being aware 
that political values were a paramount contribution. 
The present paradigm within geography presents an ongoing confrontation 
between those who wish to quantify material that is amenable to scientific 
law-like transactions, and those ideographers who expand the regional con-
cept. In Britain resource funding by different government departments 
emphasises this division. 
Geographers have always been eclectic in utilising materials, theories and 
ideas from other disciplines. This is recently true concerning loans 
from sociology and other social sciences; for proofs, justifications, 
theoretical references and explanations. Many usages of social theories 
by geographers present confusion to sociologists, because of their unusua~ 
if not bizarre applications. Different social theories may arrive at 
similar ends, but their logic runs through very different routes, from vay 
different philosophies. 
Echoing the ideas of Mackinder, David Harvey writing in "Social Justice 
and the City" suggested that geographers might untangle this web by relat-
ing the ideas of social and moral philosophy to geography, in a manner in 
which methods and philosophy would not be separate. 
been mainly refuted or ignored. 
This suggestion has 
However from these bvo authors, it is possible to synthesize the four con-
cepts, that contemporary geography finds problematic to deal with, through 
a combined philosophy and methodology. These concepts are the nature of 
scientific enquiry; of theory or explanation; of space; and of knowledge. 
The contribution to knowledge in this pager lies in the inference that no 
form of geographical concept is either value or culture free. Every con-
ceptual form is derived from a social theory, and every social theory has 
a political bias. 
To 
Miss Potts, 
of The Village School, Little Eaton, 
who taught me to read, 
and all others of that ilk. 
Title page. 
Abstract. 
Index. 
Chapter 1. 
Section 1.1. 
1. 2. 
1.3. 
1.4. 
1. 5. 
1.6. 
Chapter 2. 
Section 2.1. 
2.2. 
2.3. 
2.4. 
2.5. 
Chapter 3. 
Section 3.1. 
3.2. 
3.3. 
3.4. 
3.5. 
3.6. 
3.7. 
lNDEX 
Nationalism and the classical foundations of 
contemporary geography. 
The Varenian change of paradigm. 
The German influence. 
The French influence. 
The American influence. 
The British influence. 
Geography, culture and political values. 
Modern geography - a plurality of orthodoxies. 
"The Peninsular" and "The Personality of Ulster." 
British and American regionalism. 
Values and reality and status. 
Quantificatory "new" geography. 
Values and politics in quantification. 
Geography and Social theory. 
Geographers use of social theory. 
Talcott Parsons and systems. 
Max Weber and social action. 
Darwin, Marx and social conflict. 
Kant and phenomenology. 
Geographers problems with social theory. 
Social theories as choices. 
1 
25 
51 
Chapter 4. Geography as social and moral philosophy 78 
Section 4.1. Social problems arising from Harvey's 
"Social Justice." 
4.2. Moral problems. 
4.3. Criticism. 
4.4. The problem of change. 
Chapter 5. Concepts and Utopias. 102 
Section 5.1. Concepts as ideology. 
5.2. Values as ideology. 
5.3. Values as morals. 
5.4. Utopias in geography. 
5.5. Geographical statements are political 
statements. 
* Notes: an asterisk (*) in the text indicates an included note. 122 
Appendix. 140 
Report on a search for information from geographers. 
CHAPTER ONE: NATIONALISM AND THE CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF CONTEMPORARY GEOGRAPHY 
Thus the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the 
host of them. Genesis. 2 v.I. 
1.1.1 
liThe time honoured scholasttc method o;e tracing the 
growth of a subject from its presumed origins, is 
singularly ill-fitt~ng in the case of geography. 
Ancient geography was generically different from 
its modern representative. 1I 
So claimed S.W. Wooldridge, *indicating that over time many conceptual 
alterations had made an impact upon the disciplines that continue under 
the umbrella of geography, as indeed they have. In accepting this claim, 
one may attempt to trace the discipline back to ancient roots, or to 
choose a cut off point that marks a paradigmatic reformulation. The 
former choice infers the need for an a-priori definition of geography, 
which presents needless difficulties, because history socializes one into 
accepting the causality of the past in defining and determining the pres-
ent. Therefore a point of paradigmatic acceptance is taken here between 
the publication of "Introductio in Universam Geographiam ll for Philip 
Cluverius (1624) and "Geographia Generalis ll for Bernhardus Varenius (1650). 
1.1.2 
The former work is derived from a ptolemaic concept of the universe, the 
second. accepts the formulation of the planetary system as conceptualised 
by Copernicus. The generic gap of differentiation is outlined by T.S. 
Kuhn * at length and it is to his notions of paradigmatic change that 
reference is given in this instance. The replacing of the earth as the 
centre of the universe, with the sun had many implications. It was a 
logical assault upon Christian beliefs, it belittled mankind, undermined 
his evaluation of himself by posing the problems of reason against every-
day experience. 
1.1.3 
The pre-Copernican conception of the Cosmos placed the God ordained Earth 
at the centre. Georgraphy meant writing about or describing the lands 
and people of the inhabited world, and speculating about what lay beyond 
the range of human knowledge; truth and myth took equal values in des-
cription, because all acceptable insights were gifts from God. 
The idea of systematic order amongst the planets gave impetus to the dev-
elopment of western thought in the direction of systematic sciences, 
firstly as the acquisition of systematic knowledge of all kinds as opposed 
to the former muddles of the monks and alchemists, and further towards the 
analysis of factors or determinants. Thus knowledge appeared to progress 
through the development of orderly sciences. Although Kuhn * suggests, 
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1.1.4 
"One need, however, look no further than Copernicus and 
the calendar to discover that external conditions may 
help to transform mere anomaly into a source of acute 
crisis. The same example would illustrate the way in 
which conditions outside the sciences may influence the 
range of alternatives available to the man who seeks to 
end a crisis by proposing one or another revolutionary 
reform. (and) I have said nothing about the role of 
technological advance or external social, economic and 
intellectual conditions in the development of the 
sciences." 
Kuhn, unwittingly, appears to emphasi~e a problem that has beset geogr-
aphers since Varenius accepted the Copernican formulation of the planets. 
Varenius created a bifurcation in geography as a discipline. He pro-
posed a division in geographic knowledge between general and special geo-
graphy, and having published Geographia Generalis in 1650, died before 
elaborating his thesis. General geography has since been labelled nomo-
thetic. Constants that were deemed mainly physical upon the face of the 
earth, could be used to establish generalities that might be applied to 
like conditions upon the rest of the earth. Special geographical pheno-
mena were those that have since been considered to be ideographic; they 
offered only treatment that would be explanatory through description. 
The inherent duality that he saw as explanatorily problematic, still faces 
geographers today. For Varenius realised that certain processes andphe-
nomena could be explained as objects that were solely physical and subject 
to law-like generalisations; subjects of the orderly sciences. The at-
mospher~, hydrosphere, and lithosphere and their relationships with the 
heavenly bodies would all fall into these categories. Their study could 
be carried out with some exactitude through geometry, mathematics and the 
methods then being explored by the physical sciences. 
1.1.5 
Varenius assumed that much geographic material would never be open to soch 
explanatory verification as was available to the modes of the physical 
sciences. Topics of geographic study that included man or involvement 
with human groups would only lead to statements of probability; therefore 
the method to cope with these studies in explanatory forms was by de&xipt-
ion. The division of knowledge that Varenius suggested should apply to 
geography was in keeping with the attitudes of his era and is mirrored in 
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the writing of Bacon.* 
Dickinson * explains: 
It included an important value judgement, as 
"Varenius complained, that special geography was always 
taught at the expense of general (geography), and on this 
account he argued that geography scarcely merited the 
dignity of a science. In special geography, features 
should be explained in terms of general laws, so as to 
make local geography logical and intelligible." 
This division of geography by Varenius has had a transcendental impact 
upon all later essays in the discipline. He had introduced values, the 
primary one being notions of science that equated with a higher form of 
knowledge higher than mere description. Varenius brought a protestant 
ethic into geography from a Dutch background. The acceptance of Coper-
nican conceptualization of the Universe was more fitting to his times 
with the new techniques in navigation and the expansion of Dutch inter-
ests into Asia. Generalisation of accurate knowledge was already a re-
flection of the accuracy of charts and tables and improved chronometry. 
1.1.6 
Science as a value, rests upon the premiss that science adequately explains. 
Ernest Nagel * analyses the basis of this value judgement. He suggests 
that there are four types of explanation commonly used in the sciences 
(including the social sciences), each one showing a variation upon the log-
ical pattern of how comprehensive and accurate responses to the question 
"How?" are arrived at. 
1.1. 7 
The four patterns of explanation that Nagel chose to elucidate, he termed 
deductive; probabilistic; functional or teleologicaJ.), and genetic. "The 
Structure of Science" is analytical and argued in depth, but gradually he 
creates from these patterns of explanation a hierarchy of values, untilhe 
posits one explanation against another, reinforcing Varenius' similardiv-
ision and value judgement with: * 
"However acute our awareness may be of the rich variety of 
human experience, it is not likely that our best interests 
would be served by stopping objective inquiry into the var-
ious conditions determining the existence of human traits 
and actions, and thus shutting the door to the progressive 
liberation from illusion that comes from the knowledge 
achieved by such inquiry." 
This is an emotive passage of writing, that is hardly in accord with 
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Nagel's stated aim * in composing the book ••••.. "that the distinctive 
aim of the scientific enterprise is to provide systematic and respons-
ibly supported explanations. 1I 
This is hardly representative of 'conditions determining human actions' 
and 'our best interests' together with 'liberation from illusion,' _un-
less Nagel was' unaware of the naturalistic fallacy. Science is supp-
osedly value free, in order to be objective. Objectivity is a require-
ment of the scientist in order to separate truth from myth, and to avoid 
the intrusion of his own personal emotions into the substance of his 
findings. 
Varenius separated his geographies by rendering to science, that which 
was scientific; and unto man that which was determined by human traits# 
yet three centuries later Nagel considered that enquiry into human traits 
by scientific methods would achieve progressive liberation from illusion. 
This would have to be realised by changing the status of scientific or 
non-scientific to a hierarchy of explanatory values. 
1.1.8 
A paradigmatic change within a discipline is not an instant overnight re-
jection of the old for a progression into the new. Even revolutions 
take a little longer. As Kuhn * suggests a major difficulty with an in-
coming paradigm, is for the innovators to utilize their time in applying 
the new forms. The old knowledge does not 'go away' and new knowledge 
is slow to replace it. 
So in geography the work of Cluverius was partly incorporated into that 
of Varenius, especially into his outline of special geography. This ~ 
noticeable· in the use of the term ghorography or the description of large 
countries; the term topography which offers views of places and small 
tract.s of land upon the earth. Both geographers works continued in use 
for decades, but only the notions of Varenius have persisted in geograph-
ical texts to the present day. Scientific knowledge or descriptive pass-
ages of travelogue are both constant features included in geographical 
texts. 
1.1.9 
From the Varenian point of paradigmatic change, geography has divided its 
subject matter into that which was scientific and that which did not fit 
into scientific modes of explanation adequately. Placed in Nagel's hier-
achy one may instance: geomorphology as deductive geography; hydrology 
as functional geography; population studies as probabilistic geography; 
historical geography as teleology and environmental and cultural studies 
4 
as genetic geography. As one progresses further from deductive reason-
ing towards ideography then the claims to being scientific become weaker. 
But geography is still divided, and division is concerned with severcmce, 
discord, distinction, order and prescription, which are values. Though 
the division of geography may date from the acceptance of Copernican 
thought, these values are still inherent within the discipline. Sever-
ance is found in the 'cutting-away' of the Earth Sciences, discord is 
found in title words as Radical, Humanistic, Revolution, Ideology, Pro-
gress; all gauntlets thrown at some other geographers. Distinction is 
idealised in other titles, as Evaluating, Models, Concept, and Frontiera 
Re-ordering of the subject is offered by prescription. 
1.1.10 
There is no simple causal relationship; the division within the subject 
has been elaborated with a web of cross cultural values from the contri-
butions of different 'national' schools of geographers. The science 
that Nagel proposes reflects that accumulation of knowledge Which geogr~h­
ers use and the certainty ,_~ : they appear to share in putting forward 
their ideas. There might be cross cultural agreements concerning methods, 
but the ideologies of nations are more problematic in their cross cultural 
transmissions. Every nation has an ideology to explain to the world, and 
a world to explain to itself within the frame work of its own ideology. 
Geography would appear to be a factual, objective and impartial vehicle 
where this process has no obvious place. 
1.2.1 
To suggest that there exist national schools of geography is both assert-
ive and a labelling device. In this instance, it is a convenient vehicle 
for transmitting the idea that cultures are dissimilar, even though it is 
often assumed that similar disciplines show fundamental relationships be-
tween science and value. As a device four traditions will be considere~ 
the German, French, North American and British. These four traditions 
conceptualized the world differently, because their national politicalOb-
jectives were divergent. Their different geographies aimed at different 
outcomes, because each nation had to justify different policies to the 
world and to themselves. German geographers offered data gathering and 
methods, the French offered ideas and microstudies, the Americans gave 
ideology with positivism, whilst the British showed a major concern for 
synthesis. 
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1.2.2 
Although these national schools presented language difficulties to one 
another, in every case translation and transmission of ideas had taken 
place with some continuity. The interchange of methods has included the 
determinative ideologies from nation to nation, and the individual states 
have lent political undertones to each exchange. The German ideal was 
to enclose their state upon the boundaries of the German tongue; the 
French had to justify their frontiers by imposing a common language; the 
United States had to justify the destruction-of the natural environment 
and its inhabitants in exchange for profit, whilst the British had to 
account for a massive, accidental and haphazard Empire. 
1. 2.3 
Key contributions to the 'German School' of geography were made by von 
Humboldtand Ritter, whose contributions are extant in present geographies. 
Von Humboldt set out to gather data through the study of local areas from 
which a German school of field work evolved which is termed ~eimatkunde' 
or the study of one's homeland. Although much of von Humbolo.tJ's work was 
carried out in the New World, the intention was to apply the methods tlat 
he established to the notions of the Fatherland. 'Heima~ has very similar 
emotive meaning to Germany, as 'home' has meaning to the English English. 
Von Humbo~ saw an inter-related gestalt of the universe, the notion of 
'Zusammenhang'* is fundamental to this conceptual formulation. 
'Zusammenhang'derives from a philosophical view of the world from a German-
ic tradition; it is used by Froebel and Pestalozzi in education, Max 
Weber in Sociology, and the gestalt psychologists. Moral philosophy was 
the virtual arbiter of man's inner world, whilst the field of natural phil-
osophy was derived from man's senses and was concerned with the physical 
world. This dichotomy was not supposed to be divisive but synthetic. 
1. 2. 4 
Von Humboldt's geographer did not delve into moral philosophy, but had the 
whole field of the observable world at his disposal. Empirical knowledge 
to Von Humbo1d4 was based upon the thoughtful observation of phenomena 
available to the senses. Geographic expertise thus studied the content 
of area, that is land, people and culture. Von Humbolt established a 
tradition from his researches into the details of the virgin lands, peo-
ples and cultures of the Americas, through the detailed attention to meth-
ods relating to the distribution of natural and organic phenomena and their 
areal associations. People as objects, together with their works were in-
cluded as organic phenomena, but man as a subject was left from thesesmdies 
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as an item for anthropology. In the introduction to "Cosmos", von Hum-
bo1dtset out his philosophical attitude as fo110ws:-
1.2.5 
"The most important aim of all physical science is this: 
to recognise unity in diversity, to judge single pheno-
mena separately without surrendering to their bulk, and 
to group nature's essences under the cover of outward 
appearances." 
Knowledge for von Humboldt·, fell into three groups. There were the syst-
ematic sciences in which phenomena were classified according to ana1agous 
characteristics. There were the historical sciences which concerned the 
development of animals, plants and rocks as existing groups, because his 
knowledge was prior to Darwin's publication of the "Origin of Species." 
Thirdly there was the science of the earth, or physical geography. His 
knowledge lead him to consider scientific material thematically. Nat-
ural philosophy as a history shared a gradual emergence of concepts con-
J 
cerning the cosmos as an organic whole. These concepts arose through 
definition and limitations of the physical descriptions of the world as 
a geographic descriptive discipline, in its own right. The concepts were 
then enhanced in an objective manner as empirical and actual aspects of 
nature in a scientific form. For instance, he condemned the numerical 
listing of flora by continents, since this obscured the distribution of 
vegetation and its relationship to climatic zones, and he stressed that 
factors other than climate affected plant distribution. Not only did he 
recognise unique landscapes, but showed that they had relationships with 
similar areas in other parts of the world. He believed that the 'inner' 
forces of mankind would through emotion and imagination, create incentives 
to study these natural spatial distributions within the cosmos. Some 
aspects of von Humboldt's attitude make his work of more than passing his-
torical interest. He viewed man as an objective part of the physical 
attributes of the earth, but that mankind had qualities that varied inre-
lationship to his environmental reciprocities: so that man did not inher-
it the earth by divine right, but lived in exchange with it. * 
1.2.6 
Von Humboktt studied the geographic fragments of his time; that is to say 
that the world had yet to be surveyed; and related them to a presumed 
cosmic whole or totality. His interest in geology was not that of a geo-
10gist, his detailed measurements were not those of a surveyor, nor was 
his interest in the inhabitants whom he met just the interest of an 
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anthropologist. These facets of the world were supplements to a scien-
tific whole. His detail of objective data gathering was meticulous, 
his transects in America are still worthy of study. By observation of 
and upon the complexities of these phenomena, von Humboldtattempted to 
explain their spatial locations. In this manner he closely approaches 
Varenius' notion of general geography, in that he, von Humboldt invari-
ably attempted to compare the locations and quantities of terrestrial 
phenomena from their unique environments into generalized groups across 
the globe. Martonne* considers that this type of explanation is aprime 
attempt at offering geographic causality. Even if von Humboldtformul-
ates his explanatory reasons teleologically; in that he was not certain 
of an evolutionary process, but considered that God was a prime mover of 
creation; he gave: a classical impetus to geography other than the mere 
exploration of unknown lands. He set up a method of data collection 
and thus adequately justified the quest for scientific reasons, in a 
search for knowledge. He also gave for the Germans the notion of simil-
arity of units across spatially separated units or regions of land. 
Similarity could exist in dissimilar areas. It required a second ingred-
ient to show that scattered pockets of the same language across a contin-
ent could be logically extended to that hideous trilogy of my youth: Ein 
Yolk, ein Vaterland und ein FUhrer. 
1.2.7 
At the same time as von HumboJ~twas exploring the world Carl Ritter held 
the professorship of geography at Berlin. He was a life long student and 
was greatly influenced by Pestalozzi, who was an advocate of 'natural 
growth' theories in education. 
members of the Prussian Army. 
In turn Ritter greatly influenced senior 
Ritter claimed that the theme of his work 
was a comparative one aimed at showing the connection between history and 
nature. His first major work concerned Africa, his second work concerned 
the movements of peoples between Asia and Europe. He believed that the 
earth was an organism, to fit the needs of man to perfection, and he claim-
ed that it could be possible to determine the development of a nation, in 
advance of history, in order to "retain the welfare which Providence has 
appointed for every nation whose direction is right and whose conformity 
to law is constant." In geography he attempted to establish the following 
precepts:- "the fundamental rules which should assure the truth to the 
whole work is to proceed from observation to observation, not from opinion 
or hypothesis to observation." 
"Although there may be geographic scientific laws, there is little success 
-'s 
in trying to establish them a-priori; we must ask the earth for its 
laws." 
"we must show a coherent relationship (Zusammenhang) of diffel.-ent 
features in terms of cause and effect, and thus derive the 'essential 
character' of each area." 
However Ritter's explanation of boundaries, regions and areas is con-
fused by his commentators, as they introduce their own biases and 
justify these from his 'translations' as referees.* 
1.2.8. 
Von Humboldt had introduced the notion of linkages between regions. 
Ritter reinforced this by presenting ideas concerning the unique and 
distinct geographical unit with, "observation must be organised accord-
ing to the chorological principle (he uses 'raumliche ' which per~aps 
means spatial) to present the geographic-physical conditions of the 
earth surface especially as a fatherland of the peoples in its most 
manifold influence on humanity developing in body and mind."* 
Here he stresses the notion that geographical boundaries are language 
boundaries, and that the Fatherland has deep geographical meaning in 
the context of the German speaking peoples. In later studies of Heimat 
Kunde the influence of language becomes a determinant of geographical 
oneness of race. A contemporary criticism of Ritter is of interest, 
because it foresees the present debate in geography, which will be con-
sidered in Chapter Four of the paper. Frobel * said, "If nature must 
be studied according to physical forms of judgement, it does not follow 
that one may not also regard nature, as well as the moral world, accord-
ing to ethical forms of judgement ..• but many of our natural scientists 
commit the error of believing that that against which they close the 
eyes of the mind therefore does not exist." 
1.2.9. 
The German 'tradition in geography seems to follow a path of relation-
ships. Th(3 method of data gathering being meticulous proceeded from 
observation to observation trusting that the earth would reveal its laws. 
But the coherent relationship in terms of cause and effect involved an 
implicit determinism in the search for 'essentials'. These essentials 
gave an ideological emphasis upon the link (Zussammenhang) that bound 
geography together, firstly the Fatherland, secondly the Lebensraum or 
national space, in which the Fatherland could become an entity. Method, 
determinism and ideology became the coherent relationship of German 
national geography. Two examples of this are, firstly upon Von Thunen's 
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gravestone the simple method and data of A = ~apt 'Secondly there 
is the contribution of Friedrich Ratzel, which seems to have generated 
so much animosity amongst those who write commentaries upon his work.* 
Ratzel influenced by the"Zusamroenhang"of tradition, was concerned with 
the interdependence of phenomena, rather than reasons, causes and dis-
tributions, thus giving a different emphasis to the meaning of data and 
the methods of its collection from those who had set out the German 
tradition. A basic concept that he held was that the state is a par-
ticular spatial grou~~ng on the earth's surface. As a biological or-
ganism he saw'every state ~s a piece of humanity and a portion of the 
earth." This concept gave certainty to the geographical character of 
Lebensraum, the geographical area within which living organisms develop. 
The character of German national geography was this relationship of 
method, determinism and ideology. 
1.3.1. 
French geographers moved away from the determinist philosophies that 
were readily at hand, and established a school of possibilism, especially 
at a theoretical level. French philosophers offered justifications for 
the. amalgam of those diverse peoples within the Republic. Sociologists 
had to explain the forms of consensus that held them together, ana deter-
minist ideas suited both these cases. Geographers however, had to show 
how very different regions, with very different peoples having different 
ethnic and linguistic roots, lead the whole nation into taking the 
choice to 'become French.'* The French geographers had to justify the 
unification of one country by the imposition of a single language. To 
contemporary geography, the French have given ideas and microstudies, 
which appear to have been generated by actors in a philosophical debate. 
A contribution to advance the notion of geographic possibilities was 
made by the Comte de Buffon *through the writing of his massive text 
"Histoire Naturelle ll which was published between 1749 and 1804. He re-
£erred to the seven periods of the earth's formation and evolvement in 
"Des epoques de la nature"; in the final stage of which he considel:('ed the 
power of man aiding that of nature. In this manner he puts forward an 
idea of a thesis of possibilism, that is to say, that there was a crea-
tive power (which need not be God) underlying human society. Therefore 
in a particular environment, a society would have a limited choice of 
ways of development. However, once that society had established a line 
in which to develop, thought would have to be given to the ensuing 
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environmental impact, and to the conservation of resources. 
1.3.2. 
The notion of choice in the environmental management would therefore 
negate the possibility of a determined social development, because 
although each society might be faced by limiting factors, choices were 
never closed. Malte-Brun, a Danish exile in France took up this notion 
when he wrote "Precis de la Geographie". In this he divided France 
into five natural 'regions'*. These were The ancient mountains, the 
recent mountains, the French plains, the coastal regions, and the water-
systems. Each of these were given characteristics which were supposed 
to be common only to each, thereby rendering description more detailed. 
This procedure Dickinson * suggests is "the one by which its chorography 
may be most conveniently explained." Into this form of convenient ex-
planation, Malte-Brun intended to introduce a description of the lands 
and peoples of the earth. This idea is quite contrary to the micro-
studies of Le Play, where there was a suggested inter-relationship 
between the place; as a point upon the earth, which limited the type 
of work that would be available. Which in turn determined the nature 
of the folk who would live and work there. For instance the sea shore 
would determine that fish would be available to fishermen, just as the 
escarpemnt above would determine easy access to the gallery mines of 
miners, whilst the forest above the mines would determine the occup-
ations of foresters and hunters. Major areas of the world might not 
seem so deterministic, but to Malte-Brun, the major regions of the earth 
would still limit total possibilities of diversity, but would open up 
limited choices for the inhabitants. The French would be allowed to see 
their world as open to individualism, variations and. choices, as long 
as they took their French culture with them, and realised that question-
ing the unity of the French language was beyond their possible range 
of. choice"s. 
1.3.3. 
This was part of their.-geographic 'genre de vie ' . 
By 1922 almost every chair of geography in France was occupied by a 
student of, or a student of a student of Vidal de la Blache. Although 
he lived from 1845 to 1918 contemporary French geography still pays 
service to his influences. Vidal de la Blache* accepted the ideas of 
de Buffon and Malte-Brun in this manner: "The dominant idea in all 
geographical progress is that of terrestrial unity."* The ideological 
importance of this is central to French geography and he therefore 
reinforced the statement as follows:- "For most historians and 
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sociologists geography exists only tox purposes o~ consultation, One 
starts with man in order to come back to man once more. One pictures 
that the earth is a 'stage upon which man's activities take place', with-
out reflecting that the stage itself is alive. The problem consists 
in enumerating the influences affecting man, in an attempt to discover 
in how far a certain kind of deter.minism is operative in the events of 
history ••• answers to (these questions) require a knowledge of the world 
wider and more profound than any available until recently." *Here he 
states that history and sociology, of the determinist tradition act as 
limitations to a true understanding of geography, through the ignorance 
of historians and sociologists. Therefore in order to 'evaluate the 
living stage and to avoid the operations of a certain kind of deter-
minism' 'La tradition Vidalienne' emerged in France. It appeared as a 
series of micro-studies of regions. This was not geography,in itself, 
but merely a methodological tool of explanation. No one would credit 
that the French language had been joyously accepted by the Catalans, 
Flemish people and Alsatians, nor that the French culture had determined 
their acceptance of an alien tongue. Possibilism in geography seemed 
best confined to study of the interactions within small environments, 
then the nature of force would not seem a paramount influence upon 
these people. 
1.3.4. 
The western tradition of telling a tale by parable frequently misleads 
the audience away from the real meaning of the examples used, when the 
underlying philosophy is not adequately explained. Vidal de la Blache 
concluded his discussion with the historians and sociologists* \vith, 
"The growth of the European agglomeration thus appears to be an achieve-
ment of intelligence and method as much as a natural phenomenon." 
*Rejection of determinism was paramount in his aim to show, "That which 
geography can offer, is the aptitude not to break up what Nature brings 
together, to understand the correspondence and the correlation of facts, 
be they in the terrestrial milieu ... ,or in the regional environments 
in which they are localised." *Vidal de la Blache's facts were wider 
and open to permutations and possibilities, much wider in scope than 
the determined 'social facts' of Durkheim, and deeper than the economic 
J 
determining facts of Le Play. It seems possible that t;his notion of 
social understanding coincided with Max Weber's notion of'Verstehen' (see 
Chapter. 3) • Abraham* states "The development of French sociology 
followed a course that had no parallel elsewhere. One can discern ••• 
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an unbroken strand o;e thought ;ero,!!) the time 0;1; the Encycl0,l?aedists to 
the end o;e the nineteenth century, grounded u,l?on philosophical re;elect-
ion. \1 Vidal de la Blache had a vested interest in oreaking this un-
broken strand. I;e geography were to exist in its own right in France, 
it had to move away from determinist philosophy and establish the idea 
that there were varieties of causes and effects. Otherw'ise they might 
conclude that their state was a sham, linguistically diverse and had 
had unity imposed upon the peop~e. 
1.3.5, 
French geographers had the alternative of stating that all human acti-
vity could be related through time to the ultimate determinant of the 
human environment, or they could outline ongoing processes of regional 
occupation thrpugh processes of analysing complex cause and effect 
chains and relationships of peoples in small environments. Harvey 
suggested* that they "seemed not so much at war with the causal prin-
ciple, but rather to have disagreed with the determinists over the 
right 
identification of the right cause and/effect." Vidal de la Blache 
·sought through possibilism a construction for entering into an under-
standing of the motivations of the significant 'others' *who populated 
and formulated his regions, only at an adequate level of causation; 
which constitutes a very different form of knowledge from that of the 
French historians and sociologists. If there is a determining factor 
in Vidal de la Blache's geography it is the ideology that justifies the 
French state. 
1.4.1. 
Out of America, the impact of theoretical geography was brought from 
Germany to Britain through translations. The ideas arrived more easily 
than from Europe, the language was vaguely familiar, even though one 
still wonders what had been done to it. But the ideas although claiming 
Germanic origins were continuously adapted to the ideology that the Amer-
ican States wished to convey to their people. Geographic justifications 
had first to be given to the development, or exploitation of the contin-
ent. This was through the destruction first of the native inhabitants 
and their resources, then through the exploitation of the land, the slaves, 
and the natural resources, such as timber and water. A geographical 
folklore had to be established concerning the pioneers, the settlers, and 
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the law. Secondly there had to be a justification established con-
cerning the destruction of the gains of the first settlers and the 
economic amalgamation of the fruits of their toil through the processes 
of law, into the hands of those who controlled the capital. The 
status of profit had to be shown to be higher than the lot of humanity, 
Dickinson * has recently compiled a domesday upon the work of those 
American geographers who have contributed to this ideology. 
considered here are Ellen Semple and Richard Hartshorne. 
1.4.2. 
The two 
Ellen C. Semple wrote "Influences of the Geographic Environment" 
in 1911, and thus introduced Ratzel's notion of geographic determinism 
(section 1.2.9.) into the literature of English reading geographers. 
Her stressing of his formulations of determinism spread these ideas 
amongst American geographers. However Miss Semple may have been 
Ratzel's pupil, but she firmly refused to act as his translator.* She 
had a different story to tell for a different national ideology, she 
wished to firmly eliminate the Germanic theory of the organic state and 
the organic society from American geography. Ideas of natural growth 
might justify equal rights for all German speaking peoples in Europe, 
but America did not require any equalities for all Americans, not 
during an era of social control through.wealth. Secondly she wished 
to reverse the society - environment relationship of the Germanic con-
struction to an environment - society relationship which would establish 
a reasonable justification for the American theft of the Indian lands. 
Within the German formulation, the wealth of the Ruhr could exist easily 
besides the poverty of Prussia, as long as there was a linguistic tie 
of the German culture. In America there was-only the wealth of the 
environment and its inhabitants that were open to exploitation of a 
capitalist society. This choice of formulation is still vital to those 
who "see geography's existence only for purposes of consultation", be-
cause here is established two very different geographies drawn from 
apparently identical factors. 
1.4.3. 
Miss Semple insisted upon the justification of a theory of social 
Darwinism, in order to explain the processes by which the Americans had 
had to establish forms of their civilization upon their empty environment 
to the south and west. The environment had to justify the society that 
it had created, because the Europeans had been in the land for too short 
a time to claim to have made inroads upon the continent and thus alter 
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the environment. There 1.a a dual1.tj[ :in this claim li i.t is to be 
seen as truthful. Hartshorne * considers the immediate difficulties 
of'Semples claims at length, because Hettner * had pointed out, from 
the Germanic tradition, how unsound it was to proceed from the consid-
eration of natural factors to the explanation of human phenomena. 
Consideration of the natural factors can "arrive only at possibilities: 
the decision lies with man ..• A sure scientific knowledge of the actual 
existing causal relationships is only possible if one proceeds from 
the human facts, classifies these and pursues them to their geographic 
roots." The construction of 'Semple's choice' leads to an inbuilt 
dualism that echoes the worst features of the Varenian division, because 
one is lead to study either one part of geography or the other. The 
invitation is to study the 'natural environment' in itself. This then, 
as Hartshorne * insists becomes to geographers and to social scientists 
"the geographic factor". Human geography then becomes the study of the 
influence of the environment as a factor upon man. 
1. 4.4,':'. 
Semple's geography became dualistic. in three ways. It separated the 
study of natural phenomena from human~phenomena. Therefore it must use 
the techniques 9f t~e natural sciences differently from the techniques 
of the various social sciences. It presents two different, but funda-
mental viewpoints when studying the natural and human attributes of 
phenomena. These forms of dualism have a doubling effect, which was 
pointed out py Hettner * writing in 1905 when he examined the dual mean-
ings of 'zwiespaltig' in this very context. He showed how the semantic 
dualism of 'dualism or discordant' could lead one on, until the "logical 
unitary structure of geography was thereby destroyed." Miss Semple's 
fundamental move away from Ratzel's geography was because the cultures 
of Germany and of the United States of America diverged. The reason 
was ideological. This discordant ideology persists in American geo-
graphy. Sauer * wrote' "For the present, living beyond one's means 
has become a civic virtue, increase of the 'output' the goal of society. 
The prophets of a new world ... may be stopped ..• They may fail ••• They may 
be checked .•. What we need more perhaps is an ethic and aesthetic."* One 
allows recognition of ideology when it is given positive or negative 
appraisal; and 'perhaps' and 'needs' in the above extract only verify the 
existence of these values. To travel from the dominant 'good' of capi-
tal exploitation to the discordant nausea of the contrary American ideo-
theme, one has only to read John Leighly's tribute to Sauer.* 
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"The people who move upon the scene of tus account are 'homefolks' 
one and alL" etc. Is thls geography? Picture for ever IJohnboy'* 
living in the cosy virtuous home, poor but honest, surrounded by a 
rapacious capitalist morality. Or is it the heads and tails of a 
dualist ideology? 
1.4.5. 
Spate wrote* "It is almost customary these days to play down the works 
of Huntington as 'naively deterministic'. This overt confession of 
ignorance of the substance and procedure of a great scholar who made 
specific contributions to our knowledge of human societies." As the 
manifest destiny thesis of the American way of life began to be ques-
tioned, so did the questioning have to take place of the theories of 
Semple and the theories of climatic determinism of Huntington. He 
followed the environment / man formulation of Semple, and considered 
the biological and physical environmental determinants upon civilisa-
tion. Further to this he 'measured' civilisations and pre-ran the 
present generation of quantifiers, even though some doubt his statistics 
as little more than engineered value judgements.* Huntington was an 
itinerant scholar and teacher, his fieLd researches mainly in Asia and 
Europe lead him to expound two major intertwining themes. These were 
the role of biological inheritance and the physical environment upon 
the course of history. In so doing he lead American geographers into 
two dark abysses. From Semple's environmental determinism Huntington 
entered into theories of physical determinism. His correlations be-
tween weather flows and human activity are frequently criticised upon 
these grounds. However it is not so often noted that his contributions 
to geography also lead to explanation through psychophysiological at-
tributes to human beings, for how else could they explain their deter-
mined behaviour to themselves? This brought the inclusion of the psy-
chological factor into the geographers' toolbox of variables. 
1.4.6. 
Huntington writes, "unfortunately, no widespread statistics are avail-
able for such qualities as idealism, altruism, honesty, self-reliance, 
originality and artistic appreciation." Spate* continues: "Yet he 
finds quantitative measures of these ... This lack of sympathy is very 
evident in his 'ranking' of the world's religions ••. " But this white 
Anglo-Saxon Protestant attitude was only an attribute to the control of 
power in America. But this form of positivism is shunned by even Karl 
Popper * when he claims "(physical determinism) is a nightmare, because 
16 
it asserts that the whole world is a huge automaton, and that we are 
nothing but little cog-wheels' within it," Yet the quantifying of 
qualities and the ranking of values is continued in this American 
tradition by Nagel in the logic of the scientific explanation, and 
appears as an acceptable mode of explanation in a myriad of geograph-
ical texts. *The nature or causality of the introduction of ideo-
logical and positivistic explanations, is interesting in itself, but 
the stressing of these notions by Huntington underpins much of the work 
of those who followed him, even when they claim to disassociate them-
selves from his 'avowed determinism. '* This include; Richard Hartshorne 
who states that if Huntington's thesis regarding climate should be sub-
stantiated, then history should be rewritten as a systematic study 
relating to climatic changes.* 
1.4.7. 
In his two outstanding researches * Richard Hartshorne avoids environ-
mental and p~ysical determinism in his efforts to familiarise American 
scholars with foreign literature. But he presses on with American 
ideology and positivism. As in liThe purpose of methodological writing 
is neither assertion of independent opinions nor contentious argumentat-
ion, but rather the clarification of problems of mutual concern. lI *His 
assumption of mutual concern infers some collectivity of ideas already 
existing amongst a collectivity of geographers. However it would appear 
that the ideologies and politics of America and Europe offereo no mutual 
basis for this assumption. In his major work (1961) * "The Nature of 
Geogr~phy" he consciously chooses. "The examination of the historical 
development of concepts concerning geography, and substantive work in it 
leads to the following conclusions"; When he claims that geography is 
concerned with the following facets, then it must be realised that these 
have been chosen to maintain the American explanation of their own cul-
ture to themselves. 
1) areal differentiation of the earth. 
2) methodological dualism. 
3) theoretical dualism. 
4) inclusion of geomorphology, or physiography into geography 
for land form study. 
5) the concept of unity (Ganzheit) has dropped out, 
6) It has been replaced by the concept of the 'whole' or 
specific region. 
7) the problems concerning the 'natural region' remain. 
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Clearly the German notion of Ganzheit, unity by language, irrespective 
of land boundaries was not to be in the American book. This list is 
evolved throughout "The Nature of Geography", but springs from a posi-
tivechoice upon Hartshorne's part, to study the region from the outset. 
There were similarities of political control in both Germany, through 
the National Socialis$and in America through the capitalist purchase 
of the political parties, but the geography of overt control did not 
suit Hartshorne who had to explain subvert control through overt demo-
cracy. 
1.4.8. 
America's national boundaries had been set and there was a need to 
explain the internal structure of the Union, therefore regionalism was 
an attractive mode. It was associated with the unification of the 
German states and the Anschluss, which took place when Hartshorne was 
a scholar in Germany. His scholarly works include a mass of profess-
ional support which is called upon to bring weight to the conclusion 
that, "if we are to avoid dissipating our efforts in ever changing 
directions, we must evaluate the framework for geography which has been 
developed hitherto. Failure to do this has enabled promoters of novel 
ideas ••• to persuade groups of geographers to pursue •.• new and attractive 
concepts ••• which later we find little use. This appears ••• unnecessary 
when we find .•• that the concepts hailed as new had been tried decades 
earlier and were wanting."* Now it may also be suggested that because 
of the seemingly valid nature of this claim, then one is trapped, trans-
cendentally into accepting the conclusion that Hartshorne arrived at. 
Research would then focus upon the historiaal nature of geography. The 
purpose of the discipline being, "the study that seeks to provide 
scientific description of the earth as the world of man."* In this case 
the earth is the American earth and the world of man, their society as a 
typology. But if the exploitation of the environment and the exploit-
ation of m~~ers of the society, are the bases of the ideology, and the 
object of the politicians, because these factors are externally deter-
mined, then people must resort to explanation through, exploitation of 
others, religion or psychology. If American geography cannot move out 
of the past, then it must look inwardly at itself, as must the members 
of its society. 
1.5.1. 
In Britain the Royal Geographical Society arrived as a learned body before 
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the formalization of geograp~y as a discipline in Universities or pro-
perly in the schools.* As the amateur appears to deserve equal pres-
tige with the professional in the view of the Society, this makes 
the nature of British Geography slightly different from other national 
geographies. * 
The cl~ssical British geographers* appear to have read and been influen-
-
ced by overseas writers. This is apparent in the connection between 
the work of Geddes and Le Play for instance, the links may be found in 
many other contributions. Geography had been an activity in the hap-
hazard collection of an Empire for centuries. Only the sub-s~ills of 
geography were of real merit to this end; as in navigation, cartography, 
and the trading assets distributed amongst the natives of various con-
tinents. The need to see geography as less than a list of annexations, 
capes, harbours, and the dispositions of unfriendly European neighbours, 
did not arise until the Empire was in a state of irreversible decay. 
From the foundations of a,~society of explorers, the R.G.S. began to 
branch into the area of education, two aspects which it has maintained 
until today. The contributors to this academic geography, two of 
whom are used as illustrations below, all seemed to hold one idea in 
common. Geography should present a synthesis of ideas. 
1.5.2. 
Andrew Herbertson was typical of the non-graduate geographer, he wrote 
the first book on human geography in Britain in 1902, when he was a 
lecturer at Oxford. He was influenced by both Le Play and Hettner in 
the formulation of his geographical ideas, the primary one being; "There 
are no men apart from their environment."* The central conception of 
Herbertson's work is claimed by Dickinson to have been 'the natural 
region I. Yet in this claim it was being inferred that Herbertson was 
arguing for Regional Geography, as a natural historical forerunner of 
the case that Dickinson stated in his "Regional Concept". The quota-
tions used, such as "The separation of the whole into man and his en-
vironment is a murderous act", are supportive of the case that Dickinson 
is making. But Herbertson from the outset of British geography required 
a disciplinary unity, through the unity of physical and human factors 
in geography. Britain could not justify the Raj through any theories 
of the world that would not allow an interchange of ideas, and trade 
between peoples and places. If the people of Britain happened to be 
superior, it could not be due to minor factors of language, race or 
. 
climatic determinants, but just to the chance of prior civilisation, 
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common law, and curiosity. Therefore it is also possible to realise 
that the case that Herbertson is actually making is a genuine synthetic 
contribution to the nature of geographical ideas. 
1.5.3. 
These synthetic ideas from Herbertson, are examples not of his use of 
a regional tool to explain how geography is merely a study of humanity. 
They are also examples of his notion of a wholeness of the discipline 
across the sciences: "For purposes of investigat~on, it is often neces-
sary to consider one element alone: but for full understanding of the •.• 
macro-organism, the nervous system; or the human society, a part cannot 
be separated from it." 
"Environment is not constant, but changes, even physically •.. social 
tradition is not constant ... heredity and environment are very convenient 
ideas for analysis. Abstract either element •.• and the whole cannot be 
understood." also "A migration of men may modify a district as well as 
the district may modify men." Further, "Information and even ideas 
can be transmitted almost instantaneously, but the movement of ideas is 
not dependent on cables and wireless apparatus alone. There must 'be a 
society fit to receive tham as well as a society capable of producing 
them. " These quotations are relevant to the. tasks of the Empire 
builders and maintainers. Herbertson's ideas of the nature of geo-
graphy therefore seem more deep and complex than mere regionalism; his 
ideas synthesize fit societies creating and disseminating ideas, which 
modify not only the societies themselves, but also their environs. 
Herbertson wished to emphasise that nowhere is there unchanging per-
manence and nowhere is there unrestricted change. Both society fu.d 
the environment appear to be in constant flux with some macro-organism, 
which appears to be the earth. This earth was the hydrological 
balance that his generation took for granted as the reality from which 
geography had to be explained. An adequate explanation of the rela-
tionships between, society, the environment and the earth could not be 
given by dividing geographic knowledge into a bundle of subjects. 
1.5.4. 
Halford J. Mackinder introduced the 'new geography' into the Univer-
sities (Oxford) in 1900 at the request of the R.G.S. His prior study 
had been in Natural Science, History and the Law. He did not attempt 
to define geography in any simple or single manner. When he asked 
"What is geography?", he answered by defining what it was not.* He 
left the audience to intuit definitions as if he had pre-read Myrdal's* 
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II in reali.ty there are not econo.roi.c, soci.ologi.cal or pa~·chologi.cal 
problems, but simply problems, and as a rule they are complex, The 
one and only type of concept that it is permissible to keep vague is 
the meaning of the terms such as economics, sociology or psychology, 
since no scientific inference can ever depend upon their definitions," 
Mackinder used this formula by defining those areas that appeared to 
be of interest to geographers, but in his view should be excluded from 
inclusion into geographical formulations, because they detracted from 
the form that geography should take. He considered that, "Geography 
must be a continuous argument, and the test of whether a given point 
is to be included or not must be this: Is it pertinent to the mai.n 
li.ne of argument? II * This argument did not explai.n the structure of 
geography, but only how the data should function. Dickinson interprets 
this to concern the argument for lIan environment as a natural region~r. * 
1.5.5. 
Mackinder was qumte clear i.n that he wanted none of this nomothetic -
ideographic division: "We have yet to see the man who taking up the cen-
tral, the geographical position, shall look equally on such parts of 
science and such parts of history as are pertinent to his inquiry. 
Knowledge is, after all, one, but the extreme specialism of the present 
day seems to hide the fact from a certain class of minds. The more 
we specialise the more room and the more necessity is there for students 
whose constant aim it-shall be to bring out the relations of the special 
subjects. One of the greatest of all gaps lies between the natural 
sciences and the study of humanity. It is the duty of the geographer 
to build one bridge over the abyss which in the opinion of many is upset-
ting the equilibrium of our culture. Lop off either limb of geography 
and you maim it in its noblest part."* It would -appear from this ext-
ract that to all but a certain class of minds, Mackinder was making 
a clear appeal that only geography had to exist as;both a physical and 
a social science. Varenian division gave a divided subject to members 
of a divided profession, whereas a synthesis of the existing parts of 
geography could offer a bridge to understanding between the sciences. 
The request was to examine what constituted geographic knowledge by 
defini.ng the parameters of the subject. 
1.5.6. 
Without detailed definition, geography is according to Mackinder cen-
tral to knowledge. Thus the geographer has a duty to terminate dualisms, 
and is required to be an interdiscipli.narian. This was an order that 
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few could understand, and even fewer have attempted to fulfil. There 
is little sense of this 'duty' in geography; in fact there is an 
invested interest in British geography that functions against it, which 
according to Michael Chisholm* exists and has been sanctified. Mackinder 
set limits to the boundaries of the discipline, firstly by excluding 
geology. He noted that; "Geomorphology as it is now developed has 
internal coherence and a consistent philosophy, many of our geographers .•. 
have blinded themselves to the fact that as geomorphologists, they are 
not at the centre but on the margin of geography." Then further, "the 
geologist looks at the present that he might interpret the past; the 
geographer looks at the past that he might interpret the present." 
:E'inally he presents the synthetic purpose of geography with, "Geography 
presents regions to be philosophically viewed in all their aspects 
interlocked. "* Mackinder's regions were not the Germanic regions of 
language, nor the French regions of how a countryside devolved from a 
French speaking culture, nor the American rectangular grids of commer-
cial returns, but the synthetic regions of great internal diversity 
that constituted the British Empire, based upon the commerce of Free 
Trade, policed by Armed Forces, and subject to Common Law. The purpose 
being the exchange of raw materials for home manufactures, at an indus-
trial profit. The very diversity of the factors involved, required a 
geography.that did not add extra complications through a division be-
tween physical and human factors. The stamp of the Raj required that 
there should be no micro-factors to detract from the wholeness of the 
enterprise. Mackinder offered to geography a centrality of place 
within the disciplines as a synthesis of the sciences, with some philo-
sophical purpose. The philosophy was the justification of Empire at 
first appearances, but in the event, his formulation was of a meaningful 
geography that transcended the era of Empire. British geography had a 
duty to be synthetic, or otherwise only a host of non-comparative micro-
studies could be offered to explain the lands and peoples at Britain's 
disposal. From such a set of studies few if ariy, generalisations could 
ever emerge. 
1.6.1. 
Part of the history of geography is an account of the discordant values 
that the discipline now contains, even when the terms used between 
nations appear to be the same. As different nations had different goals, 
so they required different geographies. Friedrich Ratzel had a profound 
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influence upon geography in Germany, .France, the Americas and subse-
quently in Britain. His work was transmitt~d t~oughvarious translat-
ors for various purposes. Raveneau* observed that, "Between physical 
geography, sometimes predominant and exclusive, and the science of ma~, 
which neglects so easily the framework in which man moves and the space 
in which he lives, Ratzel has taken his stand. He has strongly insisted 
on the necessity for a broad view of general conditions and the laws on 
which the distribution of man over the earth are based. His principle 
merit is that he reintegrated into geography the human element." 
Raveneau claimed that there was a vital difference in the modes of 
explanation between the science of man-; with general conditions; and 
physical geographyc; with laws. This claim may be seen as saying there 
is a qualitative difference between these two modes of science. The 
nature of this stand, and the qualitative differences were expanded and 
labelled by Windelband* when he introduced into the geographers' ter-
minology the notions of nomothetic and ideographic. Dualisms have a 
functional meaning when they expound and explain, but dualisms that are 
divisive and discordant contribute only to circularity of argumE~nt and 
not advances in understanding, as in Raveneau's claim that Ratzel's 
assertions for a synthetic geography, were only false claims to enhance 
the dualism between the two working geographical sciences. 
1~6.2. 
Each nation took from Varenius, and other theoreticians, what each 
nation required to ~it its own national view of the world. Therefore 
a duality developed within geography after Varenius accepted the 
Copernican paradigm, because of the wish by geographers to search for 
law-like relationships in the forms of explanations, for that material 
that seemed to fit to this form. For material that did not suit law-
like explanations, geographers resorted to descriptions. National 
geographies contributed their own cultural values, and many geographers 
accepted these cross-cultural terms through translation or mistranslation, 
without being aware that political values were a paramount contribution 
from other nations. The German search for linguistic unity could only 
be achieved by force, the assembly of force required detailed preparation, 
and methodological detail. The French contribution to the world was the 
bourgeois revolution, the politics of which required receptive regions 
with an allegiance to central authority. The American rush for exploit-
ation of physical and human resources required a complete division be-
tween the pfty-sical world and those who were allowed to inhabit it. 
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Their regions were those set in units of capital returns. The British 
contribution came late but had an international flavour of liberal trade 
between many countries, but the ideas of synthesis foundered upon the 
liberal notions that preceeded them. 
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CHAPTER TWO: MODERN GEOGRAPHY - A PLURALITY OF ORTHODOXIES. 
Give us this day our daily bread. 
Matthew 6 v.ll. 
2.1.1. 
The present paradigm that geography presents is an eclectic amal-
gamation of the forms of presentation that have been arrived at from 
the classical forms and contributions mentioned in the previous sec-
tions. Three models emerge which are to be used to show the legacy 
of Varenian tensions that have been inherited from the acceptance of 
the Copernican paradigm. Three examples are considered here; the 
first being "The Peninsular" which is given as a standard work of 
acceptable geography in 1940. As scientific geography, it poses the 
question "Is this the neutral truth?" "The Peninsular" illustrates 
the British tradition of eclectic gathering, and also highlights the 
dangers. Written as a physical and human treatise on Spain the book 
had to take upon itself clear political purposes, those concerned with 
the military invasion of Spain and Portugal. The second example, 
"The Personality of Ulster" is not presented as regional description as 
is "The Peninsular", but as a man / environment / man essay in which 
determinism is the central underlying value. 
that which would establish sciences as laws. 
This determinism is 
The third example is 
"Innovation diffusion ..• " being included as a typical essay in quan-
tification, where description has been replaced by determinism of a 
scientific form, and the scientific conclusions have been reduced to 
numbers. These seem to represent the three modes of geographical 
theoretical form that are presently utilized as * approaches to under-
standing within the discipline. The approaches are set in degrees of 
certainty of explanatory power, that is description, persuasion, and 
proof positive. 
2.1.2. 
"Spain and Portugal: the Peninsular," was published by the Naval Intell-
igence Division, coded B.R. 502 (Restricted) 1940. The authors were 
K.Mason, E.W.Gilbert, and R.P.Beckinsale*. "The purpose of the book 
is primarily naval*, but countries must be treated as wholes not ex-
clusively as coastal zones," is given as the intention of the authors 
who used mainly translated texts. Thus "The most complete account of 
Portugal being 'Die Portuguesischen Landschaften', by H.Lautensach, 
1937".· M.Sorre's 'Espagne-Portugal', Tome VII of Geographie Universelle, 
1934; O.Maull's 'Landerkunde von Sudenropa,' 1929; Baedeker's 'Spain-
Portugal' 1913, are given as contemporary examples of reference texts, 
but "older English books on the Peninsular should not be neglected as they 
provide information about the life and spirit of the people that is still 
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accurate,lI giving R.Ford, 1846 and G,Borrow 1843, as examples. At 
such a short time after the Spanish Civil War, this was the basis of 
a military document upon which lives might well depend. 
2.1.3. 
"The Peninsular" is divided into an introduction and seven chapters and 
appendices. The introduction typifies geographic usage of 1939 with 
an outline of the area and population; relief; coasts; climate; 
rivers; regionalism (viz.ethnic & linguistic}; history; maps, and 
the regional divisions thus:- the mountains of the N. & N.E.: the 
central meseta: the barrier ranges of the S. & E.; the Ebro troughj 
the plain of Andalusiaj Catalonia, and The Balearic Islands. 
The second chapter gives a physical and geological description, then 
a general description, excluding topography, but including erosion. 
A map on page 10 divides the peninsular into regions based upon von 
Hurobolt's method of placing boundaries along major watersheds. 
2.1.4. 
Chapter three offers regional descriptions mainly of the terrain and 
communications, these being mainly railway lines. A Bartholomew 
1:1,600,000 motoring map is included, but the authors warn that the 
Spaniards accounts of their bridges and roads should not be believed. 
The coasts of the Iberian Peninsular are included in this chapter, 
illustrated with block diagrams of estuaries and accessible coastline, 
with the adjunct that "Spain is continental in character, rather .. than 
oceanic, whereas Portugal is the reverse." 
The climate of the Peninsular is dealt with in detail in chapter four, 
but prefaced with "few reliable statistics are available for Spain." 
2.1.5. 
Chapter five characterizes the vegetation and then regionalizes the 
nature of land utilisation. Chapter six considers diseases and hy-
giene, with "the imperfection of the records is shown .•• " then on page 
162 the nature of the treatise is first mentioned in terms of war with:-
"specific details are difficult to obtain, but most notifiable diseases 
are present, even if the hook-worm is not likely to be of military 
significance."* Chapter seven deals with the history of the Peninsular 
to 1815. Spain is characterized as anti-British; Portugal as pro-
British, but in the event of war, Spain could be split into its historic 
regions. Four per cent of the text is devoted to the battles of the 
Napoleonic Wars, and the chapter srnmned up with, "The characteristic 
features of Spanish history continued to be poverty, civil war and 
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regional separati~t \I 
2.1.6. 
The final chapter discusses the races of the Peninsular and suggests 
that the languages would form a basis for the division of the people 
into these natural and cultural groupsj Portuguese, Basque, Castillian, 
Catalan, Gallego, Balear, Le6nese and Andalusion. The unity of reli-
gion would offer links between these provinces. The volume concludes 
with aspects of cultural activities; meteorological tables, wind, sea 
and swell tables and phonetic lists, followed b~ the bibliography. 
This contribution by eminent geographers is a standard work of the time 
and would still form the basis of a regional study for sixth form work 
in schools. But their knowledge of geography is limited in both in-
formation and statistics. Their knowledge of war is derived from 
historical accounts from Wellington's encounters. Their political 
assumptions of divide and rule were derived from their German references, 
a process that failed the Germans so badly in their conquests of Europe. 
Whilst their cultural assumptions of Basque and Catalonian provinces" 
might well have caused some anxiety in France, whose territory was thus 
equally open to cross-frontier divisions. 
2.,1. 7. 
The Varenian divisions are clearly apparent. General geography offers 
a pattern through scientific truths giving a method by which one may 
divide up the physical nature of the peninsular. This is done in the 
first five chapters, ranging through the geology of the area and the 
impact of nature upon this structure is then regionalised and described 
in the special mode that Varenius has suggested. The assumption that 
the text should be relevant to invasion, is not questioned by the authors, 
and the political implications of spilling over frontie~s, are not con-
sidered, but the British had for too long been in the habit of drawing 
frontiers suitable to themselves. References were dravm from German 
notions of 'Landschaft" equally with French notions of Vidalienne region-
alism. The mixture was successful in diverting the authors from the 
primary task in hand, which was to offer material of military use. 
The division of the peninsular according to von Humboldt,had little 
bearing upon the use of terrain that had beset the participants in the 
recent Spanish Civil War, the nature and extent of their conflicts were 
missing from the text. 
2.1.8. 
Just as the British notion of Empire underlies the geographers t 
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attitudes towards the invasion of the ~eninSlllar, so it intrudes into 
the second example, This is the address given ny Professor E..E.Evans 
in 1970 entitled "Too Personality of 1Jlsterlt*. Whereas in "The Penin~ 
sular ll eclecticism brought in a difficult mix of contrary values as a 
central theme, the Ulster paper is an example of determinism. The case 
put forward argues that the occupation of the landscape is determined 
by regional groups which relate to different cultural values. It is 
by nature a transcendental argument, in that if one accepts the premiss, 
one should agree with the conclusions. The paper represents an inter-
esting form of geography, because in a subtle way the cases cited appear 
to lead to this singular logical conclusion; lIin view of the recent 
civil disturbances," the historico - geographical solution is to repar-
tition Ulster along the lines of the river Bann, using the river as a 
demarcation between the two lIreligious li factions of the society. 
Prof. Evans traces the history of the term 'Personality' to Michelet, 
via Cyril Fox* and Vidal de'la Blache.* He points out that the term 
-
refers to the lIindividuality of a region resulting from the interaction 
of men upon environment through time.lI He·continues, lIWe seek to under-
stand, then, to what extent the traditions and modes of living of 
Ulsterment have been fashioned in and by .the land. There is no deny-
ing the strength of that personality, but the internal divisions ••• show 
that we have to deal with a split personality. In anthropological 
terms, there are two endogamous communities, nursing different historical 
myths." 
2.1.9. 
In note five *Prof. Evans concludes the values that have been drawn 
from the determinants of the environment, with these reasons:- liThe 
lower Bann valley too, is obstructed by a northwards extension of the 
main drumlin belt of south Ulster. If one had to choose the land form 
most characteristic of Protestant Ulster, it would be the drumlin 
country of east and south Ulste~ and parts of Donegal, giving a 'closed' 
landscape of isolated hillocks and restricted horizons."* 
2 .1.10. 
The abstract of this paper is mainly thus:* - "Northern Ireland •.• invol-
ved the partition of the historic province of Ulster. The Protestant 
Unionists •.. in six of the nine counties were faced with a hostile one-
third Catholic minority. These political events have obscured the 
common heritage of the province. The personality of Ulster derives in 
part from its proximity to Scotland, with which it shares a Caledonian 
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structure and extensiyeigneous activit¥,'. Successive incoming peoples 
and cultures tound a natural trontier along the edge ot the mountains 
in a broad belt ot drumlins running westward tram Dundalk. Internally 
the province is a complex ot hill masses, and its only lowland is 
interrupted by Lough Neagh and the River Bann. Diverse groups of 
people have been able to survive in diverse habitats, e.g. east and 
west of the River Bann. From Neolithic people and times there had 
been both cultural distinctiveness and diversity, and cultural contact 
has brought initiative, but also tensions, released in strife or re-
lieved by emigration. Attitudes have always been hard and uncompro-
mising. Ulster's resistance to the rest of Ireland in early Celtic 
times was the most productive fact in Gaelic literature •.• despite mas-
sive investment in new industries •.• their location has perpetuated 
the contrast between the more prosperous east and the more Catholic 
country "west of the Bann", where recent civil disturbances originated." 
2 .1.11 
The political nature of geography is made absolutely clear in liThe 
Personality of Ulster". It is derived from the French tradition of 
geographical enquiry, as the references make plain. It is a micro 
study utilising the ideas - political ideas - that the French gave to 
geography from their philosophical tradition. In this place where the 
British have their only experience of a land frontier, there has to be 
a justification for drawing a physical line upon the map. But the 
line was never agreed upon, nor were political adjustments of the French 
order make within that boundary .. The French tradition is to wipe out 
everything non-French within their frontiers, be those things languages 
like Flemish, Catalan, Savoyard, or Norman, and then to justify the 
diverse cultures as ideothemes of French regionalism. The British 
tried to synthesize the cultures that existed in Ulster. The attempt 
has failed., The solution given by Professor Evans - partition - was 
derived from the physical division of the landscape of Ulster. If 
cultures are so absolutely determined by environmental factors in this 
manner then this is a total reduction of geography in both phYSical and 
human factors to a nomothetic form. The causes of the political 
situation in Ulster are therefore a synthesis of all the chosen data that 
the geographer can muster for his case, even if one doubts the trans-
lation of the meaning* of the French ideas as a justification for the 
conclusion that this paper sets out to show. An Irish Republican 
might seek other reasons and causes for the perpetuation of the contrast 
29 
between the more ~ros~erous east of Ulster, and the ~overt¥ of the 
more Catholic country, "west of the Bann.tt 
2.1.12. 
The tensions of the Varenian separation arise differently in the 
"Ulster" paper. The generalisations of the physical nature of the 
region, becomes causal in the subsequent human conditions. This is 
an example of physical determinism given to examine a political situa-
tion. In the previous chapter it was attempted to show that present 
day contributions to geography stem from nation alist geographies of 
the immediate past. Explanation in each case was derived from each 
nations need to show how their world appeared to them, and to how they 
could explain their world to those being socialised into their own cul-
tures. The two papers above show how British geographers come to terms 
with problems of descriptions, continue the pattern of inculcation of 
culture, and still arrive at political conclusions. Geographers have 
long been beset by the difficulties of a discipline having descriptive 
characteristics. These become obvious in the work of Richard Hartshorne, 
in his footnotes throughout "The Nature of Geography" as he struggled 
to put meaningful translations across from German into English. The 
same is true of Robert Dickinson in his 'Who's Who?' of geography. 
Even in his "Regional Concept" - the contribution to geography by the 
Anglo-Americans, his index is splattered with German and French words. 
Scientific attributes are difficult to apply to reg~ons from a multi-
lingual base; the words apparently translate, but do the cultural con-
cepts transpose? 
2.2.1. 
Consider the simple and universal notion of ugive us this day our daily 
bread", in relation to the cultural understanding of the nations pre-
viously referred to. Does the white hard grain cuboid loaf of southern 
England bear any relationship to the tacky over-sugared article of the 
Americas? How do these articles compare to the Volkornbrot of West-
phalia? And what do these three forms resemble when set against that 
short life product du pain of the French Boulangerie? In our simplest 
and most staple items we seem worlds apart: is it then not highly pre-
sumptive to assume that any word translation of notions as complex as 
national notions of geography, could accurately convey the transposition 
of cultural meanings? 
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2.2.2. 
The orthodoxy of present geography in BrLta!n appears to ne represented 
by two modes, the traditional, as in 'The Peninsular' and 'Ulster' and 
the quantificatory, as in 'Innovation diffusion; which is discussed 
below. Both are parts of the same paradigm that stems from Varenius. 
Both derive the logic of their existence from foreign contrinutions. 
The 'need' for academic geography arrived in Britain long after its 
arrival in France, Germany and the Americas, even long after* the estab-
lishment of a Royal Geographical Society. 
From the outset academic geography, as Mackinder suggested, should oc-
cupy a central place within the academic disciplines, should define its 
parametres, and should synthesize all relevant, available knowledge. 
The object of this exercise being to bridge the natural and human 
sciences. The outcome has been that geographers have accepted that the 
dichotomy should be extended through funding of research from divisive 
resource centres. That the parameters of the discipline should be 
whittled away, by the establishment of sub-disciplines from geography 
as sciences within their own right, such as meteorology .. lNhilst at 
the same time geographers have gone beyond their bounds into the area 
of psychology. 
2.2.3. 
The establishing of the Earth Sciences from the mass of geographic know-
ledge was to follow the quest for science. It seemed obvious that in 
order to be scientific, the practitioner had to eliminate all values 
from the work undertaken. Especially in the post second world war years, 
this quest for a value-free science became almost a fetish, equating the 
greater the distance from the human subject to the greater the purity 
of the scientific enterprise. However t:his in itself was a value judge-
ment. But for geographers involved in human geography, the knowledge 
of psychology became very tempting. If one had to deal with the incon-
sistencies of the human condition, then the science of psychology offer-
ed a guide by which one might be able to judge that one's own judgements 
were not deviating from the nature of truth. The opposite ends of the 
scientific scale appeared to give factors of control to geographers eit-
her in avoiding values or through analysing their own. But these judge-
ments and decisions were value laden and there was an undercover infil-
tration of values into the very decisions to avoid a 'value biased dis-
cipline. The acceptance that the theories used in geography were value 
free, or value controlled allowed other values to be brought into the 
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discipline including those of beliefs, the correct nature of societies 
and political choi.ces. 
2.2.4. 
Dickinson and Hartshorne may be read as two chroniclers *who have ser-
iously attempted to bring into English their iuterpretations of the 
semantic character of geographic notions from other cultures. Robert 
Dickinson has written biographies of the main contributors to geography 
over the past two centuries. He has steadfastly remained an exponent 
of the necessity of regionalism in geographic explanation, and has thus 
continued in the Varenian tradition, by rooting the nature of knowledge 
in geography to the acceptance of the Copernican paradigm. For him, 
geography has not been given any new paradigmatic base since the divi-
sion into general and special geography. Richard Hartshorne spent a 
studentship in Germany, translating the German contribution to geography 
for the benefit of American geographers. His influence was profound. 
In America, geography became a humanistic discipline and physical geo-
graphy fell by the wayside. Human geography also became systematic, 
compartmental and specialized, because Hartshorne overlooked both the 
French and British contributions to the discipline. Consequently 
American geography lacks the sweep of composite regional study, it lacks 
the notions proposed by Vidal de la Blache, and mainly ignores the con-
tribution of the man-made landscape. But both of these authors explain, 
demonstrate and justify their concepts of the region. For instance, 
Dickinson states,* 
liThe true geographer is a regionalist, a categorical statement, that 
will undoubtably raise a storm of opposition, but this is the main 
lesson derived from a historical evaluation. He searches for 
interpretations of regional entities at any scale. He may 
select •..•.•• at the outset an arbitrary area for his own convenience -
of access or assignment. Within this he searches for regional 
associations as a 'terminus ad quem; not an origo a qua'. He 
may examine separate associations, say geomorphology or land use, 
or urbanism. But his final and guiding question is regional 
localization. This involves the spatial cohesion of similar forms 
or functional interconnections, resolved into cores of association, 
limits and fluctuations. These find their medium in the network of 
nodal centres and routes and in uniform surface areas of land cover 
This circumspection applies to all of the physical, biotic and human 
aspects. 
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These conclusions are derLved from the ideas, procedures and 
achievements of the makers of modern geography in both western 
Europe and America." 
2.2.5. 
In the same vein Hartshorne* thought that "The greatest differences in 
character within geography are found between the two major ways of organ-
ising geographic knowledge - systematic geography and regional geo-
graphy - each of which includes its appropriate part of all the special 
fields. In addition to the difference in form of organisation in the 
two parts, there is a radical difference in the extent to which know-
ledge may be expressed in universals, whether generic concepts or prin-
ciples of relationships. 
Systematic geography is organised in terms of particular phenomena of 
general geographic significance, each of which is studied in terms of 
relations of its areal differentiation to that of the others. Its 
descriptive form is therefore similar to that of the systematic 
sciences .•.. No more than in the systematic sciences, however can sys-
tematic geography hope to express all its knowledge in terms of univer-
sals; much must be expressed and studied as unique." 
Here Hartshorne acknowledges the Varenian division, but in order to be 
scientific, begins to qualify his explanation. 
2.2.6. 
"While there are no logical limitations to the development of generic 
concepts and principles in systematic geography, the nature of the phen-
omena and the relations between them that are studied in geography 
present many difficulties preventing the establishment of precise 
principles •... Nevertheless the degree of completeness, accuracy and 
certainty, both of the principles established and of the facts known in 
regard to any particular situation, seldom permit definite predictions 
in geography .•••. Regional geography organises the knowledge of all in-
terrelated forms of areal differentiation in individual units of area, 
which it must organise into a system of division and subdivision of the 
total earth surface. Its form of description involves two steps .•. the 
findings of regional geography, through they include interpretations of 
details, are in large part descriptive. The discovery, analysis and 
synthesis of the unique in not to be dismissed as 'mere description': 
on the contrary, it represents an essential function of science .•. To 
know and understand fully the character of the unique is to know com-
pletely: no universals need be evolved, other than the general laW of 
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geograp~y that all its areas are uniqlle.,.The llltimate purpose of 
geograp~y, the study of the areal differentiation of the world, is most 
clearly expressed in regional geography; only by constantly main-
taining its relation to regional geography can systematic geography 
hold to the purpose of geography and not disappear into other sciences." 
2.2.7. 
The previous statement is concluded as a credo by Hartshorne following 
a prior 450 closely argued pages. Almost forty years later, after 
carefully researching the same basic areas of the discipline, 
Dickinson has arrived at the same tentative conclusion. But whereas 
Dickinson declines to project a future course for geography, Hartshorne 
had been bold enough to state, "If American geography is approac~ng 
that major degree of common understanding on the fundamental nature of 
its field that was attained in Germany two or three decades earlier, 
and likewise in French geography, we may hope that the immediate future 
in this country will show a period of correspondingly rich production 
along a wide common front."* 
This position taken by Hartshorne appears to echo superficially that of 
Varenius; the division of the discipline into ideographic and nomo-
thetic attributes, but as interdependent parts, together with a stress 
upon the importance of a working methodology drawn from the themes of 
regions. Dickinson would seem to follow Hartshornells view, indeed he 
dedicates his book to Hartshorne*, but with some reservations. He 
points out that Hartshorne had grossly underrated the study of the man-
made landscape; the work of J. Brunhes and O. Schluter; that he com-
pletely ignores the contribution of Vidal de la Blache, and thus the 
contribution to geographic thought by the French; ..•. " as a consequence, 
his (Hartshornels) emphasis lies on the geographic distribution of as-
sociated groups of phenomena, and he fails to confront his readers with 
the problems and procedures of composite regional study." Because of 
this "Hartshorne sowed the seeds of systematic, compartmental, spec-
ialization, which has been dominant in Britain and America over the past 
generation, and the true challenge of the regional concept has been mis-
understood and neglected." 
2.2.8. 
There is therefore a vital difference of opinion between Hartshorne's 
and Dickinson's views as to what constitutes the orthodox nature of 
geographic theory, and it would seem that this is the result of Hart-
shorne having not adequately studied the French contribution to geography 
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and thrOllg~ his having chosen a limLted form of landscape understanding, 
whic~ generated introverted studies dependent upon a limLted realisa-
tLon of the utility of regional methods. No one can fairly claim that 
Dickinson has not researched the work of the contributors to geographic 
thought. His regional interest was of course attacked by the quan-
tifiers, an attack that seemed justified in their terms, because of the 
introvert nature of the studies of regions, and because of the dif-
ficulties involved in generating statistics from an unique item. 
Further to this was the difficulty of values implicit in regional 
studies, Hartshorne had suggested that the methodology of regional 
studies was intended to allow geography to "proceed upon a wide and 
common front. II Anything as vague as this was certainly not subject-
able to statistical treatment, therefore could not be accepted as quan-
tifable geographic data. 
But Hartshorne's 'The Nature of Geography' was intended as an intro-
ductory summary of the "development as a modern discipline (which} 
crystallized in Europe, and primarily in Germany, during the period 
1750 to 190011 , for American geographers, through an lIexamination of the 
development of concepts concerning geography, and the substantive work 
in it .• " *Indeed his reference material constitutes about 70% of works 
in German, 4% in British English, and only 2% in French, which seems to 
indLcate that his main intention was to take Germanic constructions to 
the Americas; if numbers have any meaning. 
2.2.9. 
The differences of opinion between Hartshorne and Dickinson emphasis a 
continual impact of national schools of geography. Hartshorne's claim 
that IIRegionalism comes from German geography,1I is denied by Dickinsonls 
belief that regionalism comes from everTNhere. Knowledge had to be 
taken to the Americas and adapted to the expansion of statehoods in 
order to justify the rape of their natural resourees. The Germanic 
tradition gave scholarly credance to these internal activities. 
Dickinson remained steadfast to the tradition of attempting to synthe-
size all geographic knowledge, even when he worked in America. This 
reflected the tradition of pis British background, where he expected 
a geography to explain the eclectic amalgamation of a haphazard Empire. 
Hartshorne's search was for respectability within his discipline. The 
ideomatic nature of his material was not contradictory to the manner in 
which America experienced growth and expansion, because each new inter-
face with natural reality was both unique and yet fundamental to those 
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who explored and settled, thus creating the base for American human 
geography. Dickinson's regionalism seemed to be in a rouchmore 
precarious position, because eclecticism needed re-examining, because 
reflection upon a passing Empire did not offer a form of explanation 
that lead to law-like theories. Each disputant therefore put for-
ward theoretical constructs concerning regionalism, that they consider-
ed justified their national geographies. 
2.2.10. 
The attendant difficulties of bringing a German geography into English, 
which Hartshorne attempted, and those that Dickinson would bring with 
the French works are more than the sum of the mere translations of 
terms. German is regarded as a language of logic, French as one of 
rhetoric and English as the language of empiricism. English has an 
archaic and simplificated transatlantic form that was used to integ~ate 
various European mother tongues, in order to simplify immigrant com-
munications. In order to arrive at a term that is mutuaUy agreeable 
between two of these languages that involves even a simple, singular 
image from the world, there must firstly be an agreement of an inter-
pretation of an agreed perceptual experience. There must then be a 
mutuality of thought, followed by an agreement in language. * The 
logical process is from percept to concept, and from concept to term. 
A 'rational' examination of some of the problems involved in this mutual-
ity has been put forward by David Harvey *in 'Explanation in Geography'. 
Harvey is one of the post second world war phenomena in geography. His 
contribution to the discipline is a starting point for the writing of 
this paper. It has been said of him that he made two significant con-
tributions to geography. Firstly that "only can the process of advance 
in geographical understanding be logical and reasonable by the combina-
tion of scientific methodology and the traditional objectives in geog-
raphy." And secondly "theory can not stem from the artificial separ-
ation of philosophy from methodology."* 
2.3.1. 
Whatever one~ definition of geography maybe, there seems to be little 
doubt that geographers have always sought ways of explaining reality 
within the limits that theixso9ieties imposed upon them. Harvey 
points out * "The transformation from percepts to works requires, there-
fore, that we understand in some way the relationship between them, since 
only through such understanding are we able to disCllSS the relationship 
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between man himself and the realLty he is seeking to know," However 
well the relatLonship between percept, concept and term may appear to 
be understood and ratLonalised, the transitions are made to include 
our objective and subjective values, which are coloured by both class-
consciousness and national feelings. Most geographers, from the time 
of Varenius' division have appeared intuitively to avoid the diffi-
culties presented by attempting to make generalised law like statements 
concerning their perceptions of the world, in order to establish claims 
to objectivity, but have concentrated upon describing what they claim 
to have seen. 
2.3.2. 
Although geographers have at their disposal adequate terms with which 
to describe their worlds, and have adequate concepts with which to or-
ganise their terms, 'f~w, if any have the perceptual range and depth of 
sense, with which to come to terms with the whole of reality. Stan-
dard practise has been to research an area that was adjacent to their 
lives, or within reach of their special interests, or if they were for-
tunate with their funding, remote but attainable, and then to publish 
their findings, which would then become available knowledge. Geograph-
ers select their chosen topics in the-way that they do because of the 
values that they hold. They then try to shed their obvious values in 
the name of science; but their values, as in the cases of Dickinson 
and Hartshorne stay with them. This is the case in modern geographical 
texts. A search for values soon makes them obvious, as was shown in 
liThe Peninsular" and "Ulster" papers. 
2.3.3. 
There are difficulties concerning our views of the 'relevant other' in 
all human transactions, that may be seen as rational by those involved 
in a transaction, but are distinctly non-rational to an observer. There 
is a massive literature concerned with perception; the majority of the 
inventions of civilisations have been concerned with extending the range 
of the senses of the human individual. The early navigators were seek-
ing spices to improve their food, with lenses to extend their vision, 
and cannon to extend their defence. The arts try to extend the chal-
lenge of understanding to the senses. Yet in our percepts ,'Ie are soc-
ialised and prejudiced by values. I do not consider that black is 
beautiful,' I do not take to singers with two chord guitars,' I prefer 
the touch of cotton to nylon as a fabric,' and the taste of celery is 
revolting, whilst the noisesome hamburger should never have passed 
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throug~ immigration. These values are subjective, but they colour my 
perceptions ot reality, even when I realise that others have values ot 
a difterent character. Yet all tliese values arise from personal, not 
nationalistic attributes. 
2.3.4. 
My nationalistic values *also colour my prejudices, yet here there is 
a difficulty of patriality, I see myself as English, yet my passport 
labels me as a resident of the United Kingdom, others might term me 
as British; therefore there is a trilogy of percepts of varying object-
ivity concerning my status as a citizen, and they may all be correct. 
My views of others of other nationality are also coloured by my exper-
iences of how we seem to experience each others definitions of reality. 
These subjectivities are present in all our perceptions, whether we are 
prepared to acknowledge them or not. Also I have been socialized or 
educated into certain values, some of which are simple to discern such 
as liThe only good German is ..... The French infantrymen are the best in 
the world, if only .... and here come the Yanks, years late as usual!1I 
But the centrality of Greenwich, and the red on the old political maps, 
seem to be a little more insidious. But seemingly natural is the im-
portance of the English language as a vehicle of international com-
munication. The views of the nations that follows must therefore be 
judged upon these prejudices that exist. The time scale concerns 
present concepts that concern geography and may be assumed to stem from 
the -middle of the eighteenth century to the middle twentieth century. 
In the nations considered, excepting Germany (which existed in reality 
only from 1938 to 1944) there had been civil wars, an overthrow of mon-
archy, or some form of class domination, and a rise to control by the 
middle classes. 
When geographers wrote geographies that touched upon politics, values, 
prejudices and limits of language, then these geographies had to be 
acceptable to their political masters who were defining the parameters 
of the acceptable definitions of the reality of th~ir world, if the 
material was to be accepted. 
could choose.* 
2.3.5. 
Within these determinants, the geographers 
During the first half of the twentieth century geographers argued upon 
the definition of a region. Only later did they concern themselves 
with whether regional studies were a worth while occupation. According 
to Haggett *there were five themes in search of theories: areal 
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differentiation: landscape; man~enyironment; spatial distribution 
and geogmetric themes. to be fitted to the regional occupation. These 
themes are not mutually exclusive, and vary from strict attempts to be 
nomothetic to pure relapse into descriptive art forms. For as Burton 
points out* "The moment that a geographer begins to describe an area, 
he becomes selective, (for it is not possible to describe every thing 1 , 
and in the very act of selection demonstrates a conscious or uncon~ 
cious theory or hypothesis concerning what is significant." 
The thematic basis of each regional description lead to or derived from 
some theoretical notions, or as Haggett suggested, the themes were in 
search of theories. In science theories require statements from which 
theorems may be derived. In order to become empirical in status, these 
statements need be seen as observable classes of events or explained as 
theoretical concepts, from which the behaviour of events may be derived. 
Harvey *suggests that the concepts used by geographers may be termed 
either derivative or indigenous. 
2.3.6. 
Derivative concepts appear to be based upon concepts commonly in use in 
disciplines other than geography, such as economics, psychology, phy-
sics, chemistry and sociology. Examples of these are the use of von 
Thunen's work, phenomenological geographies, hydrology, ecology in 
agriculture and interpretations of social space.* 
Geographic concepts of an indigenous character seem to be of three types, 
those concerned with temporal processes, which, because geography is 
usually classed as a spatial discipline, then become derivities from 
some form of mathematics. Secondly those concepts concerning spatial 
relationships, especially in their geographic - geometrical form, as so 
brilliantly examined by Bunge*, and thirdly the classificatory concept. 
Of this third indigenous conceptual form Harvey writes* "Some concepts 
in geography play an ambiguous role. They sometimes play an explan-
atory role, but on other occasions they may be interpreted as proceed-
ural rules for conducting geographical research. For example, the 
region has sometimes been accorded the status of a theoretical entity •.. 
which could not be precisely observed but whose existence could be in-
ferred from its effe.€ts. The areal differentiation of the earth's 
surface could thus be explained with reference to this theoretical ob-
ject. Later writers ••. came to regard it as an essential mental con-
struct for the organisation of geographic data," (viz.Hartshornel. 
(Others} "have since indicated that the concept ••. is nothing more than 
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a special ~orm o~ class~ication. The double role which the concept 
o~ the region has played in the history q~ geography can be confusing •• 
the danger of tautological argument is evident." And a tautology is .J 
only a vain attempt to give a value judgement scienti~ic status. 
2.4.1. 
During the late 1948's and early 1~50's there was genuine dissatis-
faction in the social sciences with the ideographic character of much 
o~ the available theory. This spilled into geography, and a new gen-
eration of geographers, who had seen the rapid results of scientific 
activity during wartime, wished to bring these value free notions into 
geography. The question that they put was "Why is orthodox geography 
unsatisfactory?" If one considers 'The Peninsular' (2.1.2.) as an 
orthodox geographical text then it seemed unsatisfactory because of its 
British particularism, it had-not been researched at first hand, it was 
merely descriptive, it was obsessively value laden, the inferiority of 
the Spaniard, and jingoism towards the Portuguese was patently ideo-
logical and the generalizability of this form of travel guide could not 
be extended, except in form to other parts of the world. If all these 
arbitrary values could be eliminated and the sum total of factual in-
formation could be reduced to formulae and expressed in quantified terms, 
then there would be a whole new form of understanding to be derived from 
the world through geography. 
2.4.2. 
Two geographies appeared, the orthodoxy as illustrated by "The Penin-
sular" and a quantificatory "new" geography. These two labels 'ortho-
dox' and 'quantificatory' require unravelling from the outset. Ian 
Burton writing "The quantitative revolution and theoretical geography", 
claimed that the reveolution into quantification was over in 1963 and 
that geography had henceforth a new paradigmatic basis. *The attempt 
was to define science and a science of geography. It seemed obvious 
to the 'new' geographers that as the nomothetic element in geography had 
in the past produced results in physical geography of a scientific type, 
as Varenius had predicted; then all geography could be scientific. 
Their aim was to model the data to predict, as in physical science. 
The conceptions of their orthodox predecessors were too narrow to be 
termed scientific. Hartshorne's science, seemed to be a mixture of 
methods equated with meritorious academic description. Dickinson's 
claims for scientific geography excluded nomothetic regionalism. But 
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it seemed clear that in order to know what causes what to happen, one 
needs laws. Regions had causes, they had dimensions, and their quan-
tities could De enumerated, therefore the regions were open to quan-
tification. An idealized - typification of this application is given 
in the following section of this chapter. 
2.4.3. 
The quantitative revolution was derived from a laudatory but false as-
sumption, which has created problems of a similar nature in sociology. 
As Gorman points out, * "While our ability to explain natural phenomena 
has grown dramatically, social scientists find themselves without any 
universally valid generalisations to facilitate explanation, prediction 
and control ••• natural catastrophes are explained in terms of ... laws, 
and at least partially controlled .•. social catastrophes and crises seem 
immune to either scientific explanation or human manipulation." 
There are limits to what we can expect of social science in the fields 
of explanation, prediction and control; yet the quantifiers assumed 
that social facts were as amenable to scientific laws as were the facts 
of the natural sciences. 
The quantifiers assumed that in their new-paradigmatic stage, formulae 
would produce meaningful spatial relationships of the facts of the 
social sciences. Or as Chorley & Haggett claimed, "Geography, coming 
late to the paradigm race, has the compensating advantage that it can 
study at leisure the 'take 'off' paradigms of the other sciences."* 
2.4.4. 
A basic logic for the acceptance of quantification is offered by Harvey. 
*Firstly he posits Kuhn's interpretation of the notion of a paradigm 
as "universally recognised scientific achievements that for a time pro-
vide model problems and solutions to a community of practioners." Hence 
Whitehand's paper has been given as an example of this in a prior sec-
tion. From this one may infer that explanation is both process and an 
activity, from which the activity of an investigator {geographer) is to 
judge whether the explanations that he is given, or that he is giving, 
are reasonable and satisfying. 
'Norma~ science' is characterised by the activity of 'puzzle-solving' 
or seeking for solutions within a generally accepted set of rules and 
conventions. These rules are referents from the laws of the scien-
tific activity, but this whole activity may be interrupted by a 
'scientific revolution! ' In which case new laws must be generated 
through new rules and conventions, in order to address scientific ~c-
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activities towards solving new puzzles. Such a revolution is a 
response to a crisis generated ny more profilems arising than the rules 
of the prevailing paradigm can apparently offer solutions for. 
Secondly Harvey considers at length the nature of laws and their pos-
sible derivitives in geography. After sadly reflecting that, "The 
failure to achieve a hypothetico-deductive unification of geographic 
principles - or to postulate such a structure - has seriolls implica-
tions," he lists forms of explanation that could be viable for method-
ological and empirical work. These he details as cognitive descrip-
tion, morphometric analysis, cause and effect analysis, temporal modes 
of explanation, functional and ecological analysis, and systems analysis. 
These forms are virtually identical to the forms of scientific explana-
tion suggested by Nagel in "The Structure of Science" that are considered 
to be slightly inferior to the hypothetico-deductive model. 
2.4.5. 
From these model forms, Harvey suggests that six forms of question 
emerge. 
11. How may the phenomena being studied be ordered and grouped? 
21. How are the phenomena organised in terms of their spatial structure 
and form? 
3). How were the phenomena caused? 
4). How did the phenomena originate and develop? 
51. How do particular phenomena relate to and interact with phenomena 
in general? 
61. How are phenomena organised as coherent wholes? 
further, "From these questions objectives and logical form converge to 
determine the nature of geographic explanation." 
Thirdly Harvey *makes the following statements: "There is no reason in 
principle why laws should not serve to explain geographical phenomena, 
or. theories of considerable explanatory power be constructed. Explana-
tions which conform to the rules of the scientific explanation as gen-
erally conceived of can, in principle be offered. 
conclusion." 
2.4,6. 
This is our central 
Quantification stems directly from the foundations of Varenius· general 
geography, with theoretical and empirical imputs from von Thunen, von 
Richtofen, Weber,Le"Play, Chris taller and Losch. Many of these ideas 
underlie W. Bunge's "Theoretical Geography" *, but whereas the former 
contributors were firstly concerned with economics, and secondly with 
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location; Bunge attempted to show that the geometric structures of 
location mainly influence the economics of space; uAll human life takes 
place in space, where it expresses itself in terms of geometric figures, 
such as straight lines, triangles, squares, rectangles, hexagons, etc.* 
These abstract models must then be confronted with reality of an actual 
landscape. Deviations from the model are than caused * by natural 
elements occuring in real space, such as mountains, rivers etc., or by 
historic development or by man's lack of judgement."* Concerning the 
amalgamation of physical and human geography, quantification; or theore-
tical geography as Bunge terms it; overcomes the difficulty by "assuming 
that geography is the science of locations with a predictive (theoretical) 
arm, and a classificatory (regional) arm. (Based) upon the recognition 
that regional geography is simply classificatory science with the empha-
sis on the word science."* But does one create a science by merely lab-
elling something as such? 
2.4.7. 
The problematic idea in dispute by the quantifiers is Windelband's 
ideographic and nomothetic nature of a non-synthesis. If one reverses 
the form of Harvey's argument, then the following is apparent; If laws 
are established in geography, and there are no good reasons why this 
should not be so, then, they may be drawn from many forms of explanation, 
which having been given by a philosopher of science, must have an aura 
of science about them, these 'accepted' forms then offer a revolutionary 
paradigm for geographers within which the process of 'puzzle-solving' 
must take a scientific form; that form being derived from quantitative 
techniques. When the whole of geography falls under the nomothetic 
umbrella, then the revolutionary paradigm has been effective. The dis-
carded paradigm, would have been ideographic geography, as characterised 
by the Naval text upon the Peninsular. In general it was Harvey writing 
in "Explanation in Geography" who most clearly summarized these aims. 
2.4.8. 
A resume of the needs, progress and outcome of the quantitative revolu-
tion was given by Ian Burton in 1963.* The aim was clear; If geog-
raphy were to be a science, it must be derived from theory, and theory 
is derived from maths; "It follows that any branch of geography claim-
ing to be scientific has need for the development of theory, and any 
branch of geography that has need for theory, has need for quantitative 
techniques."* He continued, "Dissatisfaction with ideographic geography 
lies at the root of the quantitative revolution. The development of 
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theoretical, model-building geography is likely to be the major con-
sequence of the revolution. Theory provides the sieve through which 
myriads of facts are sorted, without it the facts remain a meaningless 
jumble. Theory provides the measure against which exceptional and 
unusual events can be recognized. In a world without theory there 
are no exceptions; every thing is unique. The quantification of 
theory, the use of mathemetics to express relationships, can be sup-
ported on two main grounds •.. it is more rigorous, •.• it is a consider-
able aid to the avoidance of self-deception. lI * 
2.4.9. 
It might appear that Burton merely reiterates the difficulties seen by 
Varenius in 1624, IIIn special geography, features should be explained 
in terms of general laws, so as to make local geography logical and 
intelligible." But Burton has two further and major problems to face; 
the first concerns the 'real world' and the second is to generate facts 
from values. Varenius changed the paradigm in order to explore the 
real world, and this exploration was his value. Burton's world had 
already been explored and his choice of quantifying was the self decep-
tion of a value judgement. This he expands,II •.• description is an es-
sential part of the scientific method. In examining the real world, 
our first task is to describe what we have seen, and to calssify our 
observations into meaningful groups •.. The moment that a geographer 
begins to describe an area, he becomes selective •.• an act (which) .•• 
demonstrates a conscious or unconscious theory or hypothesis concerning 
what is significant. lI * The selection of observations from the hypothesis 
then establish the nature of the theory, even though they seem to be 
derived from cultural, socialized values; because "to sp.\?cify the pre-
sence or absence of an attribute or quality is merely to begin the pro-
cess of measurement."* Finally Burton notes that "the contemporary 
trends in science are that they are probabilistic. One may hazard the 
assertion that every serious study is a study of the chance mechanism 
behind some phenomena. lI * 
2.4.10. 
In order to give the new order respectibility, Burton asserts *that, 
IIwhat is philosophically distinctive about contemporary science is its 
disinterest in dubious dichotomies or disabling dilemmas." And then 
proceeds to justify the assertion of "an intellectual revolution is 
over," by reference to the support of Hartshorne, whom he claims quali-
fied quantification as "conventional wisdom"* with this statement, 
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"to raise ••• thinking to the level of scientific knowing, it is nec-
essary to establish generic concepts that can be applied with the maxi-
mum degree of objectivity and accuracy and to determine correlations of 
phenomena with the maximum degree of certainty. Both purposes can 
best be accomplished if the phenomena can be fully and correctly des-
cribed by quantitative measurements and these can be subjected to stat-
istical comparisons through the logic of mathematics." 
2.4.11. 
Chapter Eight of Bunge's "Theoretical Geography" develops the notion of 
a "science of geography" and its "subject matter" to the point where 
"Patterns, geometrical, concrete spatial patterns are the dual of motions, 
literal movements over the surface of the earth"*. This evident dynamic 
relates directly back to; "Agriculture, irrigation, mineral exploitation, 
industry, and settlements constitute the static elements of geography, 
whereas trade and commerce make up its dynamic elements." Bunge bel-
ieved that the statics and dynamics of this new geography would edu-
cate "seventy per cent of American adults who cannot read maps, (who} 
remain geographic illiterates and grope their way through the spatial 
experience of life in major disorientation." Because this new geography, 
"emerging as the science of locations, seeks to predict locations where 
before there was contentment with simply describing and classifying 
them."* The justification for this new geography is claimed in "I am 
of the opinion that the originality and power of geography as a basic 
science will soon establish a first rank position for geography among 
the sciences."* Which seems to be a justification through tautology, 
thereby not moving one through persuasion from von Richittp£en~s.l "Thus 
there are two approaches according to whether the areas of the things 
and the phenomena are the primary object of study. The first is 
Special Geography, and is primarily descriptive. The second is 
General Geography. One is synthetic, the other is analytibal."* And 
this is exactly what Varenius had introduced with his new paradigm! 
2.5.1. 
The object of the revolution into 'new' geography was to establish that 
only General Geography would survive as the science of geography. An 
ideal - typical example of the contribution, written by J.W.R.Whitehand, 
entitled "Innovation diffusion in an academic discipline; the case of the 
'new geography."* was published by the Institute of British Geographers. 
The paper set out to prove the value judgement that the acceptance of 
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the 'new' geography was recorded by the increase in numbers of "new 
geography~type questions set in puBlic examinations. The spatiality 
of the project was represented by an axial line connecting Cambridge 
to Bristol; the two reputed centres of 'new' geographYi from which 
measurements of distances were taken.* This datum line is dubious, 
because distances were given for innovation spread from the line in 
miles, whereas in reality ease of travel between two points is the more 
telling factor. The data concerning the items taken from the examina-
tion papers were even more dubious however: Whiteh~nd writes, * "All 
questions; whether compulsory or optional and irrespective of the 
number on the paper and the duration of the examinations; were given 
equal weight •.•. A difficult classification problem was presented by 
reference to the forerunners of the t new ' geography ••• viz. von Thunen, 
Weber, Christaller, Losch ••• " But the statistical methods used were 
also highly problematic in conjunction with such dubious material, 
"Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation Coefficients have been used through-
out, "noted Whitehand.* 
2.5.2. 
The 'new' innovation in geography was shown, of course, by Whitehand 
to have diffused through the academic discipline. This diffusion was 
shown to be related to distances about the the base line, and these 
distances were shown to have been measured. The base line for this 
diffusion passed very close to Oxford, which has a University, which 
at the time contributed to the areal dispositions of 'new' geography 
teaching staff, but singularly failed to contribute to innovatory exam-
ination texts. The objective statistics formulated through Spearman·' s 
correlation were probably as doubtful in value as when these same co-
efficients were used as the proofs for dividing generations of school-
children by I.Q. The disaster that these statistical methods wrought 
when used for Grammar School selection is a sad chapter in educational 
history. Quantitative studies deserve better methods than those that 
have already been found wanting in the real world. Whitehand failed 
to analyse his data sUfficiently. His datum line connected three points, 
one of which he ignored because it did not fit the premissed value judge-
mente He excused sources of information, because they "do not provide 
satisfactory information", advances in new paradigms surely come from 
confronting the problems raised by unsatisfactory information. Yet in 
this paper, given by the I.B.G. as an exemplar of quantificatory tech-
nique, it is almost laughable to understand the terms that Whitehand 
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"conSidered diagnostic of the 'new' geography."* These include, 'data 
collection', 'deductive derivation', 'deductive reasoning', 'correlat-
ion', 'concept of spatial equilibrium', 'empirical regularities' and 
'geographic theory'; these terms are not exclusive to any singular 
discipline, and certainly not to only one methodological mode within 
an area of academic study. 
2.5.3. 
The quantifiers aim was stated by Harvey (1969) *with "Explanations 
which conform to rules of the scientific explanation as generally con-
ceived of can, in principle be offered. This is our central conclus-
ion. " But with this central conclusion there were also a number of 
peripheral assumptions, that had previously been considered by the 
social sciences. The scientific justification for Harvey's claims 
were taken from Nagel* in such a manner as to assume a philosophical 
mantle. Nagel uses certain statements as "Since social scientists 
generally differ in their value commitments, the 'value neutrality' 
that seems to be so pervasive in the natural sciences is therefore 
often held to be impossible in social inquiry." *"It has taken cen-
turies of effort to develop habits and techniques of investigation 
which help s~feguard inquiries in the natural sciences against the in-
trusion of irrelevant personal factors." * "A number of further differ-
ences between common sense and scientific knowledge are almost direct 
consequences of the systematic character of the latter." *and "It is 
the desire for explanations which are at once systematic and controll-
able by factual evidence that generates science; and it is the organ-
isation and classification of knowledge on the basis of explanatory 
principles that is the distinctive goal of the sciences .•• ln consequence 
when ... inquiry is successful, propositions that hitherto appeared to be 
quite unrelated are exhibited as linked to each other in determinate 
ways by virtue of their place in a system of explanations."* 
2.5.4. 
But the above are four statements that deny the value neutrality of the 
natural scientist, values are personal factors that even natural scien-
tists have. These difficulties of systematic science and factual evid-
ence- are explained by Nagel himself. But these assumptions held out 
great promise for the revolutionary geographers, in that they could es-
tablish a nomothetic base for the discipline. Nagel examined four 
forms of explanation, firstly the attainable model, followed by three 
sub-types, which gave the model explanation the highest status, thus 
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"A type of explanation c01lJ1llonly encountered i.n the natural sciences, 
has the formal structure of a deductive argument, in which the explic-
andllIU is a logically necessary consequence of the explanatory premises." 
*This is the form that Whitehand attempted to attain in "Innovation 
diffusion ... " Nagel's first sub-typical explanation he terms probabil-
istic, i.n that "though the premises are logically insufficient to sec-
ure the truth of the explicandum, they are said to make the latter 
'probable'." This would seem to be the case for Professor Evans paper 
on Ulster with reference to the line of the river Bann, and the probable 
inferences that follow. The second sub-typical form of explanation is 
teleological or functional: "explanations take the form of indicating 
one or more functions (or dysfunctionsl that a unit performs in main-
taining a ••• system, or stating the instrumental role an action per-
forms i.n bri.nging about some goal. 1f This seems to have been the ob-
ject of the geography of "The Peninsular" which set out the goal of i.n-
forming the Forces concerning an area of the world, about which they 
would not necessarily be familiar. The lowest form of explanation, 
according to Nagel ("and it is a moot question whether it constitutes 
a distinctive type" 1 , he terms genetic where certain "inquiries under-
take to explain why it is that a given subject of study has certain 
characteristics by describing how the subject has evolved out of some 
earlier one." *This obviously refers to all regional description. 
2.5.5. 
The four forms of explanation form a hierarchy, the latter three sub-
types bei.ng progressively inferior to the model form. The method-
ological inferences were quickly apparent to the geographical revolu-
tionaries, the 'new' geography'could attain a scientific aura by for-
mulating structures that were explicable through hypothetico-deductive 
forms of explanation, whereas the orthodoxy would have to continue to 
rely upon inferior forms of reasoning. Forms of explanation offered 
status to quantifiers: Burton claimed that the quantitative revolution 
Ifwas inspired by a genuine need to make geography more scientific, and 
by a concern to develop a .. body of theory. Dissatisfaction with ideo-
graphic geography lies at the root of the quantitative revolution. The 
development of theoretical, model-building geography is likely to be the 
major consequence of the quantitative revolution.\!* 
2.5.6. 
He claimed that there were five categories of opposition to quantifica-
tion. There were those who considered that geography would be mislead 
48 
into fruitless directions; they have now been silenced l196l1. There 
were those like Stamp, who saw the research tool of geography as the 
map, and not statistics nor economics nor sociology. There were those 
who claimed that statistics were suitable for some kinds of geography, 
but not others, Burton claims that qualitative data are open to stat-
istical utility. There were objections that ends were being confused 
with means in the application of statistics, and thus the significant 
and the trivial were confused. Finally quantifiers were open to at-
tacks, ad hominem. However Burton realized that "in examining the 
real world, our first task is to describe what we see, and to classify 
our observations into meaningful groups." * Which is what geographers 
have claimed to have done since time immemorable. But "the art of sel-
ection demonstrates a theory or hypothesis concerning what is signifi-
cant. " Concerning the .. nature of significance Burton refers to Hart-
shorne's notion expressing "the variable character from place to place 
of the earth as the world of man" extended with "man is the measure of 
significance,' and spatial variation is the focus. \I This is, of course, 
purely an American power, territory and possession conceptualisation, 
where the world is a mere resource. The statement of significance is 
a totally value laden claim to the resources of the earth as utility. 
2.5.7. 
Burton then claims that lithe first steps in the development of theory 
are through the observation and description of regularities, as the 
spatial arrangement of cultural features, human activities, and physical 
variables. These facts are sorted through theory, if they are not to 
remain a meaningless jumble. Without such theory, everything in the 
world is unique."* Many French geographers could rightly claim that 
this was the process followed by Vidal de la Blache using a theory of 
words and not statistics. However Burton would counter claim that 
"The core of scientific method is the organisation of facts into theories 
••• with a view to validation through prediction." The best tool for 
this is mathematics. Because mathematics is more rigorous, and more 
important, it is a considerable aid to self-deception. David Harvey 
writing in "Explanation in Geography"* carefully argued the case in the 
accepted formulations of the time in order to establish Burton's claims 
to the logic of a revolution in geography. However upon completion of 
this book, Harvey wrote a revealing preface. He claimed that it was 
but a step forward in his knowledge; "In constructing this interim re-
port, I have had a good deal of help: what started for me as a quest 
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to understand the nature of certain powerful tools of science, thus 
ended as a quest for an understanding of the totality of the process 
which leads to the acquisition and codification of geographical under-
standing. II *He added, III interpret this (t scientific method I) in a 
very broad sense to mean the setting up and observing of decent intell-
ectual standards for rational argument. Now it is obvious that we can 
observe these standards without indulging in quantification. Good geo-
graphers have always observed them. I believe that the most important 
effect of quantification has been to force us to think logically and 
consistently where we had not done so before. lI * 
2.5.8. 
At this point geography presented an apparent choice of paradigms. 
Simply one might follow the traditional orthodoxy or opt for the revol-
utionary methods of quantification. The choice was not simple. As 
Burton realised, IIAlthough the quantitative revolution is over, it is 
instructive to examine its course because to do so tells us something 
about the sociology of ~ profession, and because it provides a back-
ground for the c::Iuestion, "quantification for what?1I *Indeed, even the 
innovators of quantificatory techniques did not agree as to whether the 
revolution applied nomological strictures to a world of unique items, or 
whether it merely made thought more logical and consistent. It did 
impose upon a generation of students a strictly mathematical geography. 
It did, and still does impose stresses upon teaching the subject in 
schools, and it created two fresh avenues of thought. Firstly that of 
Dickinson * who devoted much effort withstanding the destruction of reg-
ional geography, and the work of Alan Pred, in which he tried to simplify 
the overwhelming impact of too much mathematics, by offering geometry 
and algebra as extensions~ of crude numerical formulae. The revolution 
failed to establish an acceptable paradigm. The present paradigm in 
geography is a discipline of tensions. The quantifiers took the ten-
sions from the Varenian divisions that derived from nationalism and par-
ticularism, and expected to establish laws possibly acceptable to phy-
sical geography, then to sweep human geography into the same formulae. 
The Varenian division of the discipline is extant. In Britain resource 
funding by different government departments continues to emphasise the 
division between physical and human geography. 
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CHAPTER THREE: GEOGRAPHY AND SOCIAL THEORY 
For now we see through a glass, darkly: 
First Corinthians 13 v.12. 
3.1.1. 
The modern approaches outlined in Chapter 2 all deal with problems from 
geographers points of view. There appear to be three levels of treat-
ment offered. Problems may be treated empirically, or they may be 
treated analytically, or one may talk about geography as a self percep-
tion. Consider the following from Coates, Johnston & Knox*, consider-
ing the spatial dimensions of social inequalitYi IINevertheless, the 
phenomena involved are complex, operating together as mutually reinfor-
cing variables whose origins and effects may be seen at once in social, 
economic, political and spatial terms." These phenomena have been 
better considered in the social sciences than in geography, but best 
considered in sociology. Geographers have not taken into their work 
a long tradition and debate from sociology, that is just missed out, or 
just wrong. Sociology has shown that there are not just social, econ-
omic and political termsi but that there are ranges of terms with im-
plicit assumptions that stem from very different theories of the world. 
Further, complex phenomena do not necessarily reinforce each other, nor 
do they need have a poolable causality, nor mutual effects. The im-
plicit assumptions may be either ontological or epistemological, and 
lack of distinction between them frequently shows in geographical texts. 
3.1.2. 
The ontological assumptions in the "Peninsular" paper concerned the 
existence of Iberian life as an unchanging phenomenon through centuries, 
even though the existence of this status quo was gleaned from many di-
verse sources. A similar assumption was used concerning "Ulster". The 
theory of what in reality exists in "Innovation diffusion •.• " was dubious 
from the outset. Epistemologically all these papers were weak. "The 
Peninsular" did nothing to examine the procedures and conditions that 
made knowledge possible; The "Ulster" paper assumed that historical 
records were adequate to justify the stance taken concerning a present 
day political division of the land; whereas Whitehand assumed that 
mathematical totting up was the ultimate knowledge from which proof could 
be shown. These two distinctions constantly appear in the geographers 
concern for social, economic and political terms, that appear to be ac-
ceptable. Society is reduced to terms concerned with system or action; 
this is further reduced to society and environment, and the environment 
is further reduced to living area determined by culture. The whole of 
this then becomes analogous to a mechanistic system, which then gives 
ease of handling for the human inhabitants of the society being examined. 
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General social traits may be reduced to rules, and special traits may 
be reduced to attitudes, as was so clearly shown in too "Ulster" paper, 
3.1.3. 
Sociologists would inform us of the nature of societies. Men, however 
differ concerning their views of too world and in their ways of ex-
planation. According to Martindale, *"The entire structure of human 
culture is learned and maintained, by habit." If this is so, then the 
first difficulty that arises in taking a sociological view of any theo-
retical framework that appeals to one, is to realise that one's own 
viewpoint arises from convergence with onets own values. This is a 
bias to be aware of, because the bias may be not only illogical but 
may also be determined by the habits of one's own culture. If the cul-
tural bias of British geography is towards disciplinary synthesis, then 
all the three examples quoted above are guilty of this. The differen-
ces in the mode of the texts and the reasons that are used for individ-
ual justification of choice of subject matter, merely reflect the in-
dividual authors values. The societies examined show a social frame-
work of either Iberians, Ulstermen, or quantifiers framed in social 
typifications derived from each authors cultural expectations. All 
could be wrong, in every chosen item. A contrary view of unexamined 
assumptions could be put forward in sociological terms, that could be 
equally 'correct and logical. ' 
3.1.4. 
Four different sociological theoretical constructs seem to be commonly 
drawn upon by geographers. My view of these constructs is value-
laden, biased and culturally determined, before I write. My own biases 
have classified them before, therefore I can only set them out as ideal-
ized typifications of sociological theories. Ideal types are constructs 
used by some sociologists as references from which the real world de-
viates. They are extended models used as forms of explanation, as when 
a teacher says, "The Earth is round," since he idealizes the nature of 
a planet, and simplifies the nature of a sphere, and simplifies the geo-
logical structure of the World, such a typification is incorrect upon 
all counts. However the ideal type is helpful in order to introduce 
the notion of a non-flat earth, and to relate vast size to a hand held 
object, as a ball within the pupiltsrealisation of reality, also the 
erroneous simplification eliminates a vast amount of prior and complex 
explanation. Ideal types in this chapter are of this nature, they are 
biased and simplified examples, being far from definitive. ~he four 
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viewpoint examples gtyen here are those typuied by Talcott Parsons, 
Max Weber, Karl Marx, and those sociologists who are labelled as 
phenomenologists. The derivitive theories considered are structural 
functionalism, social action, social conflict, and phenomenology. 
These four frames of reference relate to the general question, "What 
is the nature of society'?" It is imperative to realise that although 
the theories may argue between themselves, they neither use a universal 
technical language, nor do they realise universal conclusions. The 
modes of the arguments are mutally exclusive. Contemporary geographers 
seem to flitter across these theoretical boundaries. 
3.1.5. 
In the examples given previously, the problems arising from social bor-
rowing become apparent. In liThe Peninsular" the nature of Iberian 
society was left to references from historical documents. In the 
"Ulster" paper,.a society in open conflict was seen as a society that 
was coming to terms with certain strains in the functioning of the soc-
ial structure. In "Innovation diffusion ••• " the relevant society was 
split into those who did and those who did not. Such a social phen-
omena cannot exist in any reality: even in such a simple device as a 
referendum vote, there are numerous ways of accounting for those who 
failed to vote either'~ea'or'~ay~ In the example from Coates et al 
C3.1.1.} to consider the dimensions of social inequality, is reduction-
ism, and spatial dimensions of social inequality then becomes secondary 
reductionism. This confusion is then increased by the cross refer-
encing of different social theories, for instance, complex phenomena, 
reinforcing variables, and origins with effects. Unless this was not 
made as a social statement. There has been an attempt to show in the 
previous chapters of this paper that assumptions between cultures, nat-
ions and even within languages mislead the naive as well as the acad-
emic. A similar difficulty arises when one moves into uncertain dis-
ciplines, that appear to have similar materials that appear to be re-
levant. In each of the following sociological theories, each type con-
siders a tentative theory that is seen as problematic. Out of consid-
eration of the problem arises a new theory. Simply each theory arises 
from the problems of one of the other theories, because each author 
found certain inadequacies. The circularity of form is the status of 
the argument within sociology. There is no one definitive theory. 
There are choices and there are unexplored ideas, but because choices 
are made by individuals, one must give reasons for one's chosen 
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theoretical social type of explanation. 
otherwise. 
It would be dishonest to do 
3.2.1. 
Talcott Parsons was concerned to establish sets of universals or laws 
of social life which would explain any particular social fact. Such 
facts would be empirical. He had translated Max Weber (q.v.) from 
the German into a book for America. The liberal notions of Weber's 
concept of social action were not conservative ~nough for Parsons, and 
Weber's formulation brought the individual into the social equation. 
This ideographic form was eliminated by Parsons, in order to establish 
a purely nomothetic typology of society. Parsons considered that 
theory, "is confined to the formulation and logical relations of pro-
positions containing empirical facts in direct relation to the obser-
vations of the facts and thus empirical verification of the proposi-
tions." *This implies that there must be an empirical social system 
and a theoretical one; the reality of the former is very different 
from the structure of the latter, which only defines the properties of 
the variables in the social system and shows relationships between em-
pirical values. Therefore ea~h theoretical term has to be interpreted. 
The inhabitants of this social world are not taken as acting people, 
but as the purveyors of roles which when acted upon show conformity 
to their expected roles. These roles could be evaluated as one of 
Parsons commentators suggested, * "We need to develop quantitative units 
and forms of expression so that we may utilize in the description of 
societal phenomena the tremendously powerful technics of mathematics." 
3.2.2. 
This was a form of societal explanation that offered great appeal to 
many geographers, because what Parsons had offered to the Americans as 
a justification for a very inequitable society, also offered a simplified 
formula for reducing the ideographic content of human geography to the 
sum of an individual's roles. The mode is outlined above. Observed 
facts are empirical facts, which may be verifed. The theoretical 
system justifies the empirical system. Roles are both theoretical and 
empirical. If roles are empirical one may enumerate them. These are 
them quantifiable units, from which one may quantify the ideographic nat-
ure of human activity. This social theory then helps reduce all geo-
graphic data to nomothetic structures. Which is exactly what Whitehand 
attempted to show in"Innovation diffusion •.. "However Parsons 
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formulatedhi.s theory out o;e the w.ork.. of Weber, who in turn had form-
ulated his socLal theory as tf in argument with Marx, therefore it 
must oe borne in mind that Parsons work was a dialogue within a dial-
ogue. Part of his problem was: to examine four problems that face all 
societies. These are, How does a society govern? How does it main-
tain economic stability? How does it hold itself together? And how 
does it manage stresses within the society? 
laws. 
3.2.3. 
These Parsons reduced to 
In the Parsonian formulation, the structure of every social system was 
capable of facing four functional problems, which social organisation 
had to solve, the mnemonic for which is termed GAIL. The goals (G) of 
society are dealt with through the government or policy of the society. 
The economic welfare of the society is dealt with by the adaptive CAl 
subsystem. The integrative (I) subsystem is maintained by the profes-
sion of law, the media, and other professional groups who restate the 
social values of the society. The latency subsystem is concerned with 
social pattern maintenance and with the management of social tension 
(Ll, this problem area being ordered through the family, the schools, 
religious groups and the civil police. The structure of society has 
four functional subsystems, the political, the economic~ the value 
setters and the value enforcers, each of which may be seen and analysed 
as a social system within its own right against an environmental back-
ground of the other subsystems. Each subgroup must adapt to the total 
'environment' if it is to achieve its goals. This formulation of soc-
ial models should not be unfamiliar to those geographers who are con-
versant with the anthropological work of Radcliffe-Brown, or the place-
work-folk constructions of Le Play. The influence of both of these 
contributors is clearly apparent in Talcott Parsons modelling of society. 
3.2.4. 
The Parsonian approach made a powerful appeal in sociology prior to the 
quantitative revolution in geography. A s~ila~ appeal was easily 
transferable to geographers. Social structure and social functions 
were put together as interdependent faces of social explanation. The 
apparent ease of explantory means and the power to relate, social parts 
to social wholes derived from the fact that Parsonian theory seemed to 
explain. This model of society showed regularities, conformity and 
above all, system. The Americans sought justification for expansion 
into new territories, and explanation of movement after civilization. 
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The Br~t~sh saw in t~s tramework a neat synthesis and a general law 
for the functioning of societies. The appeal to English speaking 
geographers was obvious. The ideographic content of human geography 
could first be codified, then the structure of societies could be mapped, 
and f~ally the resultant data could be subjected to quantification. 
These concepts were taken into the social view of the world in the 
~Ulstert paper, but especially this marks the view of society assumed 
in "Innovation diffusion ..• 11 But disingenuous ideological neutrality 
is based upon a non-examination of the assumptions that Parsons made. 
Parsons assumptions concerning social structure are not free of problems. 
3.2.5. 
The subsystems within the Parsonian analysis of social systems are 
structurally functional. They are also interdependent. Therefore 
there is an inbuilt difficulty concerning the a~planation of social 
change using this model. If the structures of societies continue to 
function, there is a similarity to perpetual motion, in that change may 
only come from outside the social system itself. Internal revolutions 
can not happen, becauses as mere dysfunctions or social tensions, the 
system should always cope with their impact and adjust their tensions 
back into the system.* The appeal of this form of explanation for the 
structuring and functioning of society is obvious in the work of those 
geographers, who extended their methods into quantification. However 
there is a philosophical problem in their claims to a quantitative re-
volution based upon the Parsonian notion of society. The quantitative 
revolution took place within the establishment of geography as a dis-
cipline, and according to this social formulation, revolution may only 
be an external phenomenon. Quantification in geography within this 
social context may at best only be a stressful strain. As a discip-
linary management dysfunction, quantification gave to geography a real-
location of roles, for those who had new techniques to offer. 
3.2.6. 
If one considers that one's total contribution to society may be gauged 
by the sum total of one's social roles, then the Parsonian formulation 
has appeal to the individual. But roles alone rule out the individ-
uality of the individual, and in doing so rule out the interaction of 
social dynamics. When Parsons translated Max Weber's work, it must 
have appeared to him how the idiosyncratic element of human conscious-
ness that Weber had included in his theory of Social action, would not 
relate to the nomothetic explanation that Parsons wished to establish. 
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In order to establish a logical explanation of social interaction 
Parsons wished to set out an orderly and positiyistic model, There 
could be no ideographs. Social structures could not be derived from 
the content of the human consciousness, which were associated with the 
inward beliefs of individuals. Therefore to explain this interaction 
in a pOSitivistic manner, the human roles became the n~rm, and the sum 
of a person's roles became the final total of assessment of human con-
tribution to society. The accusation levelled at Parsons for this re-
duction of humanity to 'things' is termed reification. The two major 
weaknesses in Parsons theory are inability to account for social change 
and reification. 
3.3.1. 
Social-action theory in sociology is usually attributed to Max Weber. 
His work post dates that of Karl Marx, and may be seen as an attempt 
to synthesize the crass oversimplifications of positivism. The poverty 
of positivism lies in the attempt to keep cultural and physical sciences 
apart through the explanation of phenomena, irrespective of whether the 
phenomena are those of the physical world or those of the individual. 
Weber saw that there was a choice of explanations available to sociol-
ogy because science is the analysis of nature in terms of causal laws, 
whereas history is the analysis of nature as a pattern of unique events. 
The nomothetic and ideographic dichotomy is not unique to geography 
alone. This simple division is then extended, in that human thought 
in the natural sciences has a distinct form from human thought in the 
cultural sciences and therefore requires a distinct method. Further 
it may be suggested that the physical sciences deal with facts, whereas 
the cultural sciences deal wi'th meanings. Thus the method of explan-
ation in the natural sciences would be through experiment, whilst the 
method of understanding in the cultural sciences should consist of 
interpretations. 
3.3.2. 
This dichotomy of view by Weber offered the choice that the world could 
be dealt with as an object of knowledge, or that the world:.could be used 
as a field of action. These two views of reality may be termed positi-
vistic and idealistic. They may also be termed nomothetic and ideo·-
graphic. One view only becomes fully explan~tory if it is treated as 
value free and untainted by ones preferences, the other view leads to 
political action concerned with social change. These are the two flows 
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of ~deas that underpin the present parad~gm in geography, and have done 
since Varenius set them apart. Too ind~v~dual contributors to the 
'national I schools of geography set out in the first chapter, all 
showed strong emotion for their ties to the discipline. All showed 
values both national, cultural and tending towards either positivism 
or idealism. The same is true of the authors of the contributory 
texts in the second chapter. Too nomothetic I ideographic division 
in geography, according to Weber's view of society, relates only to in-
d~viduals emotions concerning different methodological process choices. 
It seems strange that geographers have not realised this. Reality is 
not reducible to a system of laws, which seems to be a value that the 
quantifiers hold. If the relationship to values and the realisation 
of values is a-priori necessary in order to understand the unique, then 
a system of laws is not possible without taking the values of the par-
ticipant individuals into account. Prediction is only possible within 
closed systems; and no body of laws could be established that could 
exhaust a science of culture, because values change. In order to ex-
amine this conflict of ideas Weber posited the following scheme * which 
is included because geographers deal within these same disciplinary 
areas:-
3.3.3. 
Discipline Kind of Data Type of explanation Nature of 
studied employed resultant expln. 
Cultural Meanings, Meaningful Unique sequences 
History factual interpretations, of cultural 
conditions causal explanations development. 
Cultural Meanings, Meaningful Causal laws of 
Science factual interpretations, cultural I 
conditions causal explanations phenomena I 
Natural Facts, Causal Laws of natural 
I Science explored by explanations phenomena 
meanings. 
Natural Facts, 
.' 
Meaningful Unique sequences 
History explored by interpretations, of physical 
I meanings causal explanations development. i 
------
~.--~-.-- --_._---
3.3.4. 
Weber's ideas lead to some confusion concerning their interpretation, 
because although he developed certain theoretical and ph8losophical 
issues, he did not clearly separate these from his methodological ideas. 
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Early sociology was faced with problems of methods, because much of 
the material of the discipline was taken from history, and historical 
data are notoriously subjective y 
plicable to statistical methods. 
putting society into a laboratory. 
consequently data not reliably ap-
Nor could sociologists see ways of 
Methods which were employable 
were comparative methods based upon historical material, with supple-
ments from ethnography. These are familiar problems to geographers. 
The compilers of "The Peninsular" faced the difficulty of obtaining 
material that was not dependent upon ancient texts. The difficulty 
in the "Personality of Ulster" arose through a confusion of facts and 
values when the author chose sides in a debate. The paper of "Innova-
tion diffusion ..• "presented a problem in assuming that theory and 
philosophy are the same thing, all values were presented as facts and 
the quantophrenic methodology just ignored the reality that was in the 
real world. This is the difficulty when one takes reality into a 
laboratory, when it is social reality. This confusion upon Weber's 
part is open to the same criticisms that are often levelled against 
regional geographers, such as Dickinson and Minshull. As in "by what 
standards does one compare one regional study to another, other than 
by the standards of common sense." Weber would claim that common sense 
is one of the great sociological unknowns, that requires researching. 
3.3.5. 
Weber accepted that meanings and values were basic subject matter for 
sociologists; he considered that science was science if it dealt with 
mental, social or physical phenomena: further he considered that to' 
establish an explanation of the meanings of social events as an end 
product would not put sociology in a different class from those dis-
ciplines that attempted to establi~h eausallaws. He believed that 
one could arrive at methodological precision through a properly deve-
loped typological procedure. To this end he posited the notion of 
'idealized typifications'. (Ideal types). 
These would avail the comparative method of a means to actually compare 
cases. 
3.3.6. 
These hypothetical, but concrete individuals could be personalities, 
situations, classes, changes, revolutions, sects, or institutions, 
Ideal types ,are to be found in every natural and social science, if one 
'sees' reality through these comparisons, A comm9n ideal type fami-
liar to geographers is the river estuary printea as an explanatory key 
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on Ordnance Survey maps, in order to explain the conventional signs 
whi.ch may appear on the map. The original purpose of these maps was 
for gunlayers to bracket their fall of shot in case of war or civil 
war. The ideal estuary has little to do with this, because it does 
not exist, but it does fulfil the two basic criteria of idealized 
typification. It is an objective possibility and shows adequate caus-
ation. All models are abstractions of ideal types, but not all maps 
come up to the two Weber ian criteria, and certainly few lIModels in Geo-
graphy" * show signs of either criteria. There are numerous rigorous 
conditions laid down in Weber's formulation for understanding social 
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interaction. The notions that are termed here as beliefs, he argues 
for in a logical manner. His intermingling of theory, philosophy and 
methods was not a chance happening. Although this confused those who 
were seeking simplifications, and the intermingled parts were teased 
out by Parsons in his search for a nomothetic formulation of societies, 
it is possible that this inter~ngling of philosophy, theory and met-
hods was both deliberate and meaningful upon Weber's part. It is only 
now becoming vaguely apparent that this seeming confusion may offer a 
way through the nomothetic - ideographic nexus. 
3.3.7. 
It is now possible to relate the Weberian chart 13.3.3.) to geography. 
The division of nomothetic goegraphy could relate to those marked 
'Natural Science' and 'Natural History' whilst ideographic geography 
could relate to those marked 'Cultural History' and 'Cultural Science'. 
The permutat~on is between culture; nature; science and history. These 
are the ingredients of geography at first glance, as have been outlined 
in the previous two chapters of this paper, and the resultant explana-
tions are equally at home in geography as in sociology. Unique se-
quences of cultural development gave an appeal in the lIUlsterll paper. 
Unique sequences of physical development are the explanations given by 
the determinists, as Huntington, or the authors of the "Peninsular". 
One might claim that the '~radition Vidalienne' sought causal laws of cul-
tural phenomena. But- the quantificatory 'revolutionaries' would 
claim to be able to reduce all geography to explanations by laws of nat-
ural phenomena, as Parsons attempted ill sociology. However a Weberian 
view of disciplinary data shows that the division between ideographic and 
nomothetic is too simple and that deeper analysis of data, and explana-
tion is required in order to arrive at an, explanation that is meaningful 
if it is to relate to the primary data studied. The required control 
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that Weber offered to comparematerLal across the boundarLes of reasons 
and causes was the ideal type. It was as Lf in debate with Karl Marx, 
that Weber for.mulated an analytLcal theory of society. Social action 
represents a liberal view of the world, bringing men into the social 
world of structures and functions, and endowing them with meaningful 
responsibilities, rather than suggesting that they live in societies 
deter.mined by social conflict. 
3.4.1. 
Modern conflict social theory has two major contributors, Charles Darwin 
and Karl Marx. Marxist ideas of socialism arise from the notions of 
social conflict. These ideas run parallel with the conflict idealogy 
that resulted from the ideas of Darwin being extrapolated to man. Yet 
the two ideologies conflict about and around the nature of economic com-
petition. Much of Marx's writing was a dialogue with Hegel, who sug-
gested that in society one was faced with a certain ordered conflict of 
oppositions centred about personality, the state, society and mankind. 
From this the d~alectic of civil society was due to each man's struggle 
to pursue his own egoistic good. This pursuit of good, inevitably 
sharpens the difference between the classes, separating the wealthy from 
those in poverty. Further to this the division between the classes is 
a product of the rule of law, because law and property are inseparable. 
The central difficulty for mankind is that men are taught to see their 
world as an interconnection of objects, whereas in reality it is an 
inter.meshing of processes, and in these processes "What individuals are 
•••• coincides with their production, both with what they produce and 
how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends upon the mat-
erial conditions deter.mining their production." * Therefore the point of 
departure for all understanding arises from the facts of material exis-
tence rather than from ideas derived from religion or philosophy of from 
the state. 
3.4.2. 
Conflict is structured into society through 'natural' process; "The 
consolidation of what we ourselves produce into an objective power above 
us, growing out of control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to 
naught our calculations, is one of the chief factors in the historical 
development up till now. And out of this very contradiction between 
the interest of the individual and that of the community the latter takes 
an independent for.m as the State, divorced from the real interests of 
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individual and community. \1 * 
From the family, where the first division of labour occurs, there is a 
first awareness of a division of consciousness that leads to distinc-
tions and oppositions, which show most profoundly in soeieties that 
have a division between material and mental labour, where one group 
creates things that are real and another group creates derivitives 
from concepts. The latent slavery within the family, emerges into 
actual slavery of some to the law of the state to maintain the status 
of those who are the beneficiaries of the law. Thus the classes that 
are determined by the division of labour, become natural agents in op-
position. nIt follows from this that all struggles within the State, 
the struggle between democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, the struggle 
for the franchise, etc., are merely illusory forms in which the real 
struggles of the different classes are fought out among one another."* 
3.4.3. 
Nationalism, not patriotism, was a bourgeois ideology. The reasons 
for nationalism being encouraged are not so pertinent as the realisa-
tion that all the examples of geographers given in the first chapter 
were encouraged in their nationalistic attitudes. It is not just the 
case that the attitudes are built into nationalism that laud a chosen 
course, but there are also ideographic assumptions that are included. 
These paint geographic pictures of personalised needs for the chosen 
nation. The mixture of bourgeois ideals and national needs together 
paint a picture that is ideological in character and the character is 
political. Nationalist politics include emotions, assumptions of 
strengths, and antogonism towards other nations. But Marx offers a 
different view of nationalism, which developed side by side with capital-
ism. This included the notion of the land being not a utility of the 
market place, but a national asset. The notion that order and law was 
not a commodity to be purchased, but a shared experience of all the mem-
bers of the nation. Further he would suggest that the 'national 
schools' of geographic views were redundant, as only serving the inter-
ests of intranational exploitation, and that an international combine 
of workers could reduce international conflicts. 
3.4.4. 
The class struggles of slavery and feudalism changed with the advent of 
capitalism. It exchanged the man to man values to a personal cash ex-
change value, and exchanged a host of guilded freedoms for free trade. 
lIIn a word, it has replaced exploitation veiled by religious and 
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polLt~cal Lllllsions, by exploitation that is open, direct and brutal,"* 
This is one view of the conditions of the subject matter that people 
geographical texts. The conflict between the capitalist bourgeoisie and 
the proletariat is central to the society that we live in, whether the 
capitalists are local, national, or international concerns. The con-
flicts generated increase the consolidation of the sides involved, and 
these consolidations typify the accounts of societies that geographers 
must use in explanations, be they rural, urban, historical or spatial. 
Most sincere accounts using quantificatory ~ata are offerings of il-
lusory conclusions as to the processes of class conflict. Whitehand's 
paper seemed to take account of an area without a society. The 
"Ulster" paper, saw little conflict of classes as causative to the con-
dition of Ulster. The "Peninsular" missed the massive class struggle 
that had taken place in Spain under the label of a Civil War. But the 
bourgeois class has agglomerated the po~ulation, centralized the means 
of production and has concentrated the means of production in a few 
hands; which has been most noticeable in agriculture. Thus the cap-
italist class has created more productive forces than all the genera-
tions of previous histories. Through the division of wealth, the bour-
geois classes are turning against one another, as in the American de-
bacle in Vietnam, and concerning their conflicts in the U,S.A. over their 
military occupation of the Holy Land. "More and more, society is 
splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes dir-
ectly facing each other: bourgeoisie and proletariat."* 
3.4,5. 
One may dismiss Marxist ideologies on account of the prophecies having 
not been fulfilled, or upon account of the utopian dreams being scien-
ti£ically implausable. But any geographer may check Mackinder's map* 
"The Natural Seats of Power", and answer how Marxist influenced social-
ism has filled the Pivot area and taking half the marginal crescent of 
the world, has splashed deeply into the outer crescent: in a mere two 
generations of time. No social scientist can ignore the dialogue that 
Marx set in motion. Both Parsons and Weber formulated theories in ans-
wer to the problems that Marx set out. The example of class given here, 
is only one pertinent aspect, but there are a series of assumptions that 
people hold, that Marx would suggest they re-examine. If this should 
include geographers, then they require to decide to which o£ the classes 
they owe allegiance. 
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3.4.6. 
The pourgeois classes saw social conflict from the ideological stand-
point derived from the work of Charles Darwin.* This conflict of con-
flict theories offers both sociologists and geographers choices of pro-
blems derived from their latent values. Darwinism gave justification 
for attitudes supportive of nationalism. In the "Peninsular", the 
authors take a superior view towards the Spaniards" in the "Ulster" 
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paper a choice favouring the Loyalists is made, whilst "Innovation 
diffusion .•. " declines to report upon those so uncultivated as not to 
quantify. Social Darwinism lies close to the justification for Imper-
ial British thought. The views of development and causality that 
Darwin's evolutionary theories suggested were readily applied to mankind. 
All creatures are in competition to survive. There must be a natural 
selection of the most fit. Therefore for mankind, when the level of 
subsistence falls, then the laws of natural selection should operate. 
Through natural selection, man was the only intelligent form which sus-
tained the use of language, discovered how to control fire, then main-
tained his ascendency over other life forms through observation, memory, 
imagination, curiosity and reason. But the tribe \OTi th the strongest 
ethics of solidarity always overcame the ethically weaker tribe in battle, 
even at the sacrifice of some of its bravest men, but in civilized soc-
ieties, "we do our utmost not to eliminate the weakest men •.• we build 
asylums for the imbecile, the maimed, and the sick •.. and our medical 
men exert their utmost skill to save the life of everyone to the last 
moment. Thus the weak members of civilized societies propogate their 
kind. . •. excepting in the case of man himself, hardly anyone is so ig-
norant as to allow his worst animals to breed."* 
3.4.7. 
Humans also take only their fittest men to serve in armed services, there-
by eliminating the fittest and aiding the lives of the weak. Darwin's 
superior animal seems to create a society that tends to destroy the bio-
logical superiority that natural selection took so long to produce. The 
intellect that marks the human being as in a class nearest to the divine 
is in immediate danger of destruction by the ideas of democracy or soc-
ialism. The derivitive problems of this form of belief are still with 
us in considerations of the status of comprehensive education. When 
as apparently egalitarian form of education is imposed upon a nation by 
politicians with elitist educational backgrounds, who maintain elitist 
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educational boltholes for their offspring, and for those of their lit-
erati in the civil service. Then the immediate question that arises 
is to enquire why the structure of educational institutions has not 
been changed first into forms of democratic management and administra-
tion. Darwin saw this contradiction between human society and human 
intellect. The survival of the fittest becomes a dubious cliche in 
bourgeois terms, because the control of wealth subverts .the functions 
of evolution. 
Thus the conflict involved in the processes of natural selection is 
thwarted by the intervention of capital. The two basic theories of 
social conflict contain elements of determinism. It is the ratio of 
men to land that determines both human development and the attainable 
level of civilisation, in any given society according to Darwinian 
theory. It is the level of exploitation of one class, that deter-
mines the standard of the bourgeois classes' civilization, according to 
Marx. 
3.5.1. 
Knowledge of society does not present itself as a neutral study. Geo-
graphers in delving into parts of social theory collect parts of social 
understanding and meaning. The Parsonian, outline of social interaction 
is derived from a nomothetic theoretical stand. Weberian social action 
theory is ideographic. Darwin realised that from a collection of ideo-
graphs of natural history, that there could be a nomothetic formulation 
for explaining the process of evolution, but that this became illogical 
when applied to human societies. Marx ideographic and nomothetic ex-
planations in constructing his theory of social conflict. From all 
these theories one may accept the fact that the acquisition of knowledge 
is a social activity. The group of sociologists who studied most close-
ly the production of knowledge are labelled phenomenologists,· but in order 
to understand their problems one should first consider the contribution 
to philosophy, sociology and geography of Kant. 
3.5.2. 
Immanuel Kant* was a teacher of geography at Konigsburg,who later was 
acclaimed as a philosopher, who is frequently burdened with some res-
ponsibility for the Germanic progression of geographic conceptual deve-
lopment. As a point of departure, philosophical understanding. Geo-
graphers often see geography as the cause of Kant's contribution to 
philosophy, in that it enhances the status of their discipline. 
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Further to this his philosophical ideas were glossed back into history, 
in order to establis~ different connotations of geographic meaning, as 
if the understanding of geograpQy was the sole reason for Kant's ex-
cursions into philosophy. 
3.5.3. 
Kant's philosophy may be given as proof for almost any chosen geographic 
standpoint as in these random extracts: 
"In his (Kant's) view the human element was an integral part of the 
subject matter of geography ••.. he regarded both history and geography 
as descriptions, the former in time and the latter in space. He claim-
ed physical geography to be a 'summary of nature·, •.•• (it) thus embraced 
the outer physical world, the earth's surface, and its cover of life 
forms of plants, animals and man and his works ••• "(1969 I Dickinson. 1* 
" •••• Kant was able to produce, without the experimental method, but 
by the power and logic of his penetrating intellect, an unrivalled ac-
count of man's cognitive and moral powers. Kant thought that the free-
dom of the will in man was a necessity of nature,' as the conception of 
natural science demanded the notion of necessity as a basic postulate. 
There arose from this (not Varenius?) the problem of the two kinds of 
knowledge. On the one side we have the realm of knowledge of nature 
.where law and necessity prevail; on the other the knowledge of man, 
his activities, societies and beliefs, where we act as if man had some 
freedom of choice. This in fact is the model of the subject over which 
geographers presently contend." (1967 Chorley & Haggett)* 
or 
"According to Kant, all knowledge can be organised from three dif-
ferent viewpoints •.•. disciplines that study these categories - as - such 
are the 'systematic sciences. ' ••. a second way of looking at facts is to 
see their relationship through time. Historical sciences employ this 
viewpoint ••• thirdly, there is the study of things as they are assoc'-
iated in space. This is the domain of the 'geographical sciences'. 
It is readily seen that in this philosophical construction geography 
gained an honourable status amongst the sciences." (1965 Jan Broek)* 
3.5.4. 
Indeed how could geography fail to find an honourable status amongst the 
sciences, w·hen geographers can claim that Kant I s view was that geo-
graphy was only ideographic, Or that geography was both ideographic 
and nomothetic~ Or that geography was indeed a trio logy of all the 
sciences? Perhaps Kant presents to geographers only a model over which 
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to contend. The philosophy of Kant offers justifications to geogra-
phers, whether they are arguing for a unity, a dichotomy or a trilogy 
of meaning for the enhancement of their discipline. However there is 
some agreement that Kant made a contribution to the'scientific nature 
of geography, through his conviction that human knowledge was limited 
to phenomena alone, and therefore transcendental metaphysics was im-
possible. Thus one should renounce speculative philosophy, and limit 
one's knowledge to the definite results of science. Kant's contri-
bution to knowledge arose through his dialogue with Hume, who posited 
that 'all knowledge comes from sensory impressions,' but then the pro-
blematic question arises, 'From what sense data is our knowledge of 
causation received?' which must elicit the response, 'None'. 
a response would destroy the logic of empirical science. 
3.5.5. 
But such 
Therefore Kant qualified the nature of knowledge, which he argues be-
gins ,with experience, even if it does not logically arise out of ex-
perience, because experience may also relate to aspects of reality 
which are not immediately supplied by the senses. These aspects of 
reality, Kant termed a-priori knowledge, inclusive of which were both 
time and space, neither of which are arrived at through the physical 
senses, but are 'intuited' by the mind. Therefore, according to Kant, 
',progress in knowledge' does not imply that reality has changed, only 
that we have changed our a-priori concepts within our minds and accept 
a variation upon the nature of causality in these instances under re-
view, which becomes justification for the acceptance of Darwinism, the 
Copernican alternative universe and indeed any paradigmatic change de-
rived from alternative a-priori concepts. For geographers Kant gave 
a wealth of intuitions to be available to them for scientific treatment, 
and the responses to sense data a material for descriptions. In this 
he justified Varenius' division of geographic knowledge, not as a geo-
grapher, as a philosopher. 
3.5.6. 
In Kant's view of the world the individual receives more emphasis than 
the group. This liberal view of history is more concerned with oppor-
tunity than with group solidarity, thus society would not be an organic 
form, but an ordered community of independent wills. Therefore his-
tory represents the development of the principle of freedom. Kant, 
naturally wished to formalize the principles of freedom in terms of the 
requirements of order in interhuman terms. So one should be able to 
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realise that the external conditions of government could well be the 
very conditton that the tndividual required'to attain his full nature. 
Therefore the central problem for societies would be to attain a uni-
versal system of law based upon the nature of man rather than upon the 
rule of force. Individuals, as free agents could participate in consti-
tutions based upon laws that they had helped to create. A participatory 
society would be a conceptual advance upon contractual notions, or group 
dominance ideas of social responsibility, and by placing law as the cen-
tral agreement of society Kant offered a very different view of the 
world from the major conflict theorists. 
3.5.7. 
But for Kant there is a problem concerning the object in itself, as far 
as knowledge is concerned. Laws for individuals would have to be 
founded upon science and knowledge. For what else could the law be 
founded upon? New science and knowledge required searches for the ob-
jective, the general and the universal. These elements of knowledge, 
through science evolved into a search for the formal. This process of 
search has been followed in geography. If one follows the history of 
scientific accuracy in cartography, then this search process may be dis-
tinguished in the evolution of map presentation, but the individual 
items included upon maps are formal representations, the 'things in them-
selves' have been t~ansferred from phenomena to representations of phen-
omena. When this formalism moved beyond the representation of reality 
upon a scale map to models drawn from the generalisation of reality, as 
in quantified models, then an attempt to universalise the elements of 
geographic knowledge was made. The formalism arose from a two way dis-
tinction; one that separated phenomenon from the thing in itself, the 
other, rejecting the 'thing' as an object of cognition. There was thus 
a distinction between form and content of phenomena, when the forms are 
seen as objective and universal, and representing to the mind the univer-
sal element of knowledge. The Kantian problem concerns how the object 
stands with regard to knowledge of it. Or does the map really represent 
the reality that it purports to show? 
3.5.8. 
A different ordering of society was derived from the approach considered 
by Edmund Husserl writing "Ideas" in 1913. Husserl assumed that there 
was a real external world which can be known. Experience allows real-
isation of this world, which consists of both objects and essences of 
essential objects. This iS2realised by the subject through the sense 
68 
qualities of the object. Hllsserl considered that Kant .made a funda-
mental error in assuming that the only objects of experience and cognit-
ion are those of a sensory character. Russerl maintained that there 
were many kinds of experience. Phenomena are not merely constructions 
of the consciousness as Kant suggested, nut they form the content of 
pure consciousness, because they are essences. For Hllsserl the content 
of knowledge consists of natural objects and their intrinsic phenomenal 
essentiality. From this a sociological school of thought has arisen 
through the work of Schutz * which is being introduced into geography.* 
Alfred Schutz (d.19591 "was not only a phenomenological philosopher. 
Re was also a social scientist trained in law, economics and sociology. 
He shared Max Weber's methodological individualism, and realised the 
importance of an adequate theory of human action for the methodology 
of social science. Yet there can be no doubt that Schutz's original 
thinking and systematic investigations led him into new territory ••• "* 
3.5.9. 
In order to analyse the objective aspects of scientific knowledge in 
Kantian terms one starts with the question, "Row is nature a-priori 
possible?" In social terms, "What are the a-priori conditions that 
make society possible?" In geographical terms the question would be, 
"What are the a-priori conditions that make space knowable?\I These 
questions are pertinent, because Kant appeared to confine all science 
purely to experience. If science is only this, then the pursuit of 
knowledge leaves out creativity, thought, and the concept of value. 
If phenomena alone could be studied as science, the rest of knowledge 
- the noumena - the really real could not be reached. Thus all that 
made science worth while was to be sacrificed by Kant. Even geograp-
hers in trying to examine space have realised this difficulty. As 
Tuan * wrote in 1979 "Danger occurs when the scientist then naively 
tries to impose his findings on the real world, for he may forget that 
the simplicity of human beings is an assumption .••. " In the logic of 
Kantian explanation, the only possible answer to the above three ques-
tions is "forms". Schutz maintained that Kant was in error to believe 
that only objects of experience and cognition can be of a sensory char-
acter. He insisted, as Tuan agrees, that phenomena are the objects 
of immediate experience and the data of cognition. Phenomena are the 
essences that are the contents of pure consciousness. Therefore every 
object, be it factual, natural, actual, imaginary or in essence (essen-
tiall is a potential object of some kind of experience. Such experience 
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is related to the consciousness and to the ego. 
3.5.10. 
Schutz divided experiences into natural and eidetic, being the world of 
events and to the essences directly intuited from it. Phenomenological 
concern is for the eidetic, because all meaning given to the natural 
world is derived from its relationship to the essences that man first 
intuited from his consciousness of the natural world. The element of 
generality in social life is supplied for phenomenologists' sociological 
formalism through directly intuited essences. This is because Schutz's 
major concern was with the social construction of knowledge. His vieTti 
that knowledge, both in epistemology and ontology, is constructed 
through the society that people inhabit, derives from the problematic 
nature of the Weberian position. Schutz considered that the major 
area of unexplored assumptions in action theory lay in the inadequacy 
of the structure of idealised typifications. For him ideal types had 
to be constructed by scientists who already had a bias to justify their 
work. In doing this they gave themselves a free hand to typify that 
which they wished to prove, not that which conformed to the essences of 
reality. 
Many geographers whose education has lead them through rigourous fact 
finding missions to ultimates in data that may be clearly assessed stat-
istically, may wonder how directly intuited essences through their con-
sciousness of the reflections of reality could remotely approach a mean-
ingful relationship with the reality that they believe that they have 
experienced. It may be put as 'Why does society want students of geo-
graphy to chip bits off the Scottish mountains?' or 'Why does society 
send students to chip .... ? etc. or 'Why do students choose to chip ••. ?' 
or 'Why are students educated to choose to chip •.• ?' The form of the 
question to be answered derives from our notion of the relationship, 
form and process that we use to explain the interaction between society 
and the students that the educational process processes. Our choice 
of formulation of the question is influenced by the degrees of freewill 
or determinism that we see as relevant to social structure, together 
with the level of idealism that is present within our range of beliefs. 
Which ever question we choose is derived from our theoretical under-
standing of society .. If there are various theories to choose from, 
then what determines our choice of question? What beliefs inhibit our 
choice? From what forms of intuition do we formulate any question con-
cerning the social ordering involved? The nature of phenomena does range 
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from reality to reflections from the ego. 
3.5.11. 
The Kantian search for objectivity may have lead into philosophical 
refinements of science and knowledge, but the phenomenologists have 
given one outstanding precept to anyone involved in researches that 
contain assumptions. It is, simply, "Examine the bias ~" "Which may 
be the bias of ones self or that of any significant other. For in-
stance, consider these personal questions; "How do you judge the work 
of your inferiors?"; "Do you really believe that the society that you 
live in is democratic?", or "Do you believe that the society that you 
live in is really democratic?"; "To which social class do you belong?lI; 
-IIHave you fulfilled your parents expectations of yoU?II: or "What guar-
antee can you give as to the exactitude of the scientific nature of your 
work?" The IIWhy?" questions that follow the answers are a matter be-
tween you and your conscience, but there is an initial bias in each 
question, before one may even transcendentally embark upon an answer. 
The bias stems from the typified question, each one arises from one of 
the social theories outlined above. Your view of each phenomenon de-
rived from each question, is an essence, in phenomenological terms of 
how different formulations of reality offer elements of generality. 
Knowledge is socially constructed according to the phenomenological 
tradition. One's view of society will bias one's view as to what con-
stitutes knowledge. If this is so the present constitution of geography, 
is institutionally constructed. The institutions that determine what 
geography is present geography as institutionalized knowledge, This 
knowledge is therefore socially constructed. 
3.6.1. 
Before either sociology or geography had become institutionalised and 
professional disciplines, each had produced two systems of theory, that 
still influence them. In sociology the division was between organismic 
positivism (Parsonian theory) and social conflict theory, for geography 
the dual vision of the world had lead to either ideographic or nomothetic 
methodological interpretations. Institutionalisation, the setting up 
of departments in colleges and universities, taught by specially sel-
ected staff, came late for both disciplines. In neither of these cases 
may the persons involved in this institutionalisation be termed profess-
ional, because their status, standards of instruction, and conditions of 
employment were all determined by their employing agencies. The majority. 
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migh-t lay claim to be teachers ot sociolog~ or geogral?h.~, but onl~ 
those members of established or recognised scientific or learned socie-
ties, or those who made contributions of disciplinary knowledge to re-
levant journals might make claims to be professional within their dis-
ciplines. In order to try to understand the role of geography acad-
emically, one has to explain that the diversity of geographical subject 
matter still has to function under an umbrella called geography, 
3.6.2. 
Institutionalisation required that an area of knowledge had to be de-
fined, which could be rendered into units that could be transmitted. 
Thus syllabuses could be derived from the total possible units of know-
ledge that were required to establish pre-professional standards for 
the granting of degrees and certificates. Such qualifications could 
only be offered after the field of the discipline had been defined, in 
order not to make claims upon areas of knowledge that already existed 
as disciplines within their own right. Having established macro-
boundaries to disciplines in the academic sense of division, then in-
ternal or micro-boundaries came into being more quickly in geography 
than in sociology, with the fracturing of geology, geomorphology, clima-
tology and meteorology being established in their own 'scientific' 
rights. The primitive claim that all areas of knowledge, including 
sociology could be contained under the geographical imbrella of all 
knowledge of 'the Cosmos', was as ludicrous as the alternative claim 
that all knowledge, because it is derived from social actions, could 
live under the umbrella of sociology. 
3.6.3. 
Knowledge also has political dimensions. Education in England and Wales 
has always differed for different classes withing society, as Maclure 
indicates; *" ... the hold of public school men on senior posts in many 
fields, is the outcome of a process which ..• leads to the universities and 
beyond. Their success in securing entry to Oxford and Cambridge is one 
of the biggest advantages that they offer to those who pay their fees ••• " 
(1968) * Because, "It has been held to be the sole business of the Un-
iversity(Oxford) to train the powers of the mind, not to give much pos-
itive or any professional knowledge; the study of the classical books 
is regarded as the best means of refining and invigorating the mind. 
All stud~nts will henceforth be permitted to choose ••. the special studies 
of Law and History, 'or Mathematical Science or Natural Science, •.. but 
must present himself ... to be examined in Classics .• , as well as Philosophy 
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and Hi.story. n l1852i *Whereas, liThe children do not generally obtain 
mastery over elementary subj ects wUclL the school ouglLt to give, They 
neither read well, nor write well, •• , they learn their arithmetic in 
such a way as to be of little practical use in common life." (18611 
*Finally, "We have ourselves seen schools caught in such vicious circles, 
and read accounts of many more ...• We noted the grim approaches; incess-
ant traffic noise from the narrow streets, rubbish dumps on land near-
by; absence of green playing spaces .•. tiny playgrounds; •.. narrow 
passages; dark rooms; unheated cloakrooms; unroofed outside lava-
tories; inadequate storage space with consequent restrictions on teach-
ing materials and therefore methods; inadequate space for movement; 
meals in classrooms; .•. non-soundproof partitions between classes; 
attractive books kept in cupboards for lack of space to lay them out; 
and sometimes all around, the ingrained grime of generations." *(19671 
These are all reports to government, it is the dates that are cause 
for concern, because according to the phenomenologists, knowledge is 
socially constructed. 
3.6.4. 
. , . 
Geog~aphers encounter difficulties when entering the world of the social 
nature of processes. Consider this credo by R.J. Johnston *when con-
sidering that "The main aim of the quantitative and theoretical revol-
ution in human geography has been to develop general theory concerning 
the spatial patterns of human activities." He claims that "Human be-
haviour is affected and constrained in a great variety of ways. These 
can be grouped into four categories, or sets of environmental influences, 
those of : (i) the physical environment, the land, water and air man 
occupies, plus the flora and fauna he shares these with; (ii) the soc-
ial environment, the cultural, organisational structures erected by man; 
as bases of his life; (iii) the built environment, created by man; and 
(ivl the spatial environment, the set of relative locations within which 
man exists .•. Most'areas of scholarship are clearly identified'w~th one 
of these four environments outlined here. Geography, on the other hand, 
has commonly studied the interactions among environments •.. In an age 
wh~n 'socially relevant' research is more frequently demanded, it is 
hoped that this outline of the complexity of interrelations in the spat-
ial system will indicate the need for, and use of, such understanding 
in the even less tractable task of 'improving society'." 
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3.6.5. 
It is this attitude of certainty, positivism and an ultimate nomo-
thetic geography, that has given rise to the intrusion of phenomenology 
into geographical theory. The backlash to these statements of certain-
ty was put forward in three books. The first "Method and Measurement 
in Sociology" by Cicourel,* written in 1964 makes this key statement; 
"the unstated conditions of everyday life are sufficiently indeter-
minate to raise serious questions about the measurement systems now 
in use •.. some forms of everyday life may never be measured very pre-
cisely because of the innovative elements in social action. 1I Secondly, 
Berger and Luckmann, writing "The Social Construction of Reality" in 
1966 *included two chapters, one entitled 'Society as Objective Reality' 
and another 'Society as Subjective Reality', Thirdly in 1967 Glaser and 
Strauss *published liThe Discovery of Grounded Theory" in which they set 
out to show that; IIPrincipally, what is required (to extend the range 
of qualitative data for generating theory) are some imagination, some 
ingenuity and, most of all, a considerable shift in attitude toward 
qualitative materials themselves." They set out to say what the aims 
and intentions of people are more vigourously than does Weber. To ap-
ply their social criteria to the IIPeninsular" paper, one would ask for 
the political reason for omitting the people, and of thellUlsterll paper 
one would question the micro intentions of the people of the province, 
and then question the nature of the bias of the author. Unhappily 
phenomenology in the final analysis reduces to a form of empiricism, 
and terminates in reporting conversations. 
3.6.6. 
Without considering the nature of his text, there are a number of pro-
blems here that Johnston above considers and qualifies in a manner that 
relates directly to the values and theories that both inform him and 
sustain his knowledge. When he uses the notion of human behaviour, 
the antithesis of human action is omitted. This is followed by expect-
ations of affected and constrained, which indicates that here is a 
search for law like explanations, without being involved in the philoso-
phical debate that has concerned geographers with determinism. The 
physical enviroD~ent is shared with the flora and fauna of Nature. With ... 
out questioning the morality of the shared experience of battery chic-
kens, one is presented with the cosy idea of harmony and concensus in 
the world of creation. The social world, is that of mankind organising 
the structure of his world " and his culture from which the bases of life 
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are derived through the functioning of agreed structures. Out of his 
cultural bases man has created built living space, and his behaviour 
in his environment is influenced by the space and activities in the 
space that surrounds him. If the researches in geography are to be 
meaningful and socially relevant then the aim of the discipline is to 
improve society. 
3.6.7. 
If Johnston's concern was with change for society that would offer im-
provement, then-one might assume that he might take his theory from a 
standpoint of conflict, if his work was into the understanding of soc-
ial phenomena, he might well divide his research into macro-theories 
and micro-studies, in order to view society in either Weberian terms or 
to have appealed to the theories of phenomenology. But his under-
standing of society is derived from either Parsonian structural func-
tionalism, or Darwinian theories of conflict. Darwin had suggested 
that change was the inevitability of gradualness, and that change did 
not necessarily lead to improvement. Johnston confirms that for him 
societies are structures that function, *"Societies are complex organ-
isations. Within them, each member performs a particular role, either 
one which he has chosen or one to which he has been ordained~" In fact 
the four tenets of human behaviours that Johnston puts forward fit exact-
ly'the mnemonic GAIL of structural functionalism. Control of the phy-
sical environment is the goal of mankind, his adaptation to this is by 
the establishment of a social environment, which is integrated through 
the establishment of a built environment, and the spatial environment 
offers that factor of latency which orders the whole network in which 
human behaviour may be observed and recorded. The basic concept of 
society may then be dealt with as an item that follows law-like regular-
ities. The study of material derived from these models of societies 
may then be claimed to be objective material, because it stems from a 
logical theoretical basis. If the studies of this data follow logical 
forms, then the results may be seen as proofs, which justify both the 
methods used to arrive at conclusions, and the use of the conclusions 
to verify further law-like certainties. This is the way of science. 
Johnston dismissed all views of society, excepting this one, because 
this form of explanation best appeared to fit the need to establish a 
scientific basis for geographical theory. His choice of this form of 
social explanation was a value judgement, not a logical conclusion. 
This is an accepted form of society taken up by geographers, as did 
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Coates et al, in Section 3,1,1, 
3.7.1. 
The methods that Johnston advocates follow the usage that has been ad-
opted by quantifiers of geographical material in their wish to make 
scientific investigations of society and social phenomena. Such a 
systematic approach to study requires that propositions are logically 
constructed, and are eventually capable of being tested by being sub-
jected to scrutiny or assessment by public criteria. The chosen met-
hods for examination, will affect what and how one examines, and the 
manner in which one perceives given material. By adopting the methods 
of the physical sciences, it may be expected that the outcome of scien-
tific investigations will have a scientific aura. By following the 
,positivistic tradition of the physical sciences, geographers restrict 
themselves to collecting data about obserable 'facts' from the social 
world. In this the assumption is made that the proven methods of the 
physical sciences will insure a correct account of social reality. The 
process of description and analysis leads to the establishment of cate-
gories; there are regularities in distribution; there are developments 
of the results, and causal explanations are set out. 
But eventually ther~ ~as to be a point as to why these processes are 
carried out. Deutscher writes, * "We concentrate on consistency with-
out much concern with what we are being consistent about, or whether 
we are consistently r;i:ght or \V'rong. As a consequence we may be learn-
ing a great deal about how to pursue an incorrect course with a maximum 
amount of precision .•• It is not my intention to disparage the importance 
of reliability per se; it is the obsession with it to which I refer .•• 
the adoption of the scientific model in the social sciences has resulted 
in an uncommon concern for methodological problems centering on issues 
of reliability and a concomitant neglect I of the problem of validity." 
3.7.2. 
There is an essential difference in the structure of the concepts formed 
in the social sciences and the physical sciences. As Schutz points out, 
*"The world of nature, as explored by the natural scientist, does not 
mean anything to molecules, atoms and electrons. But the observational 
field of the social scientist, - social reality - has a specific meaning 
and relevance structure for human living beings, acting and thinking 
within it." When a geogolist sets up a chemical reaction in controlled 
conditions upon a sample of galena, the outcome is predictable, within 
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certain well de.;t;ined li,mits. Bllt the galena and the reaction only 
come to have meaning when the geologist imposes his frame of reference 
upon them. Without this frame of reference the object and the reac-
tion are literally meaningless. Social action is less predictable and 
already has meaning for the participants quite independent of any im-
posed by the frame of reference of any observer. G.H.Mead *has indi-
cated that the individual may be the object of his own actions and can 
abstract and engage in symbolic communication which enables him to ren-
der his environment meaningful and offers him the opportunity of escape 
from the determinism of the material world. 
3.7.3. 
When a geographer engages in establishing frames of reference for study, 
he becomes involved in gathering information. In this he must be 
aware that the concepts of the world, that he is trying to a~pand, have 
been conceptualized in his own terms. They have also been conceptual~ 
ised in their terms. The simplest social words, which one may assume 
have universal meaning, do not necessarily have any basis upon which 
the collector of information might agree a definition with his informant. 
*The Esquimaux have over thirty variant descriptions for snow. But 
in the process of interaction in establishing terminology, either party 
may so influence the other in explaining their meanings of terms, that 
definitions of reality change during their interaction. This is the 
point of all social action theory and the extension of it into pheno-
menology. As Silverman, *has made very clear, there is a sense in 
which the social sciences and the physical sciences deal with entirely 
different orders of subject matter. However factors of the physical 
world may affect social structure and social action as in the case of 
volcanic eruptions and tidal waves on small islands, ~~d vice versa, as 
when society requires control over insect pests and communities require 
bowling green lawns in deserts. Pest control alters the nature of the 
soil, and grass in deserts removes the water table. A geographer may 
choose and acknowledge a methodology suited to the characterisitics of 
social action as it seems to concern him, in his work. But he must 
also take account of the physical world and its possible effects upon 
the social world as an .interaction. The economic effects of discoveries 
of sources of oil is an example. This is not possible if one formulates 
social structure as a fixed object in which the inhabitants live out 
their roles. 
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3.7.4. 
The ~orros o~ social theory that tropinge upon geography today, all have 
foundations that arise ~rom branches of philosophy, Each form presents 
an acceptable form of explanation from differing political viewpoints, 
whether these are the politics o~ the state, or the politics of religion. 
Those who teach these theories, and those who use them as bases for jus-
tifications, accentuate their own beliefs and ideologies. Which theory 
appears to tie to which belief system has been avoided in this paper, but 
over the course of time the theoretical formulations have moved away 
from their original philosophical beginings. ~ociety may be theorised 
as positivistic functionalism, socially behaviouristic, socially in con-
flict, or as a phenomena of social formality. But having been so 
typified the philosophical roots are lost. Harvey * recognised this when 
he wrote, "What kind of object or entity are we dealing with when we seek 
to investigate urbanism? We cannot answer that urbanism is a 'thing' 
in the ordinary sense of the work ... Systems modelling attempts to trace 
the interaction and feedback within a totality, but by having to define 
fixed categories and activities it ~oses the flexibility to deal with 
the fluid structure of social relationships which exist in reality." As 
the first present day geographer to realise that the discipline had not 
utilised the material at hand from sociology, and ha~ also moved away 
from the problems posed by philosophy, Harvey's contribution was most 
timely. It is no accident that his book "Social Justice and the City" 
will form the basis of the next chapter. 
CHAPTER FOUR: GEOGRAPHY AS SOCIAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
and when he saw, he passed by on the other side. 
Luke 10 v.31. 
4.1.1, 
Four years after Harvey had complete.d "Explanation in Geography" C.19691. 
at a point in time when tquantophrenia
' 
appeared to have. gained the 
ascendency in geography, he turned his thesis upon its head and wrote: 
"After completing a study of methodological problems in geography, which 
was published under the title of "Explanation in Geography", I began to 
explore certain philosophical issues which had deliberately been neg-
lected in that book. In particular, I felt it important and appro-
priate to explore how ideas in social and moral philosophy - ideas that 
are ~ustomarily regarded as distinctive and separate avenues of enquiry 
from the philosophy of science which had hitherto held my attention -
could be related to geographical enquiry ... "* In the introduction to 
"Social Justice and the City", Harvey outlines the areas of geographical 
explanation that he had found to be. problematical in his previous writ-
ing. In so doing he outlines those conceptual sections of contemporary 
geography that present difficulties in explanation as, the nature of 
space, nhe nature of theory, the nature of knowledge, and the nature of 
scientific enquiry. In order to exemplify these he explores the theme 
of social justice drawn from urbanism. The examples that he uses are 
drawn from different philosophical modes. The first half of the book 
being ideologically based upon the notions of distributive justice, as 
exemplified in the work of Rawls*, and the second half of the book is 
modelled upon Harvey's understanding of social justice derived from the 
works of Marx. He terms these respectively as liberal and socialist 
formulations of the nature of social justice in the urban community. 
4.1.2. 
Harvey puts forward the ideas of social justice in two forms. The 
liberal form as an accepted present possibility, he presents as a thesis 
The Marxian possibility he puts forward as an antithesis. The point 
about "Social Justice and the City" is that Harvey does not write a syn-
thesis; therefore the work is from the outset incomplete. To take a 
simple example of these two formulations, consider the justice of soc ie-
ties to children and infants whose parents have died. The Rawlsian 
philosophy is that the parents should make provision for their children, 
and amass some wealth for their future welfare. The Marxian philosophy 
is that the state should provide, until such time as the children can make 
their contribution to the welfare of others within the state. Distri-
butive justice leaves more to chance than socialist justice, it also 
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allows children to inherit the Jl)istortunes of their parents. Harvey 
realised that IIExplanati-on til Geography" was not only a defi-nitive work 
on the quanttticatory theme, but that the theme was thus totally devoid 
of humanity towards those who inhaoited the geographical world, and as 
such only continued the Varenian division. The revolution into quan-
ti-fi-cati-on was not new, but rather the revival of an ancient theme. 
In Lord Kelvin~s "Popular Lectures and Addresses" of 1891, one may read: 
"When you cannot measure what you are speaking about, when you cannot 
express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory 
kind; i-t may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely in 
your thoughts advanced to the stage of a science, whatever the matter 
may be." This nomothetic appeal continued with, .•• "increasing mea-
surements and quantification being the distinguishing marks of a pro-
gressing science"* Against which Ackerman* suggested that "These state-
ments do not deny the place of the 'geographic' region (compage) as an 
intellectual concept. Certainly it has been a useful concept, which 
already must be ranked as an important contribution by twentieth century 
geography." Such an i-deographic response continued the Varenian divi-
sion, excepting for appeals for a philosophical unity of purpose, as 
suggested by Mackinder (l.S.S.l, until Harvey realised that this was 
a key problem that geographers had avoided through lack of philosophical 
understanding. 
4.1.3. 
Harvey then saw the difficulty that geographers had created for them-
selves, and how he had contributed to this position. The discipline 
existed based upon an unnecessary paradigmatic division in structure. 
This had added philosophical contributions into the framework, but had 
never been examined philosophically, The simple inputs from sociology 
showed that geographical data was not in total amenable to treatment 
as suggested in "Explanation in Geography". This view presupposed a 
state of geographical data theory and concepts as taken for granted. 
Nomothetics could not pbse concepts as problems, and they could not ac-
count for change. The Parsonian view of the social world was assumed 
into the world of quantophrenic geography. The need was for a dialectic, 
but there must be a prior investigation of the terms involved, because 
before one may arrive at a synthesis of geography, one first requires 
a thesis and antithesis, Harvey suggests that there are prior analy-
tical i-nvestigations that might be considered before 'one need embrace 
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the l1arxist )JJethod o:e the dialectic. \ \\Social Justice and the City" 
sets out two s~ple and clear constructions of how one may view the 
city as problematic. The liberal formulations of the first part con-
sider the conceptual problems of urban planning, then the social pro-
cesses and spatial form concerned with the redistribution of real in-
comes in an urban system. This extends into territorial social jus-
tice relating to a 'just distribution'. The underpinning values are 
those of need, the common good and merit, derived from the morality of 
Rawlsian distribution. In geographical terms need may span the wish of 
some human beings not to starve, to the wish of some who need cheap en-
ergy to fly the oceans. The common good is frequently first utilised 
by the bureaucracy, and merit is a very moveable feast: killing an 
enemy for the common good in war time has a different merit from the 
same act in time of peace. 
4.1.4. 
The second part of "Social Justice and the City", entitled 'Socialist 
Formulations' considers the nature of revolutionary and counter revolu-
tionary theories pertaining to geography. Harvey examines how these 
theories relate to use value and exchange value, and how these ideas 
extend into the modes of production and the mode of economic integration, 
thence into the space economy of urbanism. Between these formulations, 
Harvey has set out only a liberal thesis and a socialist antithesis. 
According to Mao Tse-Tung * liThe law of contradictions in things, that 
is the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic la\v of materialist 
dialectics. II Harvey does not attempt to unify the opposites into a 
Marxian dialectic, because as he points out,* "I have already indicated 
that a radical transformation of method occurs between Part 1 and Part 2 
of this book. This transformation of method does not negate the formu-
lations of Part 1. It enriches them to higher order concepts. It 
also brings about a convergence towards an ontological and epistemo-
logical pOSition akin to that held by Marx. "* One cannot create a 
Marxist explanation based upon accepted material that justifies a liberal 
- bourgeois society, which Harvey claims to have done here. Yet refer-
ence to the dialectic is not omitted by him, it is rejected for logical 
reasons, that should have appealed to geographers had they stayed the 
course and read to page 302. These were that the pressing and serious 
probelms that confronted, many disciplines at the end of the 1960's were 
those of economic development, the environment and urbanism. Any study 
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ot these problems showed then) to be interrelated. Al though they be-
came ;t..llpact areas ot study tor geographers only an interdisciplinary 
approach seemed to otter rewards:. "Social Justice and the City" is tirst 
ot all an appeal tor interdisciplinary examination of problems in geog-
raphy. Dialectics is a suggested method, which Harvey fails to fully 
explore. 
4.1.5. 
Two further areas of investigation proposed by Harvey include "How and 
why would we bring about a revolution in geographic thought?"* and 
"Concepts and categories cannot be viewed as having an independent exis-
tence, as being universal abstractions for all time."* To the first 
proposition Harvey devotes his fourth chapter. The 'how' of revolution 
in disciplinary thought is not difficult to understand. Varenius man-
aged a revolution by accepting the Copernican paradigm; Keynes revolu-
tionised economics, and Burton claimed a quantitative revolution in 
geographic technology. There are further claims to revolutions in 
geography since Burton which will be examined later. This progression 
of revolutions mirrors a similar progression in contemporary sociology, 
which was examined in the previous chapter. Each 'revolution' arises 
at a time when the established orthodoxy of the discipline shows clear 
inconsistencies with the outstanding facts of reality, and yet appears 
to be confident of its own intellectual ability to explain these facts. 
The 'revolutionary' theory exposes the incompetence of the orthodoxy 
in order to make them open to ridicule. If confusion follows, the 
way opens for the new theory to offer convincing explanations to the 
nature of the problems devised for a new era, and to offer a new set of 
policy prescriptions based upon new a~planations. A new theory requires 
five main characteristics. Firstly it has to attack the orthodoxy's 
central propOSitions as conservative by reversing their analysis. 
Secondly the theory has to appear new With an academically acceptable 
analysis of the non-disputable components of the existing theory. 
Thirdly, the new theory requires a certain degree of difficulty to com-
prehend; old concepts are given new names; senior academics waste time 
on peripheral issues and not having the time or energy to absorb the 
'new' mode, they are criticised and dismissed as ignorant by younger, 
hungrier colleagues, who present the new theory as a challenge to younger 
colleagues and stud~!ts. Fourthly, the new theory has to offer a new 
methodology to keep the keen but less status-seeking members of the 
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discipline busy. ~inally, it llsually has to offer a relationship, 
preferably an empirical one ••• ideally to measure something. This 
analysis was suggested by Harvey* to show how the orthodox geography 
with the central propositions of the qualitative and the unique had 
their propositions reversed into the quantitative revolution. 
4.1.6. 
The 'why' of revolution is not so difficult. Together. with Harvey*, 
I* accept the proposition by Marx and Engels in "The German Ideology", 
that the ruling class produces the ruling ideas that rule society. The 
organisation of knowledge reflects the ruling interests in our society, 
and knowledge is derived from the status quo: it is our duty not to 
explain reality, but by changing it, to improve it. As our society 
devolves upon the spatiality of class, change requires revolution. 
Conflict in terms of the Darwinian inevitability of gradualness does 
not lead to revolutions: revolutions require help even at the lowest 
level of the exchange of ideas. Revolutions in disciplines may only 
be claimed when one has some clarity of understanding as to what con-
st.itutes a revolution. 
4.1.7. 
Besides the nature of revolutionary thought in geography, Harvey con-
siders the nature of concepts.* "It is irrelevant to ask whether con-
cepts, categories and relationships are 'true' or 'false'. We have to 
ask, rather, what it is that produces them and what is it that they 
serve to produce?" Geographical concepts are produced in part and 
serve to produce the social theories from which they are drawn, and 
which they serve. Harvey's examples of revolutionary theory in geog-
raphy relate directly to those various social theories considered in 
Chapter 3 of'· this paper. Theories of a revolutionary nature being 
productive of change from within the existing social structure. Theo-
ries termed status quo preserve the existing social order in both prac-
tice and theory. Counter revolutionary theories according to Harvey 
produce only confusion, 'ob.fuscation and frustration. These classes 
of concepts are more deliberately chosen than Harvey seems to suggest. 
Recent moves to equate geography with phenomenology, which will be con-
sidered in the next section, are attempts to take geography back to a 
pre-quantophrenic era. If one is aware of the functions that concepts 
carry out in society, then it is not difficult to realise that a 
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deliberate attempt to moye the d~$ctpline back in time ts counter-
revoluttonary. Fundamental to phenomenology ts a methodology of net-
works derived from micro-studies which will lead geography into attempts 
to seriously analyse data more trivial than the rejected notes of either 
Le Play or Vidal de la Blache. The logic of such studies requires 
that each situation will be dictated by an acute awareness of the in-
tentionality of each relevant individual as a point of take-off in each 
micro-study. conceptually this will take geography back in time for 
generations. One might as well attempt to rewrite "The Personality 
of Ulster", but starting from two opposite intentionalities of 'repre-
sentative' individuals from either side of the line of drumlins. Two 
geographies would result. They would be micro-studies of regional 
views originating from different socio-economic histories. Any attempt 
at a synthesis of these conflicting geographies would be pointless, be-
cause the nature of the individual meanings of solutions are incompatible 
from the outset. Identical words could not have similar undertones, 
such a geography would only highlight the nature of the social and cul-
tural gaps. 
4.1.8. 
Concepts arise t~rough a process derived from no~ only prior concepts, 
but also from theories of what exists: these ontologies concern our 
notions of reality; and realities have structures. A difficulty with 
structures concerns their stability and it is problematic whether we 
know enough: to decide whether the structures of theories are static, 
ephemeral, or for ever in transformation. The conditions and proceedures 
that one uses to attempt to understand the nature of knowledge are epis-
temological. Knowledge is a part of an individuals experience, but 
also part of the culture that is transmitted by modes of information, 
education and experience; knowledge also develops out of human practice. 
If ontology and epistemology are determinants of concepts,. being the 
fundamental categories of knowledge, concepts must be open to change, 
just as knowledge of reality and the process of knowing seems to expand 
and contract. 
The theories that are presently upon offer to geographers all have his-
tories , and these histories have twins in other disciplines. Each 
theory has a methodology to offer, it has a conceptual base to serve the 
chosen methods, and the methods and concepts have a justification by 
reference to some philosophical viewpoint. Yet the open invitation to 
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any geographer to wr~te a d~alecttc to Haxyey\s ~Social Justice' 
appears to have been avoided, stnce Churchill labelled the IIron 
Curtain', socialism in the Western world has been viewed with concern, 
Marxist socialism has been greeted with a socialised fear. Yet the 
ideology of Marx has been transformed into various practical forms 
across the globe at a speed only forseen by Mackinder in "Democratic 
Ideals and Reality. II He was accused of seeing hordes of folk swarm-
ing out of central Asia, but perhaps he may have been writing concern-
ing the spread of ideas, in which case his choice of Heartland was seem-
ingly apt. Cohen's * globe requires considerable updating to include 
the ideological shades and divisions since, 1973. 
4.2.l. 
Having realised that the structural functionalist elements which he had 
taken into "Expla.nation in Geography" distorted the balance of theore-
tical social meanings, Harvey also realised that there were further dis-
tortions. The choice of social theory, distorted social meaning; the 
choice of philosophical justification distorted the derived geographical 
concepts, but the separation of methodology from philosophy limited the 
nature of geographical categories at the disposal of the theorist. The 
problem concerning categories revolved around three core areas. These 
are concerned with human reason, paradigms and meanings. 
In the 'Critique of Pure Reason I Kant raises three core questions through 
philosophy, that are central to those concerned with human reason. 
"How can I know?" "What shall I do?" and "What may I hope?" These 
questions comprise an essential concern of philosophy, if it is involved 
with the essential potential of mankind when faced with the deprivations 
of reality. Hegel placed this philosophical concern in the historical 
context of his own times, therefore the questions lead into the actual 
historical process. But Hegel's historical process was an advanced and 
comprehensive statement of bourgeois principles. It claimed that rea-
son was the only standard of society, it showed that abstract labour 
lead to a unified system of Iwants'; it showed the revolutionary nature 
of liberal ideas of freedom and equality, and offered history of socie-
ties as the history of irreconcilable antagonisms in the social order 
that could only be made latent by a monarchic structure. According to 
Hegel the process, of labour determines the development of consciousness, 
whilst the interdependence with 'wants' determines the system of the 
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state and 0;1; socj..etYt The ~aY.' to selt. consct.ous t.reedom lies through 
the 'lue and deatlL' struggle between master and servant, Of this 
system, all these categories terminate in the state of the existing 
order at the time at which Hegel lived, 
4.2.2. 
Writing in 'Explanation' in 1969, Harvey arrived at a similar histor-
ical position in the chapter on tSystems': "the rendering of an explan-
ation of any type may be contingent upon the specification of a system .•. 
justification for regarding the system as the key to explanation arises 
from major applications of the concept on all areas of empirical invest-
igation during the twentieth century. From both a methodological and 
an empirical point of view, therefore the concept of a system appears 
absolutely central for our understanding of explanation in geography." 
A Marxian critique* of this theoretical stance could suggest that all 
these Helelian concepts are an indictment of the total existing order. 
Marxian philosophy is addressed to the negation of this very order of 
society. The truth which Marxists address is to be obtained only 
through the abolition of civil society in the form in which Hegel saw 
it. Even when describing the current form of society i or attemp1:ing 
to explain current society, Marxist systems of c~tegories aim at a new 
form of society altogether. The simplest explanation for this is that 
Hegel's philosophy is separated from the methods of explaining the rea-
lity around him, and in 'Explanation', Harvey* eventually becomes aware 
that theory and methods are not enough to answer Kant's questions. He 
assembles the difficulties in this order:- "Unfortunately it is not 
always possible to separate philosophy and methodology; •. Nevertheless, 
there are many methods which can be evaluated independent of their 
philosophical connotations .•• But geographical problems cannot be solved 
by the mere selection of some more logically consistent methodology. 
What is omitted from this •.• amounts to an adequate philosophy of geog-
raphy •.• The philosophical implication is that the geographer needs to 
identify the particular domain with which he is specifically concerned •.. 
it is easiest to identify such a domain when we possess a well articu-
lated and well validated theory •.• Since academic activity frequently in-
volves division of labour, individual geographers may specialise ••• 
and some may not be aware of the general structure to which they are 
contributing." 
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4.2,3, 
This is the Hegelian statement, which some cla~ Marx turned upon its 
head. Harvey also attempted this when he wrote in tSocial Justice 
and the City' that geographical explanation required a methodology that 
was not divorced from philosophy. For those geographers who had 
recently accepted 'Explanation in Geography I , the about turn in 'Social 
Justice' presented too difficult a challenge, too quickly to accept. 
It may be supposed that Harvey was lead into a re-examination of his 
material through the Marxist categories of contradiction. His philo-
sophy of science had been derived from the work of Nagel* from whose 
law-like science geography would fulfil the Kantian category of 'knowing', 
from a science of spatial relationships one could derive the Kantian 
ldoing', and by establishing a category of predictiveness, geography 
would offer the Kantian 'hopei. However the obvious contradiction 
derived from a review of the work of Kuhn, not that geographers are 
asked to define their discipline as to the nature of the scientific 
model that each should choose; Is it a purely popper ian: , modeltl or 
is it a popperian model? The telling Kuhnian question is "How does 
this as a set of concepts make sense of the relationship between the 
intellectual and the social sides of the discipline?" Harvey felt 
some guilt concerning the establishment of the quantitative technology* 
therefore the statements in Kuhn's liThe Structure of Scientific Revolu-
tions" concerning various ways in which paradigm disputes demark them-
selves must have been especially meaningful. According to Kuhn * a 
paradigm should, "for a time implicitly define the legitimate problems 
and methods of a research field for succeeding generations of practi-
tioners, (because) their achievement is sufficiently unprecedented to 
attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of 
scientific activity, simultaneously, it is sufficiently open ended to 
leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to 
resolve." Yet to many it seemed that having been involved in the es-
tablishment of one alternative paradigm to orthodox geography, Harvey 
immediately set out to establish another. 
4.2.4. 
Further Kuhn suggests that there are five dimensions to a paradigm demar-
cation. The first is the political dimension, the second is the dimen-
sion from philosophy, the third is ontological; in so far as it is con-
cerned with reasons and causes; the fourth involves a methodological 
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dimensi.on, in answer to the question; IIWhat are the appropri.ate met .... 
hods needed .in order to expla.in the nature of the chosen paradigm?" 
In 'Explanation', Harvey had glossed over many of these areas as non-
problematic. Fifthly Kuhn raises a vital difficulty concerning the 
'scientific cormnunity'*, where he discusses not socialization into 
the cormnunity, but the division of labour and how it is socially main-
tained. 
These five dimensions are the five that are the substansive points at 
dispute throughout the contemporary history of geography's search for 
identity. They pose questions when they are inter-related. Questions 
of this order. "What are the politics of knowledge and control in 
geography?" "Is geography a physical science or a social science, or 
both or neither?" "Are geographers artists, measurers,or solvers of 
problems of reality?" "Are geographers interested in social .space 
and its impact upon people, and what forms of change are generated in 
or by social space?" "Or are geographers interested in descriptively 
studying social space relationships?" "Are they interested in social 
space at all?" Finally there is the problem of "Where did these cate-
gories derive from?" The nature of space is both physical and social, 
but as geography sets the study of each into different paradigmatic 
formulations, then each form subjects itself to the five dimensions of 
dispute that Kuhn p~ts forward. 
4.2.5. 
The categories that concerned geographers since Varenius were those 
that derived from the understanding of space through the modes of phy-
sics, and the case for these categories being operated as physical en-
tities culminated in the quantificatory methods stressed by Burton; 
such a choice indicates a political choice which Harvey suggests* is a 
liberal one. But irrespective of a claimed political bias one may 
argue against the existence of geography as a purely physical science, 
of physical spatial relationships that lead to predictions, because the 
social sciences had placed doubt upon such claims through three ques-
tions. The first asks simply, "At what point does geography have 
actors with aims and intentions that relate to the subject matter of 
their discipline?" The second requests to know, "What are geographers 
doing?" And the third, "If one accepts that geography needs explana-
tion in human terms, then why should the tools of the physical sciences 
apply to the case at issue?" This relationship that Kuhn had stressed 
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concerning the intellectual and social sides of any discipline offered 
to Harvey a second motivation for re-examing his previous work. In 
any discipline with human appendages, human subjects, either as actors, 
participants or observers become part of the explanations. Alasdair 
MacIntyre* Ttlhen considering, "HO\'l are beliefs related to actions? Does 
what men believe alter their actions so as to make a difference to their 
social life?" decides that "the thesis that the limits of action are 
the limits of description, that the delineation of a society's concepts 
is therefore ••. the crucial step in the delineation of its social life." 
Therefore "it follows that the analysis of an ideology must always fall 
into three parts: we have to identify what the ideas and beliefs are 
which compose it, we have to identify the kind of limits which they 
place upon action, and we have to examine what are the consequent means 
by which it either keeps open the way to rational criticism or attempts 
to prevent criticism which does not fall inside the established con-
ceptual frame work." 
4.2.6. 
The relationship between beliefs and actions suggests that in studying 
the space that is occupied by actors, or studying space for the improved 
information of human subjects, then geographers ideas relate to the 
ideas of significant others, for whom, or of whom their work is con-
cerned. Therefore a mutual conceptual framework has to be established, 
in order for both parties to relate to the study. Both or either human 
subjects, then influence the explanation, and by influencing the explan-
ation become part of it. As this is the case, then what is the point 
of believing that the orthodox macrological views of descriptions, (viz. 
of regions) or quantified relationships (transport networks) are value 
free upon the part of the geographer, or upon the part of the described 
or quantified actor within the explanation? Actors in the social set-
ting is the third influence that reformulated Harvey's ideas* for he 
states, "The notion of a one-dimensional man living in an urban non-place 
realm was explicitly rejected and in this I am in entire agreement. 1I 
4.2.6. 
If asked, social scientists might well consider that the major work of 
what geographers are doing is to contribute to an ongoing debate con-
cerning duality, organisation, intentionality and rationality. The 
matter of debate concerning duality has been common to geographers for 
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some Varenian time, but sociologists took up the matter at a different 
level * as Dawe * wrote, "There are then two sociologies: a sociology 
of social system and a sociology of social action. They are grounded 
in the diametrically opposed concerns with two central problems, those 
of order and control. And at every level they are in conflict." How 
many geographers in their concern for understanding have not intuited 
that their dichotomy debates were not really about categories of dif-
ferent orders? Dawe continues, "The first asserts the paramount nec-
essity, for societal and individual well-being, of external constraint; 
•.. The key notion of the second is autonomous man, able to realise his 
full potential and to create a truly human social order only when freed 
from external constraint." Whitehand's paper is a geographer's attempt 
at the former, but do the 'Peninsular' and the 'Ulster' paper approach 
the latter? Then Dawe suggests, "The problems of order and control 
are problems of value ... it is to say that values playa much more per-
vasive role in sociology than is allowed by the conventional wisdom of 
value-neutrality." 
Dawe by arguing for the recognition that dualities pose questions con-
cerning different orders of values, created a major response which sug-
gested that analysis would offer a key to understanding, as Robertson 
implied * with, "If anything about sociology is crystal-clear, it is 
that it exhibits low degrees of analytical consistency, continuity and 
concensus." The suggestion being that when applied to geographers 
arguing about dualities, they assumed that the differences concerned 
content, but in reality concerned only values. 
4.2.7. 
It is possible to view geographers' work, from an action frame of refer-
ence, implying different organisational connotations, involving a notion 
of autooomous man. Silverman outlines such with great clarity * because, 
"while behaviour may be viewed as a reflection of the organisational 
structure and its problems, ... it is equally valid to suggest that the 
organisation itself is the outcome of the interaction of motivated 
peQple attempting to resolve their own problems ..• the environment in 
which an organisation is located might usefully be regarded as a source 
of meanings through which members defined their actions and made sense 
of the actions of others." 
An action approach presents seven propositions, which are:-
1) The social sciences and the natural sciences deal with entirely 
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different orders of subject-matter. 
2) Sociology is concerned with understanding action rather than with 
observing behaviour. 
3) Meanings are given to men by their society. 
4) While society defines man, man in turn defines society. 
5} Through their interactions men change social meanings. 
6) Explanations of human actions must take account of the meanings 
which those concerned assign to their acts. 
7} Positivistic explanations, are inadmissible. 
The organisati~n in which a geographer operates is a system of human 
interactions, and at the simplest level a 'human' geographer is only 
mapping out these propositions of action reference. 
4.2.7. 
Wittgenstein * termed "meaning" an 'odd job' word which is called upon 
to perform a variety of tasks. If geographers need explanations in 
human terms, then they need to consider the factors of intentionality 
and rationality that are encapsulated within meaning. The moon does 
not intend to orbit the earth, the weather does not intend to bring us 
variety, plants do not intend to grow, nor do volcanoes intend to erupt, 
these are just natural events. Weber* considered that the 'specific 
task of sociological analysis, is the interpretation of action in terms 
of subjective meaning.' The meaning of a human action is in the actor's 
intention, his purpose, his motive, or his 'reason' for carrying out 
that specific act: understanding is only as complete in so far as 
another understands the actors' reason for carrying out his act. Con-
sider the intentionality of a map where the centre of the geometric 
world is Greenwich; the intentionality of the 'Peninsular', the inten-
tionality of Whitehand's paper, and the real and the implied intention-
alities concerning the paper on 'Ulster'. As intentionality runs from 
research into meaning,* so do notions of rationality, which substantiate 
the transmitted values, because they arise from the same sources of 
meaning. 
4.2.8. 
which 
weber distinguished four types of social action/are rationally based. 
There is traditional action, which is a customary, almost automatic 
action within a social relationship. Affectual actions are those deter-
mined by the actors feelings. Value rational action is orientated 
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towards some absolute end, such as beauty, human freedom or virtue; 
the means towards the end is not ah'lays connected with it, and there 
is no guarantee that the end will be achieved. Instrumentally rat-
ional action may also be seen to be technically purposive action; this 
is action determined by the actors employment of means towards specific 
ends, which involve the expectations of natural phenomena as they be-
have, and the expectations of social actors as they act. 
Dudley Stamp's plea, "We have our maps!", is an example of a tradition-
ally rational action. Michael Chisholm's remark, "The Marxist method 
of dialectic, passes my understanding, it seems to be as a metaphysical 
belief system and not a mode of rational argument", is an example of 
rationality determined by the actor's feelings, and thus affectual emo-
tion. Harvey's justification for two halves of 'Social Justice and 
the City' is a clear example of action derived from value rationality. 
Whereas the actions of the innovators of the quantitative 'revolution' 
were clearly technically purposive, thus being instrumentally rational 
actions. 
4.2.9. 
"Social Justice and the City" attracted critics. Whet} geographers 
have 'utilised this material they have apparently been offered choices 
of different formulations of the same problematic areas. But their 
choice outcomes are partly determined by the values that they bring 
with them in addressing the text. The choices of critique that they 
adopt are reflections of the prejudices that they bring to their read-
ing, together with their personal notions of how society is. 
seems to have laid a carefully prepared and considered trap. 
Harvey 
To ques-
tion the book and the concepts that the book examines, is to question 
one's own attitudes to geography upon a wider field than geography had 
previously considered to be within its disciplinary scope. If one is 
to seriously unpack Harvey's "Social Justice", then one must be pre-
pared to examine one's own philosophy of geography, and further examine 
and justify one's own values as part of an explanation. "Social Jus-
tice and the City" is an invitation to write a synthesis for a new 
paradigm. The juxtapositioning of socialist and liberal formulations 
concerning urbanism does not offer a choice of material to choose from. 
There is no duality of the Varenian division. The two sides of the 
coin are part of the same whole, one can not walk away with the tail 
and reject the head. The major problem is to use the material without 
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falling into the trap of believing that one has a choice of either, or. 
Various scholarly entries into this arena have been made, but few quite 
so disastrously as that of Coates, Johnston and Knox, * in "Geography 
and Inequality.1I 
4.3.l. 
Coates, Johnston and Knox have a general thesis to the effect that, "We 
live in an unequal world," to which they address "Geography and Inequal-
ity." Although their concern is with the spatial dimensions of social 
inequality, they stress the the "causes, consequences and mimifestations 
of inequality are dominantly structural rather than spatial in nature." 
This Parsonain social division leads to choosing the liberal formulations 
from Harvey as references in order that their material from the Regis-
trar General relates to the measuring of the quality of life. The spa-
tial emphasis upon inequality is required in order to defend a thesis 
concerned with measurement, that will bring both inequality and equal-
ity within the reach of number. As soon as the structural content is 
lost from the thesis, then so is the synthesis of ideas that Harvey was 
suggesting. "Geography and Inequality" begins with lIa discussion of 
the concepts ~f quality, well being and need, and the problems involved 
in measuring the 'quality of life' .•. certain patterns emerge and are 
explained in terms of three broad sets of reasons; the division of lab-
our, accessibility (of resources), and territorial division (or areas 
of administration).11 Harvey is quoted as referee * and an interesting 
twist is given to the a.'{iom," From each according to his ability, to 
each according to his need," as follows" ... we have already seen ... how 
difficult it is to establish an adequate definition of need ... it is the 
overwhelming consensus ... in most societies, and certainly within the 
Western world, equity is generally identified quite simply with equality, 
which prompts the perspective on inequality which is adopted in this 
book. Accepting then that equality approximates to equity, there is a 
number of well developed techniques to which we can turn in evaluating 
spatial distributions." 
4.3.2. 
Any difficulties arising from these assertions are clarified in the 
graph of the distribution of taxable incomes in Norway for 1971, via the 
formula:-
92 
( 
n ( Xi Pi 
G = i = 1 ( 
x 
2 
But this not unexpected reductiQpism of words and meanings was prejudiced 
by bringing their own notions of theory, space, knowledge and modes of 
scientific enquiry to bear upon Harvey's philosophical discussion, that 
was already beyond the reach of numbers. The skills of mathematical 
techniques are difficult to turn into meaningful words in the forecast-
ing of the weather, when the satelite phot'ographs are at hand. Mean-
ingful explanations of the weather are difficult enough under these 
circumstances, let alone a correct forecast of what will take place in 
the continuous future. A quantified definition of 'need' seems iro-
plausiple: when Shakespeare tried using only mere words, his King Lear 
managed just, "Oh, reason not the need! Our basest beggars are in the 
poorest things superfluous." To quantify need fixes a whole range of 
qualities in a moral way. The formulae of Coates et al refer to nat-
ural science, logical positivism * and a structural functionalist soc-
'iety. These three nomothetic geographical attributes indicate that if 
one appies a law, means that the law will hold good for the future and 
that the same social conditions will hold true in the future. Consider 
this logical train: A definition of inequality, through some consensus; 
an overwhelming consensus, but only in so~e societies, or only most 
Western societies gives rather uncertain certainty as a premiss. From 
this premiss, one may positively assert that equality = equity or con-
versely inequality = inequity, and upon this firm, reasoned and logical 
base for a philosophical triviality, Coates et al., can apply their 
well worn quantophrenic techniques. The effects of politics upon soc-
ial justice is relegated to a minor conclusion. But the critical fail-
ure was that Harvey's discussion of the nature of knowledge, had clearly 
pointed out the errors in attempting to quantify human values, and Coates 
et al., trapped themselves by regression into a well known technique, 
instead of searching for an epistemological advance. 
4.3.3. 
A careful look at the trap in "Social Justice and the City" was taken 
by James Bird in "Centrality and Cities"*. He clearly read and 
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understood the implications o! choosing !xom either a liberal or soc-
ialist !ormulation, and chose to avoid making any choice. His theme 
was to consider the nature o! centrality as a concern of geographers, 
and to use the notions of urbanism as examples o! explanation. He 
uses Harvey's material as a comparison in the form of an antithesis to 
the Adams - Wheatley thesis * concerning the development of cities. 
When Bird analyses Harvey's reasoning for the founding o! cities * he 
uses the view of the foundation of cities through the forces of relig-
ion. The primary object of Bird's exercise seems to be a return to 
the Kantian proposition that "the human mind has built into it a spat-
ial schema which setves a purpose analogous to that of the graticule 
on a map projection". He sees spatial co-ordinates arising from lay-
ered graticules that inter-web on levels o! information, experience and 
expectations. This model highly influenced by Karl Popper and Levi 
Strauss appears to be a 'necessary escape' from Harvey's confrontation 
with politics. * The spatial co-ordination of information, experience 
and expectations is in the geographical terms that Harvey introduced 
through ,"Social Justice" now a political co-ordination. The major dif-
ficulty in Bird's "Centrality and Cities" is to decide whether the work 
constitutes a political examination of space. The title rules out the 
possibility of an a-political approach to the .subject, yet the structure 
of the book claims that from the nomothetic form of centrality, one may 
study the ideographs of cities devoid of political content. 
4.3.4. 
A different approach towards the thesis put forward by Harvey in IISoc-
ial Justice" ,'las that of David Ley. *He examines these propositions, 
that quantification as a response for an adequate geography cannot 
extend far beyond the limits of numbers; That Harvey's call for a pol-
itical commitment within geography is so wrapped in facts and values as 
to make the political option little more than a personal wish; that 
the data that Harvey presented should be examined in an a-political man-
nero Ley's problem is that he cannot accept a Marxian interpretation 
of social life, but realises that the problems to which Marx addressed 
himself are genuine problems. If his feelings are in tune with the 
socialist formulations of urbanism, that Harvey examined, thep they are 
more in tune to the solutions envisaged by the very early Christians, be-
fore the evolution of the Christian bureaucracy, than to the solutions 
suggested by Marx. His solution therefore lies through a 
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phenomenological enterprise into urban geography, Ley analysed the 
works of Marx to which Harvey gives reference, and through examining 
the bias of the choices of material that Harvey had used, implies that 
the meaning of the Marxian notions had been misconstrued. This ap-
proach avoided the obvious attack ad hominem, but implies that this 
could be the case. Ley followed the expected pattern of confronta-
tion of beliefs between the phenomenologist and the Marxist sociologist. 
Firstly one examines the overt bias of the other, and then reduces the 
sociological content under examination to macro and micro social systems. 
The division of the nature of the subject matter under discussion is 
then set out into an ideographic portion and a nomothetic portion as 
shown by Silverman in the previous section. (4.2.7.) This then destroys 
Harvey's appeal for structural unity within the subject matter. Sec-
ondly the major gap between the two forms, theism and atheism may be 
examined in the theist limits of a phenomenological ideograph. However 
only the human content of geography is open to examination by the pheno-
menologist. Thus Ley fails to confront the nature of scientific en-
quiry, and avoids the major contribution . that Harvey proposed. That 
is, that a geography in a social and political vacuum is impossible. 
Harvey may be wrong about Marx, and perhaps Marx is not the solution 
to the problems of urbanism in the Western world, but there is now a 
political dimension to geography. Further the world is not a mere 
phenomenon, subjective in all its dimensions, there is a genuine place 
for a natural science of things. 
4.3.5. 
A fourth dimension of criticism is through that scholastic work by 
Gregory. * His problem is manifold, but his intention in "Ideology, 
Science and Human Geography" is to "question the many assumptions of 
quantitctiv.e methodology, and above all to reinstate man into the study 
of geography."* His position in the scope of geographical theory is 
taken to be a positivist stand towards phenomenology. His solution to 
his problem is to avoid any acceptance of Harvey's suggestion to exam-
ine the dialectic, or of Mackinder's request to establish a bridge be-
tween the sciences. His method of explanation is to state that there 
is more to theory than positivism and deductivism. Then to proceed to 
an eclectic collation of all that has gone before. He seems to say, 
"We must do everything, so we must write everything and say everything 
that is available." He looks at all the schools and traditions of previous 
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geographies, and produces nothing except sheer eclectic confusion, 
Then having 'put everything together' he defends the region in which 
he has chosen to perform as the area of his ideological concern. The 
defence is against Harvey's 'holist' geography on the one hand, and 
the positivism of the quantophrenics upon the other. Firstly he stress-
es that geography will become a much more difficult enterprise, if 
geographers move into criticism or awareness of the nature of philo-
sophies. Secondly, following the social analysis of Silverman, he re-
labels the theoretical trends in contemporary geography. 
4.3.6. 
His concern about the introduction of philosophy into geography stems 
from his acceptance that the natural sciences and the social sciences 
are totally opposed in both form and content. If a study of philosophy 
were to undermine this basic assumption, the Varenian gap might be 
bridged. A unified discipline might result, which would show the weak-
nesses of phenomenology. Or as Gregory terms this, the discipline 
would become a branch of philosophy and geographies might disappear. 
His relabelling classifies "Social Justice" as radical geography, where-
as his own theorizing he labels as "critical geography", which he feels 
he has presented as an assertion, having first demonstrated the inade-
quacies of "traditional geography". This latter group being the pre-
sent paradigmatic mixture of quantification and regionalism. It is 
not the re-labelling of geographical thought that is interesting in 
this formulation, but the positivistic assertion in this thinking, when 
the book is addressed to the inadequacies of logical positivism and its 
malinfluence upon geographical theorizing. "What I am saying," claims 
Gregory*,"is that a critical geography must see it as an important pol-
itical task to resist the integration demanded by le relative ••• there~ 
fore it cannot afford to model itself on the natural sciences." This 
statement of his own values leads directly to his judgements of the pro-
blems concerning 'traditional geography.' Gregory is at pains to stress 
the timidity of other geographers. In his first two chapters he attacks 
with aggression, the positivistic forms of prior geographies, but in 
"Geography and Critical Science", his third chapter, he marks out his 
own timidity, that leads into the final eclectic confusion of this book. 
Gregory proceeds from Husserl to Schutz, in a standard manner, but then 
introduces hermeneutics. This extraction of the interpretation of the 
Scriptures, stresses the positivistic ideas of human behaviour, not the 
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ideas of h~~an action that is the usual argument into phenomenology. 
This deterministic trend in explaining human interaction seems con-
trary to all that Gregory has previously been arguing for.. The rest of 
his book is a request to place all geography, as human geography into 
the sphere of the social sciences. His ongoing aim is then revealed, 
his intention is to write a regional geography, in order to examine the 
praxis of his thesis. This is because he sees the task of the discip-
line "of ceasing to hide from open encounters with the theories which 
direct geography, or from the practices which sustain it." *After such 
attacks upon all other geographies, it seems a timid retreat to revert 
to regionalism. However he argues a case for such a retreat, through 
the needs of a duality in geography, a non inquiring philosophy, a new 
paradigm of critical hermeneutics, and a positivistic, deterministic 
base to human behaviour as seen inside regional boundaries. 
4.3.7. 
Gregory presents a confusion of the nature of theory in his attempt to 
avoid the difficulties of examining Harvey's suggestion that one should 
examine philosophy, and not separate it from one's methods. Harvey 
extended a challenge to geographers in compiling "Social Justice," and 
there appear to be six responses. The first is to consider the work 
as meaningful and attempt to extend it, as in the case of 'Radical Geo-
graphy'*. The second is the approach that Gregory seems to have taken: 
to consider the propositions of the text and to offer a limited, but 
detailed response to parts of it, whilst trying to subdue the Marxist 
definition of society. The third is to use an extract from the book 
correctly, but as an example of a different set of reference terms, as 
used by Bird. Fourthly, one may seemingly take the spirit of the text, 
turn it upon its head and quantify it as did Coates et al. Fifthly, one 
may quote from the examples of liberal formulations as used in the first 
part of Social Justice as if they expressed the total content of the 
work, which is the 'damn with faint praise, assent with civil leer'* 
technique of those' who would undervalue the book more openly, as in 
Chisholm's "Harv~y wants us to embrace the 'Marxist' method of dialec-
tic. This 'method' passes my understanding; so far as it has value, 
it seems to be as a metaphysical belief system and not - as its prota-
ganists proclaim - a mode of rational argument."* Sixthly, geographers 
appear to have ignored Social Justice, because it points to the nature 
bf, geography as being the basic discipline of all interdisciplinary 
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essays into meetings between the social and. natural sciences. 
4.4.1. 
There are three status conditions of revolution, according to Harvey* 
status quo, counter revolutionary and revolutionary, which mediate the 
problems and solutions that a discipline derives from a study of reality. 
Each theoretical conditione: may change its categorization through time 
and change its m~de of application. The bourgeois political state has 
existed through all these categories. In geography the following time 
scale has relevance: 1952 *" •. for the next decade at least, there will 
be increased prosperity and plenty .•• there will continue to be decreases 
in the hours men have to work, accompanied by an abundance of leisure 
for many." (Man's Role) . 1964: *"There are two particularly bother-
some problems in treating geography as science. The first problem is 
concerned with the role of description in geography, and the second with 
the predictability of geographic phenomena." (Theoretical Geography). 
1972: *"Within every political entity there exists a constantly changing 
mass of organised and unorganised social interaction ... Because political 
geographers cannot achieve omniscience, this mass of interaction must 
be simplified so that it can be perceived more clearly ••. functional 
boundaries are required." (Human Environment). 1978: * "A geography 
of the life-world must therefore determine the connections between soc-
I 
ial typifications of meaning and space-time rhythms of action and un-
cover the structures of intentionality which lie beneath them." 
(Ideology}. 
4.4.2. 
In this span of a generation there has been a reformulation of theories 
that geographers consider relevant. These quotations represent claims 
to revolutions. The 1952 division of knowledge into retrospect, pro-
cess and prospect may be seen now as a status quo situation of the re-
dundant orthodoxy, at the time it represented a massive advance in ex-
planation from the geographic form of "The Peninsular". However the 
1964 formulae of Bunge was revolutionary enough to sweep all of 'Man's 
Role I into the dustbins of 'two bothersome problems'. By 1972 the 
human content of the equation had been realised in terms of social inter-
action, but the solution was to simplify and structure functional bound-
aries, in order not to rock the quantitative boat; but also ideal types 
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for explanatory purposes were introduced. This "Tas not a return to 
the status quo, nor counter revolution, but just testing the stresses 
and strains in the quantitative 'paradigm'. The nature of the changes 
in philosophy within each development is important in that it shows 
the intentions of the actors who might have an interest in the pursuit 
of change. There can be nothing but commendation for the notion be-
hind the 1978 extract. But ideas cannot be sustained merely as a 
string of words, there are implicit conditions behind them. If Gregory 
intends to proceed from this notion into a restructuring of regional 
studies, this will be reductionist geography based upon futile micro-
studies whilst he searches in vain for a methodology. If every nuance 
of the spoken word is equally meaningful for the phenomenological re-
cord, then what type of geography may emerge from the inane gruntings 
of any street corner d~unk who may chance to offer one directions? 
This he must already forsee, by his self imposed limits to only human 
geography being of relevance. This will ~onstitute a quasi-revolution, 
an attempt to return to the status quo of the 1952 form. Just another 
attempt to seize control in some shabby internal battle of reformulating 
the vocabulary of the discipline. 
4.4.3. 
If however Gregory intends to lead a positive reaction to the pursuit 
of numbers and attempts to 'bring the men back in'* then there is a 
possibility that by restructuring the views that geographers have about 
the relationship between humanity and sciences and ideas (this reversal 
of order is imperative to create a meaningful relationship*), there is 
a possibility that he may enter the area of dispute that Harvey indica-
ted and launch a meaningful revolution of people facing the changes on 
the earth. Finally if the activity of change is confined only to human 
geography, the geographer enters an immediately determined situation 
progression: each statement that he makes concerning humanity, is a dis-
cussion of a social situation, all social situations derive from politi-
cal conditions; human statements are political statements and excepting 
for quantified numerical inferences, statements in human geography are 
statements of political bias. Based upon one's own political views, 
the statements of other geographers may be seen as revolutionary or 
counter-revolutionary or pleading for the status quo, whatever may be 
the intentions of the significant other in the exchange. 
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4.4.4. 
In hi..s book "Structuralism", Piaget concludes that the search for struc-
tures cannot but result in interdisciplinary co-ordinations. *Harvey 
suggests that this conclusion should be inverted so that an interdis-
ciplinary theory with respect to, say urbanism has to resort to oper-
ational structuralism in the method which Marx practices and which 
Piaget describes. The method to deal with interdisciplinary problems 
is therefore founded upon a properly constituted version of dialectic 
materialism as it operates within a structured totality. This not 
being fully exemplified in "Social Justice", one has to wait for Harvey 
to formulate an example. Harvey did, however, put forward ideas worthy 
of consideration at a seemingly less politically emotive level. The 
traditional divisions used by geographers between theory, methods and 
philosophy were used to construct the web of chapters that form the 
parts to be examined in "Sooial Justice and the City". This web in-
fluenced those who used Harvey as reference. Coates et al. seem con-
strained by choices of theory, they rely greatly upon methods, and show 
little philosophical depth in their investigation of inequality. Bird 
seems to shy away from philosophy concerning either centrality or cities, 
but substitutes psychological interpretations for iu. Although he 
shows clarity with regard to methods, he is constrained by the limits of 
theory drawn from the ideas of central places. Ley and Gregory both 
seem aware of the implications that methods and theory have for their 
examinations of the nature of geography, but their assumptions that 
phenomenology might offer both a philosophy and methodology for geo-
graphers seem confusing. However they do pose certain difficulties. 
Harvey is aware of the problem of the social construction of empirical 
data, but Ley and Gregory pose the problem that "if data is socially 
constructed, then what data can we rely upon?" Further to which is 
the difficulty of "therefore what data do we have to question?" Ley 
further suggests that geographical data should be more clearly analysed, 
and "if data is totally soiled by capitalism, what data is left for a 
Marxist to use?" Yet Harvey's suggestion that geographers should re-
appraise their views towards theory, methods and philosophy in a holis-
tic manner is beginning to bear fruit, whatever the outcome of geograph-
ers ultimate constructions of reality.* 
4.4.5. 
Theoretical change in contemporary geography has been based upon the 
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triquetrous notion that knowledge = power = control = knowledge and 
that legitimate power ~lould arise through the acceptance of an over~ 
riding paradigm. Harvey1s introduction to a humanistic view of the 
world came too soon for the paradigm claims of quantophrenia to have 
established themselves. Therefore he was at first ignored, and then 
attacked. The Weberian relationship between social action, knowledge 
and the attempt to legitimate an academic power base, suggests an entry 
into a sociology of geographic knowledge, starting perhaps at the point 
of asking, "How much of the present chaos in contemporary theories is 
due to attempts to fill the vacuum of control that the quantificatory 
'paradigm' failed to gain?" But there is a range of inconsistent phil-
osophical attitudes taken by the orthodoxies at present vying for con-
trol that have not been analysed; many assume that the subject mat-
erial of geography is not problematic, nor is it problematic to under-
stand the subject material. These assumptions have allowed the sub-
stantive inroads of phenomenology into the discipline. The subject 
material of geography is society, seen as a structured human inter-
action; human geographers write about society, in their own terms, and 
physical geographers write for society*. This may be reductionism to 
semantics, if one claims that 'some write about it, and some for it', 
but this is reification, because one fails to equate with the meaning 
of society by reducing it to an it. All geography is involved in 
human explanation, and the present tools used by groups within the dis-
cipline do not fit the cases at issue. Harvey's search for sharper 
and more analytical tools had to be ignored because geographers largely 
failed to realise that their current modes of explanation and materials 
were key problematics. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCEPTS AND UTOPIAS. 
And the light shineth in darkness; and the darkness 
comprehended it not. John 1 v.S. 
5.1.1. 
The previous four chapters have considered a number of questions. 
Nationalism from which contemporary geography fulfils the need for ex-
planation. Contemporary geography LS as a plurality of orthodoxies 
stemming from the Varenian paradigm. Contemporary geography searching 
to explain internal values through social theories, and geography in 
quest of social and moral philosophies. These are questions concerning, 
space, scientific enquiry, theory and knowledge. These questions 
raised by Harvey in "Social Justice and the City" require answers that 
will constrain any future geography. Geographers will have to make 
sense of the values that they have, through further examining these 
central themes. The requests by Harvey and his critics are in general 
addressed to geographers as prescriptions for a re-examination of the 
fundamental bases of their discipline. Such requests may be dismissed 
as ideology searching for Utopia, but if a fresh insight upon the ideas 
from which geography stems is available, then some form of Utopia may 
be a little clearer. Any theory of geography concerns the use of 
themes, and the themes that Harvey suggests should be of concern; be-
cause they are the present problematic concepts; are space, theory, 
scientific enquiry and knowledge. All of these themes contain values, 
and if the argument goes further then these values are treated as sys-
tems. One way of talking about these alternatives is as social ideal-
isations, which are Utopias. 
5.1.2. 
The notion of space presents two qualities, both of which have tangible 
and intangible aspects. Quinton *suggests that one should consider 
space in the spheres of substance, knowledge and ideas. The substance 
of space has qualities and properties, both ordinal and positional, yet 
the quality of apparently indiscernable individual units of space is 
that these units are individual; like the spaces between sugar beets in 
a field. Positional points in space also indicate individuality of sub-
stance. A simplistic view of space is that there is nothingness, but 
as a navigator would insist, there are theories as to points of refer-
ence, which project to notions of indicators and therefore ~~istence: 
to sail in a small boat between reefs in thick fog without navigational 
aids, but only the pilot 'knowing where he is to', is to experience the 
moving dimensions of space; which suggests that space relates to the 
general idea of being a 'thing'. Therefore space has identity, and 
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substance from which one may project that there must be forms of 
spatial continuity, giving an interdependence between things and places 
which is mutual. Having established that space has some identity, and 
then the objects that habit it also have identities, then the progres-
sion is to example external qualities, infinite qualities and personal 
qualities. Against this analytical arrangement it has to be realised 
that any description, explanation or att~pted understanding as to the 
substance of space takes place in a temporal plane; the juxaposition-
ing of time with space being necessary to any exposition of ideas. This 
would be a preliminary outline of an analysis of the substance of space 
as a tangible thing. One would then proceed to consider both knowledge 
and ideas concerning space at a level of tangibility, and then consider 
the intangible qualities of space in relation to substance, knowledge 
and ideas. This process would show at a primary level just how pro-
blematic the concept of space has become, without the mixing of the con-
cept with those of theories, knowledge and science, which has become a 
present difficulty in geography. The basic tool of geography, the map, 
relates to both ordinal and positional space. Yet the matter of a map 
is decided by the value judgements of the cartographer. If everything 
were included the map would be a two dimensional plan of reality. Ex-
clusion and inclusion of items and their positional relationships both 
determine the nature of the map and the values expressed by the carto-
grapher. 
5.1.3. 
Of course, one could only put forward a theory of geographical space 
from the viewpoint of whichever chosen Utopia that one hoped for. 
Choices of Utopias indicate the value laden nature of geography. I 
believe that the destiny of geography is to create the bridge that Mac-
kinder suggested should link the natural sciences and the cultural scien-
ces. Those who consider that this is too lofty an aim or that it is 
too remote from reality, have missed the opportunity of the materials 
at their disposal. They cannot claim excuses of involvement in some 
technique that occupies time, or lack of research into the knowledge 
of other disciplines that is at present available. Excuses to avoid 
involvement in this task, imply a political self interest of a sectarian 
nature. As the phenomenologists would suggest one should examine the 
individual biases that lead to their self interest. Mackinder's bridge 
is the establishment of a new paradigm through dialectics, that Harvey 
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has suggested. To use Gregory\s labels, Itraditional geography I has 
a vested interest in keeping the status quo of argument between quan-
tophrenia and regionalism; whereas tcritical geograprLyl would have 
everyone busy seeking the phenomenological grail in a counter revolu-
tion. The bias of 'radical geography I is still difficult to determine, 
but much of the movement seems to be a middle class antipathy to the 
status quo within the present sociological situation, which is not al-
ways biased towards revolutionary change of disciplinary thought. 
5.1.4. 
Geographical enquiry has different forms which show most clearly through 
the use of explanations. A form of explanation brings with it certain 
values, even at the level of having chosen which explanation one deems 
most fitting. In argument one may attempt to explain an event, and in 
doing so, one may predict that under the same conditions, the event 
will occur again. The reoccurrence would then test the explanatory 
prediction. The route to understanding such a law-like event is explan-
at ion - prediction - tests - law. In contrast one may explain the act-
ions of another who believes that the reasons for his action are correct, 
and therefore justify those actions; if one can make intelligible rules 
on which that person has made the judgement that his reasons are correct. 
This route to understanding is then of explanation - belief - justific-
ation leading to a rule. *As Weber explained at length, in human act-
ion, reasons are intentions. Intentionality is the quality that sep-
arates the behaviour of things from the behaviour of people. As a 
quality, intentionality is not quantifiable. Geographers who are cap-
able of fulfilling their explanations through general laws tend to be 
those who have established mini-disciplines in their own right. Often 
far enough to the right to take their work outside the discipline of geo-
graphy. This was the case for geology in 1887, according to Mackinder, 
when he pointed out that of a given feature upon the earth, geology could 
only ask, "What riddle of the past does it help to solve?" Whereas 
geography should ask, "Why is it?" "Where is it?", "Why is it there?" 
and "How does it act upon man in society, and how does he react on it?" 
Obviously the riddle of the past, that geology explains, may be explained 
through general laws, the law being the prediction upon which one est-
ablishes an explanation. But the conditions to be fulfilled in order 
to generate Mackinder's geographic explanations move continuously away 
from laws to explanations by rules. 
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5.1.5, 
If we take a geographical feature as: a river, chance .is that the geo-
logy of the watershed has: already been mainly \'lritten, Under similar 
geological conditions, it would be possible to find aIlother similar 
river, but to arrive at the 'Why is it?' one would have to find clima-
tic conditions for one river which would vary for the second. In ap-
proaclLing the 'Why is it there?' the resultant geomorphological factors 
emphasise the differences between rivers. The factors of geomorphology 
are more recent and variable than those of the geological foundations, 
therefore one moves away from the predictable certainty of general laws. 
*Arriving at 'Where is it?' one has to confront the factor of unique-
ness; the river has to be given exact locations in space and the only 
exactitude concerns points a to z of the river which may not be located 
anywhere else in space at that time; all other points in space exclude 
these unique places, at a given time; for rivers have a propensity to 
move across and into space over time. 'Why is it there?' may be an 
explanation from physical geography alone by reference to general laws 
or to human geography by reference to beliefs. But in order to estab-
lish how a river acts upon man in society one must ask whether general 
laws are in any way appropriate,because most notions of society are 
those of associations of beings living under constant change; whilst 
explanations of how people react towards rivers cannot be explained 
through general laws. *People may dam rivers, rivers may flood people, 
and people may divert rivers according to their purposes, but none of this 
takes place upon the abstracted knowledge of nomothetic laws. Consider 
the river as a geographical feature in space, it is determined in its 
genesis by the values of the beholder. To this Mackinder asks "Where", 
"Why?" and "Hmv?" questions. To these questions answers can be given 
without the p~ople in inter-action with the river being affected. This 
is not physical geography alone because if one is not ostensibly refer-
ring to those people, non the less the description of the configuration 
between river and people, relates to the people who describe this inter-
action. What one says about the river is concerned with the interests, 
intentions and values of those physical geographers who deny a human dim-
ens ion to their work. As Mackinder said, this dimension must be recog-
nized, because these are the hidden values of the class that underpinned 
the "Ulster" paper. 
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5.2.1. 
Mackinde~ was clea~ly awa~e * that ex~lanat~on in geog~a~hy had to ~ange 
from the ~ossibility of positivistic law at one extreme to the vagari-es' 
of the semantics of rules; or the rules of semantics at the other. He 
illustrated this with two pertinent examples. When he wrote, lILet us 
try to construct a geography of South-eastern England which shall ex-
hibit a continuous series of causal relationships.lI*, this was not a 
chance choice, but a deliberate example of a deterministic model given 
to show the connection between effects, causes, laws as shown in a value-
neutral science. This he later juxtaposed with, lIOf late it has been 
a commonplace to speak of geographical exploration as nearly over, and 
it must be recognised that geography must be diverted to the purpose of 
intensive study and philosophical synthesis. lI * 
gambit in the Geographical Pivot of History. 
This was his opening 
He then proceeded to out-
line a value-laden science with, lIIt appears to me •.• we are for the first 
time in a position to attempt, with some degree of completeness, a cor-
relation between the larger geographical and the larger historical gen-
eralisations." Here is a suggestion of choice, the element of free-
will, in which Mackinder is searching for rules not laws, and in order 
to give reasons for these connecttbns] he explains by citing actions. 
His aim was to establish logical connections to show that "Man not nat-
ure initiates, but nature in large measure controls."* In his aim to 
explain he thought "It is obvious that only a first approximation to 
the truth can be hoped for," which is more than many 'social scientists 
yet hope to achieve. 
For the proper understanding of the balance of a meaningful whole ex-
planation with a causal dimension and an action dimension, Mackinder 
considers the "Gwents" or "Ventae". These are the chalk uplands that 
run from Salisbury Plain and branch to East Anglia and to Kent. They 
centre three cities, Winchester, Canterbury and Norwich. They settled 
three different Germanic tribes, Angles, Jutes and Saxons because of 
easy acce~s to the uplands. Geographically the Fens isolated the peo-
ple of Norwich, and the Weald forests isolated the people of Kent. His-
torically the "men of Norfolk" and the "men of Kent" have been of a re-
markably rebellious disposition.* The geomorphological dimension is 
not a determinant of the human action dimension, but there is a causal 
connection. 
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5,2,2, 
The nature o£ sc~enti£~c enqutry tn geograpQy must range across a spec-
trum of explanatory forms, eaCQ of which is adequate to only a partial 
explanation of a part of any total enquiry, The disciplines outside 
the nature of geographical enquiry are on the one hand, geology for the 
reasons that Mackinder gaye, and on the other hand psychology. This 
latter because there is some over lap between those questions that 
philosophers would have one consider, and the extension of these ques-
tions into a psychological area of meanings, These questions are of 
the type as to whether human action is freely chosen or causally det-
ermined; how this relates to the problems posed by body or mind distin-
ctions, which are further complicated by the distinctions between fact 
and value. Philosophy raises the questions as problems to be consider-
ed, psychology raises the same form of questions as problems to be 
solved. It does not seem that the unique peculiarities of the unique 
human individual have any place within geographical explanations: this 
must be the subjective extreme beyond which the boundary of the discip-
line has no need to extend. In accepting psychology into geography 
one must also accept the uncertainty and mythological premises upon 
which psychology is based. From such an uncertain belief system geo-
graphy could only sink into phenomenology. The boundaries of geography 
exclude certain certainty, and certain uncertainty. The totality of 
a range of distinctive forms of explanation completes a geographical 
enquiry. This then is the form of Mackinder's bridge, but the form of 
each facet of enquiry is open to numerous modes and choices. The four 
simple questions, Why is it? Where is it? Why is it there? and How 
does it act upon man in society and how does he react upon it? merely 
require answers. Regional geography of the traditional form such as 
t~he Peninsular' answered to "What is it?", Quantophrenia, as 'Innova-
tion diffusion t merely said how long, wide and handsome it \'las, The 
"Personality of Ulster" came close to attempting to answer all the 
questions, but showed political bias concerning some men in their soc-
iety, Forthcoming phenomenology is not designed to take Mackinder's 
questions seriously, because it must start with the question, "What do 
you think of it?" 
5,2.3. 
It is clear that the forms of these qUestions do not determine nor dic-
tate the form of responses to them. The types of responses relate to 
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the completion of a satisfactorx range of scientific explanations in 
geography. Scientific includes the range between the extremes of 
natural and social scientific forms; which use either outwardly ob-
servable physical 'data' for theories containing laws, to inwardly ob-
servable subjective 'data' for theories derived from rules. But the 
idea of data requires clarification. The dictionary definition of 
datum covers a wide range of meanings, ranging from things known, taken 
for granted, assumptions, or premisses from which inferences may be 
drawn. The plural form infers that these are given facts of various 
kinds. The root of the word is concerned with giving" and it is fre-
quently assumed that data are concerned through the dative case with 
'to' or 'for'. But there has been a corruption of meaning, in that 
much material that is assumed to be data, is in no way given; it has 
been taken. Because our modern languages no longer differentiate be-
tween the dative and ablative cases, there is a false assumption that 
'facts' concerned with 'by', 'with' and 'from' are the same as those 
that have dative connotations. It would appear that there is a need 
for a stricter differentiation between data (those which are given) 
and capta (those which are taken) because they offer very different 
for:rqs of information, arising from different bases and offering dif-
ferent forms of premiss. The contextual importance of the prepositions 
within the collection of information(data or capta} appears to be vital 
to the ultimate meanings. 
5.2.4. 
If asked by a Montenegran peasant to where I was travelling, he might 
offer me the information (datum) that it was about five cigarettes 
away, were I to press him for greater accuracy, he might tell me (captus} 
that it was a couple of versts off. Different schools of geographers 
would range their responses to these choice items within their ranges 
of accuracy and expectations of knowledge. But even if all the result-
ant explanations did not arrive at what the western geographers would 
accept as 'some degree of accuracy' there seems to be a relationship 
between capta and theories tending towards laws, as opposed to the re-
lationship between data and theories tending towards rules. One takes 
measurements from the earth, the earth does not give them to one; human 
beings give information to each other freely, or it has to be taken by 
devious means. Data is meaningful in a human context, capta is dubious 
as information collected from people. The t,vo frameworks of 
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explanation, rules or laws, seem to contrast, and geographers in the 
contemporary past appear to have tallen into the misunderstanding that 
the contrasting frameworks make the content ot explanation mutually 
exclusive. The bookshelves are filled with the debates that geograp-
hers have pursued, nomothetic - ideographic, landscape - landschaft, 
tangible - intangible, descriptive - quantificatory, and soon reality -
phenomena. 
5.2.5. 
The matter of importance concerns the intrusion of values into the 
sciences. The general law model of explanation is deterministic and 
so denies the possibility of human choices, and hence with it the pos-
sibility of moral judgement: so it makes all questions of value ir-
relevant to science. This is not the case with theories following 
rules, which involve the exercise of choice, because these rules may 
be moral rules. It may seem to be possible to give a significant ex-
planation to the 'Why?' and 'Where?' aspects of a geographical X 
through a value-free law but to whom is such an explanation significant? 
In explaining 'How does the geographical X act upon man in society? it 
is the significancecofwhat is observed that becomes important. The 
geographer has to. take the physically observable aspects of X into a soc-
ial setting, in order to make judgements that are meaningful. These 
found a particular subjective appraisal, because significance has to be 
significant to someone whether the observer, the actors or those to whom 
the observations are reported. At this point the geographer refers to 
his own set of values, from which his judgements take significance. 
These values are the only set available to him, and these inform his 
choices and examples. Consider the values of Empires that Hack~nder 
wrote into the 'Geographical Pivot of History', the moral values that 
harvey, used in setting out 'Social Justice and the City.' The haughty 
cultural values implied in 'The Peninsular', the religious values in~ 
cluded in the 'Personality of Ulster,' and the values of superior know-
ledge included in 'Innovation Diffusion.' The cultural significance 
of such included values are often judged as determined facts, but in 
reality they are chosen illustrative and significant observations taken 
from material that their authors are familiar with. The material used 
is taken from the knowledge that they have been socialised into and be-
comes a crutch termed certainty. The values contained in this know-
ledge are illustrations of their socialisation. It would be very odd 
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to tind Harvey using Empire as an illustration ot positiye value, or 
Mackinde;r reterring to a tlat earth., $Uch. kno\'dedge would be out ot 
time; historical time. 
The processes involved in the study and explanation ot geography are 
absolutely value laden. This is so in what is termed physical geo-
graphy, just as it is so in human geograph.y. When one asks "What is 
happening to the local populations' water?" Then the question has 
both a physical and a human dimension. We have to recognize that all 
inquiry is predicated by the inquirers aims. These may be either phy-
sical or human geographical aims, but the values are interlaced with 
structures from the physical environment. Hence Quantification is 
impossible, it relates only to things to measure: human action needs 
to know what people think. 
5.3.1. 
If the subjects of geographers society are treated as free choosing 
agents, then the question of the moral standing of their actions cannot 
be avoided. The geographer must make positive judgements, as to whet-
her the actions of his subjects in society, and he himself towards soc-
iety are right, or wrong, or have no moral significance. Consider the 
attitudes of geographers concerning the competitive spirit of this soc-
iety; is it right, as one might infer from Mackinder, or is it wrong 
as Harvey seems to imply, or is it a neutral fact of human society as 
is either ideological, value-laden or just a social fact. However to 
explain our society as a collection of social facts, creates an ideo-
logical statement, because social facts concerning our society imply 
significance as to moral standing; because the 'competitive spirit' is 
taught as a good thing or a bad thing during the education of the nat-
ion's children. A general law model of explanation needs exclude the 
moral significance of actions, hence the requirement to reduce actions 
to behaviour,and thus discount the moral significance of what is obser-
ved in any resultant explanation.* 
5.3.2. 
There is an enforcement of a strict version of fact I value distinctions 
in general law models, that rule following models completely do away 
with. The rule following model of explanation is put forward by Searle 
*where he suggests and then argues that the fact of a persons' action 
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being made according to a social xUle entails an obligation :eox the 
person who per:eorms the act, Wh.:lch he extends to the actt-on o:e making 
a promt-se requires that one ought to do what one has promised, This 
is not without difficulty, because although deriving an ought from an 
is might overcome the fact/value distinction t-t leads straight into the 
difficulties of relativism in so far as morality is concerned. If 
one society, school or clique has such and such a rule, this does not 
enforce obligations from those who belong to a different group that 
does not have this rule. *This leads immediately to the problem of 
seeing biases of values in others, when claiming that peoples actions 
can be explained by the rules that they follow, becomes only an exhib-
ition of one's own biases. Because if this is not true, then people 
are not free to follow the rules as they claim, but are in some way 
constrained by human nature, or determined by the environment about them. 
But moving outside the general law model of explanation seems to lead 
to various forms of circularity, vagueness and biases, which perhaps 
are the outcome of the scientific description of human nature that geo-
graphers have for so long deliberately avoided. 
5.3.3. 
The two prior sections considered the moral standing of geographers 
subjects and the biases that they may bring into his work. The geo-
graphers subjects bring to him the information that fills his theories. 
Theories are suppositions usually based upon principles that are inde-
pendent of the phenomena that are being explained. Further people ar-
ticulate theories related to the values that they have. If this is so 
then the most common theoretical device utilized by geographers, is the 
map. But maps have many forms, even to "that map, the one that shows 
the earth's surface as occupied materially by the Soviet Union and the 
United States, and now tentatively China, that map has obsessed my life. 
Itproves through geography that unrestricted war is collective suicide 
for the species."* Previously Bunge had written "Theoretical Geographytl 
as an appeal to American geographers to move towards physical geography 
through the adoption of general law models of explanation, and to ex-
tend the map into mathematics, upon the necessity of logic. Yet his ex-
tended theories do not show a logical connection between the law-like 
'is' of the map through the value bias of 'unrestricted war' to the 
'ought' concerning 'collective suicide'. His assertion that "the map 
proves the consequences of war," ignores that the scientific adoption 
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of theor.i.es to the structure o;f hts .map ~uld imply that the same 
r.i.gorous attitudes of sc.i.ence need also De appl.i.ed to der.i.ve his ought 
of controlling unrestricted war, Such theoretical claims made in geo-
graphy fail to offer 2roof, because no single theory referred to is 
capable of explaining both poles of ht.s thesis. In order to move from 
the law-like statement concerning military power upon the earth, to 
the rule embracing the wish for stability for the species, different 
forms of phenomena have to be explained through different modes of ex-
planation. 
5,3.4. 
The choice of which theory to use for the appropriate explanation is 
determined by the nature of the values and biases the phenomena under 
consideration bring with them. Determinism in geography has nO\,T moved 
from a concern with not that the geographical items are determined 
(as in the work of E. Huntington) but that the items determine the 
form of explanation that is appropriate to them. One may apply cen-
tral place theories to the Dogger Bank, but these do not adequately 
explain the Dogger Bank in response to the four questions proposed by 
Mackinder. And even these four questions omit the values and biases 
that would be required by the fuller explanation required by "What are 
we explaining it for?lI As society has changed during the course of 
the history outlined in this paper, so have the reasons given for the 
justification of the right for such societies to exist. The theories 
put forward by geographers for their geographies stem from the phil-
osophies that justify their social existence. The philosophical under-
pinnings of each theory at present in use by geographers, require exam-
ination, in order to establish the claims, that each geographical theo-
rist is arguing for. Philosophy solves no problems, it only poses 
them and asks for strategies in facing the problems raised. 
5.3.5. 
The eight concepts examined in this paper * have been deliberately sep-
arated. This has indicated that as .one analyses the present problematic 
concepts concerning contemporary geography, in the manner of most of the 
users of theories, then the analysis continually divides and the problems 
multiply. It is methodologically possible to separate the parts from 
the whole, by generally describing the whole. Then specifically des-
cribing the pieces that relate to the whole, followed by further 
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describing the whole in deti3.il ;t;ro.Il} the collect;Ly;L.tl:" ot the l?arts. 
Then tinalll:" anall:"sing the proBlems: that remain t I.t :Ini3.l:" be said that 
this paper should have been a narrative, but as one separates the 
pieces trom the whole as an idea, it becomes impossible to present the 
whole without reyolutionizing the analysis into synthesis. When the 
idea crosses interdisciplinarl:" boundaries, then the whole idea is 
meaningless until some explanation of the crossed disciplines has been 
given. 
5.4.l. 
It has been stated before that requests to geographers to re-examine 
the roots of their material may be dismissed as ideology searching for 
Utopia. Derogatory attacks of this order were forseen by Mannheim* 
who suggested that there were four idealised Utopias * at least to 
choose from. Any attack upon one form of Utopia can only be made from 
the standpoint of another alternative form. When Harvey suggested 
that geographers considered the natures of the ontologies and epistem-
ologies that underpin their work, and began to analyse the political 
form of their chosen explanatorl:" models; then the struggle between 
idealised Utopias could only become derogatory. For as Mannheim said, 
*"the worGl (ideology) took on a derogatory meaning which it has retain-
ed to the present day. However, if theoretical implications of this 
concept are examined, it will be found that the depreciative attitude 
involved is, at bottom, of an epistemological and ontological nature. 
What is depreciated is the validity of the adversary's thought because 
it is regarded as unrealistic. But if one asked further, unrealistic 
with reference to what? - the answer would be, unrealistic ~lith refer-
ence to practi~e, unrealistic when contrasted with the affairs that 
t:r:anspire in the political arena ••. the word (ideology} lends support to 
that practiC'al irrationality which has so little appreciation for 
thought as an instrument for grasping reality." The reality that exists 
in geography relates to the problematic concepts of space, theory, know-
ledge and scientific enquiry. Geography is constrained from without 
by the realities of culture, methods, facts and values, and the socio-
logy of knowledge. Each Utopia requires, permutates and formulates 
these concepts in order to justify its own ideology. 
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5.4.2. 
In examining and compiling the contents ot this paper, three ot Mann-
heim's Utopias have been negated, if not by argument then by assertion. 
The orgiastic Chiliasm of the phenomenologists offers a social revolut-
ion in geography, if one is prepared to accept the spiritualization of 
the politics of geography. The purpose of their effort arises through 
an acceptance of the tensions within the discipline, and through a re-
fusal to accept events as they are, or control by others. When their 
ecstatic outbursts and energies have been exploded upon the here and now, 
and they have dissociated themselves from their own symbols and images, 
then it will be seen that the purposes that they have achieved are mun-
dane in the extreme. There seems little point in ranting about the 
functions within society, if one is not prepared to question the struc-
ture. The modern liberal thought behind the orthodox and 'regional' 
geographers is derived from modern philosophy which arose with the pur-
pose of removing clerics and monarchs from the control of the affairs of 
state. It contains an idealist mentality that is derived from a dual 
avoidance, firstly of avoiding the control of God over the reality. of the 
earth, and secondly of avoiding the conservative domination over things 
and men involved in a time and space relationship with the world. The 
major concerns are with norms, forms and the regulation of a state of 
reasonableness. This middle road steered itself between the feudal es-
tates and lower strata, in the past, whilst in the present it accepts 
the dualities of this ideal into its formulations of the disciplines. 
The actual process of progress is the liberal - humanitarian notion of 
Utopia. Change is the progress, not the process. Alteration is not 
permissable, because that would be revolution. It is this ideology 
that requires that the dualisms within geography should continue to exis~ 
tLe dualities delimit the boundaries within which it is permissable to 
carry out exploration. 
5.4.3. 
Quantophrenia represents the Utopian mentality of the conservative 
ideal. The quantitative revolution had no predisposition towards theo-
rizing, according to Mannheim, "This is in accord with the fact that 
human beings do not theorize about actual situations in which they live 
as long as they are well adjusted to them"* Conservatism remains lat-
ent until a socially ascendant group raises problems that might break 
through the existing order of things. Conservative knowledge is aimed 
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at giving practical control; in geograp~y when this control was 
threatened by the continual process of tchange' and the gradual pro-
gress to a more analytical understanding of regionalism within a lib-
eral framework which might extend into the control of power in the 
field of planning, then the conservative counter-attack was launched by 
a crude return to the simplest form of explanation; the reduction of 
quality to quantities, and the establishment of numbers as the lowest 
common factor in all transactions. The conservative ideal is set in 
reality, and other Utopias are attacked as vaporous and lacking in 
concreteness. Certainty, objectivity, and reality are the values 
that conservatism takes with iL~ and the quantificatory revolution 
claimed all these. But the difficulties that this ideal has not met 
concern the differentiation of the essential from the non-essential, 
what to do with subjective material and the meaning of the end results 
when given as data. The object of the 'revolution' was to re-establish 
professional control, and as such was either a counter revolution or a 
quasi exercise in domination. 
5.4.4. 
The fourth of Mannheim's Utopias is concerned with the socialist -
communist mentality to which all serious people refer back to the works 
of Marx. This was clearly the prescription put forward in 'Social Jus-
tice' by Harvey, and these works offer the methods by which to create for 
geography the 'Bridge' that Mackinder seemed so concerned to realise. 
The present is never the best time to turn one's attention to Marxist 
formulations of the past and future. Only recently * Tony Wedgewood 
Benn pointed out to Harold Wilson, that today to read 'Das Kapital' in 
English was considered by the government to be an offence, four hundred 
years ago, to read the Bible in English was a capital offence. However, 
if one is to see the contemporary concepts in geography in some form of 
harmony, one must search for one's own truth. As Marcuse states, "The 
concrete conditions for realiSing the truth may vary, but the truth re-
mains the same and theory remains its Ultimate guardian. Theory will 
preserve the truth even if revolutionary practiQe deviates from its pro-
per path. Practice follows the truth, not vice versa. This absolutism 
of truth completes the philosophical heritage of the Marxian theory and 
once for all separates dialectic theory from its subsequent forms of 
positivism and relativism." It may be argued that to establish an in-
troduction of a geography leading to a Marxian Utopia, then all that is 
115 
required i.s to borrow the g-eog-rP.,!?h.i.es 0;1; cQuntri.es that have already 
begun to ;move away trom the cap:.t.taLtst order ot thlng-s. As political 
orders establish themselves, they have to defend their power against 
the political forms that are closest to their o~m form, just as lib-
erals must struggle against conservatism and socialism, so communism 
needs struggle against socialist revisionism and anarchy. The forms 
of social knowledg-e in the two forms of society, liberal and socialist 
are different. 
5.4.5. 
Firstly there is a need to analyse the relationship between geographical 
knowledge and geographical existence and to trace the forms which this 
relationship has taken during the intellectual development of geograp-
hers. The variety of theories derived from sociology at present in use 
by geographers negate any cynicism towards such an undertaking. There 
is a need to recognise that knowledge is socially conditioned and part 
of this is the recognition that education is a deliberate effort to de-
ceive in the interest of political groups, education being much wider 
in meaning than schools, but to include all forms concerned with the 
transmission of knowledge. Part of the object of this education is to 
establish in the audience justifications for some form of ideology. 
Geographers have in the past been heavily involved in the deceptions 
and disguises that are part of this establishment of ideology, and this 
opinion is expressed here without denunciatory or moral implications. 
The actual process and content of thought may be determined by the soc-
iety in which one lives, and being 'at home I in such a society, this 
makes the realisation of this process most difficult. The process of 
knowledge is deeply influenced by social processes, each problem that 
one formulates already has a history of being problematic, and the data, 
or capta that is brought to bear upon each problem are derived from the 
social sources available, which also effect the formulation of the met-
hodof solution to the problem. The historical social processes of 
knowledge are also continuously relevant because they give relevance to 
the source and meanings of ideas in a social sense rather than a psy-
chological or phenomenological sense. The cases given in this paper so 
far concerning values give varying degrees of response * but all seem to 
mean different things to different people. When a geographer proceeds 
to reflect upon his work, he has implicitly 'in his mind' a socially 
established mode of thought,"for instance, once the typology of objects 
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in the natural sciences was ;formulated, and the categories and methods 
of thought derived from these types became models, it was henceforth 
hoped to solve all the problems by that method, "* 
5,4.6. 
Although we may live in 'an "Epoch of Equalisation' this refers to a 
possible process not a realisation. Discussion is rarely between 
equals, people may be aliens in their own families, in Britain besides 
class and false consciousness, misunderstanding due to accentation 
(not dialect) of the mother tongue does not tend to equality between 
persons. Communication becomes even more problematic when English is 
used between nations, foreign tongues even complicate the difficulties 
more*, but when it is hoped that understanding and mutuality of social 
meaning could transpose from say a Western capitalist society to an 
Eastern socialist society in the context of geographical theory and 
philosophy, then it is doubtful if the determined social ingredients 
that we call knowledge could meaningfully transpose.* 
If an entry by geographers into Marxist praxis, method, structure and 
philosophy is deemed to be the opprotunity to resolve their confusion 
of theories, Utopias, dualities and concepts, then the process must 
begin here. The beginning can only be by a resolution of their real-
isation that what at present passes for knowledge is the furtherance of 
a deception in the interests of those who control * the socialisation 
processes, Secondly they will require a meaningful and appealing geo-
graphy that does not just 'talk past other people t , and thirdly the 
frames of reference that such a geography uses would require t? under-
stand the others to whom it is addressed, there is no new paradigm likely 
to arise again that is based upon obscurity and deliberate methodo-
logical difficulty. 
The choices that geographers make are not politically neutral choices. 
There is no political vacuum in the discipline, because geographers 
choices relate to Mannheim's Utopias. 
5.5,1, 
This research set out to identify problems underlying the conceptual 
foundations of contemporary geography, This has been approached thr-
ough trying to establish the nature of contradictions that have appeared 
in either geographical texts or during recent lectures, together with 
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what appear to be inadequacies tn explanation. ~rom a recent back~ 
ground in the social sciences, it would seem that the problems stem 
from an inadequate understanding of the sociology of knowledge upon the 
part of those concerned with the transmission of geographical knowledge. 
TfJ..e dualities that constitu·te geographic I debate t mirror the contrad-
ictions that are social within our own international society. Consid-
er two examples, for reflection upon in contemporary geographical modes: 
"War leads to mass hunger. Will contemporary mass hunger lead to war" 
and "What purpose does the great inequality serve, between the northern 
third of the world and the other two thirds?"* Dualities of this form 
are not explained by accepting that this is the status quo and there-
fore their existence is unquestioned: similarly dualities in geography 
need questioning as to why they should continue to exist. A request 
to geographers to solve this problem was made by Mackinder, a method of 
resolution was given by Harvey, arising from his research into aspects 
of the sociology of knowledge. Prescriptions often damage the inter-
ests of those for whom they are prescribed, and this has certainly been 
the case in the antagonisms that have been aroused. It is not the pro-
vince of this paper to make a definitive statement upon what ought to 
be done, but all theoretical positions so far examined have grea~ inad-
equacies, because geographers fail to realise that they are involved 
in a political enterprise at both the human and physical levels, and an 
understanding of what Marx is claimed to have tried to explain merely 
completes the range of problems that geography is now involved with. 
5.5.2. 
"It is a mistake to believe that there is one authentic, pure or correct 
interpretation of Marx's thought ... There is a tendency a~ongst Marxist 
commentators, ... to transform Marx into a myth. tI * On the other hand at-
tempts to refute his work also "only incidentally contribute to our 
understanding of Marx's thought." Marx was human, and as such is not 
to be feared n~r deified, but merely to be understood. The criticisms 
levelled at Harvey and the "Radicals tl in present geography* are the stan-
dard criticisms levelled at Marx in the past; failure to predict, ambi-
guity in concepts, erroneous theories of value, totalitarian implications, 
which will give way to itemizing unresolved dilemmas, ambivalences and 
tensions within their theories. Harvey having written tlSocial Justice 
and the City", is at the point of interpretation and criticism that Marx 
is at. The difficulty of Marx obtaining an unbiased audience is the 
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difficulty that face~ Harvey. But clearly it is the case that Harvey's 
account of reality ~hould De ,Pursued, even though any attem,Pt at the 
,Present time to conduct a radtcal enquiry ~rould mean using data that 
is value laden from other ,Political stances, even though to condemn 
this data in sup'porting one's case undermines the argument. To use 
official statistics is to use material with rejected political values, 
even if rapid social change does affect the political bias. In a non-
Marxist frame of reference Harvey's difficulties would be dismissed as 
the stresses and strains of the-search for a new paradigm. Harvey's 
idea of introducing a Marxist conceptualisation of geography was a bold 
move in the Western world, because of emotive overtones and societies 
that are antagonistic to having their basic values questioned.* 
5.5.3. 
A severe difficulty for geographers, other than Chisholm, lies in under-
standing the method of dialectic materialism.* As Althusser said, III 
said that Marx left us no Dialectics .•. I said that Lenin left us no Dia-
lectics .•. Mao Tse Tung deveioped these",is an important text 'On Con-
tradiction'* As Marx was merely human he apparently overlooked giving 
an authoritative version of his methodology, therefore the form that one 
chooses depends upon the referees that one selects. However as time 
has progressed there have been various interpretations of what Marx meant, 
and these interpretations have been influenced by the level and accept-
ability of social knowledge extant at the time of these interpretive 
explanations. The appeal of explanation through dialectics lies in the 
fact that one has to re-establish what factors are a-priori to ones ex-
planation, and in so doing one needs to examine all the biases that are 
inherent in the values that these factors bring with them. The dif-
ficulty in a personal revolution of thought is that the process invol-
ved may be so time consuming in a theoretical sphere, that there is 
little time to be spilt into practice. This then makes one face the 
order o£ research; does theory preceed practice, or vice versa, and 
where does philosophy fit into this order? Finally a socialist for-
mUlation of geography may only in truth arise from an ideology. The 
problem here is whether an ideology of a Marxist-socialist mentality is 
derived from culture, socialisation, understanding or a bent towards 
anarchy. 
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5.5,4, 
However, before there ts another reyolutton tn geography, whether it is 
a conservative, non-philosophical counter-revolution of some new brand 
of quantification, or a quasQ-reform of the phenomenologists turning 
more curbside conversations into reliable and valid data,* or a strong 
back lash from those who see regions and maps as the stuff of geography, 
or an application of dialectics to our constructions of reality there 
is this \'rarning, "men cannot unmake their social relations at will and 
this theoretical result must be our starting point when considering 
the promotion of social changes •• ,in various ways, Continuities of 
collective memory, customs, language, habits, norms, culture, ••. across 
vast periods of time through many different and often monumental social 
changes, to say the least are in need of adequate explanation. There 
are only aspects of society which are experienced as needing to be changed 
and in principle and in practice some aspects cannot be,"* As geog-
raphy is capable of accounting for the spatial interactions of social 
relationships, just as geographers have attempted to control their own 
social relationships, even to the extent of negating them amongst their 
own practioners, there comes a timely warning from Marx, *"Revolution 
in general - the overthrow of the existing ruling power and the dis-
solution of existing social relati?nships - is a political act, .• It re-
quires this political act as it needs the overthrow and the dissolution," 
The so called revolutions of contemporary ~eography have failed, simply 
because the political act of revolution did not overthrow either those 
in control of the discipline and knowledge, nor did they succeed in dis-
solving the social relationships within the structure of the discipline, 
hO\<lever much some foundations felt shaken, simply because the crude pol-
itics of control were not enough to establish a credible philosophy, 
5.5.5, 
Credibility of Marxist theory lies in the realisation that it is by its 
'-". 
very nature an integral and integrating theory of society, Because 
of this nature there is no room left for an independent philosophy, psy-
chology or sociology, nor sciences in the antagonistic plural. "l-1ora"l-
ity, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corres-
ponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of 
independence ••• When reality is depicted, philosophy, as an independent 
branch of activity loses its medium of existence, At best its place 
can only be taken by a summing-up of the most general results, 
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abstractions which arise from the obser)Tation of tl1.e historical develop-
ment of men, 11* Marcuse notes that lIThe fundamental relations of the 
Marxian categories are not within the reach of any science that is pre-
occupied with describing and organising the objective phenomena of soc-
iety. They will appear as facts only to a theory that takes them in 
the preview of their negation. According to Marx, the correct theory 
is the consciousness of a practice that aims at changing the world."* 
Mackinder drew out the boundaries of a theoretical and mature geography, 
Harvey pointed to the possible constructional route into praxis, and 
the sociologists included in this paper offer a starting point -of enquiry. 
Which does not suggest that there should be any solutions included here, 
because the contribution to knowledge in this paper lies in the infer-
ence that there is no form of geographical concept that is either value 
or culture-free. Every form is derived from a social theory and every 
social theory has a political bias, so at least one may imply, "By your 
theories we shall know your politics."* 
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CHAPTER NOTES 
"I recognise that I can only arrive at one aspect of 
the truth, and I have no wish to stray into excessive 
materialism. " 
H.J. Mackinder, 1904. 
NOTES CHAJ?TER b 
1.1.1. S"W.Wooldri.dge, The Geographer as Sci.entist. 
1.1.2. T.S.Kuhn. The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in 
the Development of Western Thought, Cambridge, Mass. 1957. also 
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Dniv. of Chicago, 
1962. p. xii. 
1.1.3. ibid 1962, p.xii. 
1.1.5. Francis Bacon,. Essay on Knowledge. R.E.Dickinson, The Makers 
of Modern Geography, 1969, R.K.P. page 9. 
1.1.6. Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science, R.K.P. 1961. 
1.1.7. ibid, page 606. ibid, page 15. 
1.1.8. T.S.Kuhn, OPt cit. 1962, Chapter 13. 
1.2.5. The reciprocal relationship formulated by von Humbolt has mislead 
some geographers into thinking that environmental conditions de-
termine mankinds relationship with the earth. FOr instance, 
Eyre & Jones, Geography as Human Ecology, 1960, in their intro-
duction. 
*Eyre S.R. Determinism and the Ecological Approach in Geography, 
in Geography, No. 225, Nov. 1964. 
*Stoddart D.R. Geography and the Ecological Approach, in Geography, 
No. 228, July 1965. 
1.2.6. To the question, "How does Zusammenhang translate?", there is no 
adequate answer in English, but von Humbolt was enquiring into 
'die erschaute totalitat t , the total impression. What does 
Zusammenhang mean? presents a problem in geographic conceptual-
ization, and meanings have frequently been given to fit the not-
ion to the ideas being presented by those who have used von 
Humbolt's works as bases for their own points of view. For 
instance:-
S.W.Wooldridge writes (The Geographer as Scientist, 156, Nelson, 
p.9.), "What then is the geographical method? The clue is given 
by the word 'Zusammenhang', which we find on almost every other 
page of the writings of the great German founders of modern geo-
graphy - Humbolt and Ritter, and those of their followers. lL~d 
for the present purposes I would translate 'Zusammenhang' as con-
text. Our aim is to examine rocks, land-forms, soils, plants 
as well as human phenomena, in the natural contexts in area, one 
to another and all together." 
Or from Talcott Parsons (in Max Weber: The Theory of Social and 
Economic Organisations. Free Press. '47. page 95, note l3.}. 
"The German term is Sinnzusammenhang. (Sinn = mind?) • It refers 
to a plurality of elements which form a coherent whole on the 
level of meaning. There are several possible modes of meaning-
ful relation between such elements, such as logical consistency, 
the esthetic harmony of style, or the appropriateness of means 
to an end. In any case, however a Sinnzusammenhang must be 
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1,2,6. distinguished zrom a system of elements whicQ are causally in-
(Contdl terdependent. There seems to be no English term or phrase 
whiCQ is always adequate. According to variations in the con-
text, (of this translationl, tcontext of meaningt, tcomplex of 
meaning', and sometimes 'meaningful system' have been employed. II 
Or from psychology (Deutsch & Krause, Theories in Social Psy-
chology, Basic Books, 1965 pp 16 & 17.1 "If perception is or-
ganised, then some aspects of perception will remain constant 
despite a change in all the elements in the situation perceived, 
so long as the inter-relations among the elements remain the 
same ••• then perception of any element will be influenced by the 
total field of which it is a part ••• then some of its character-
istics of organisation will emerge; these will be the inter-
relations of the entities being perceived rather than the enti-
ties themselves." Thus Zusammenhang is used not as a synthetic 
element in philosophy, when it is removed from its germanic con-
text, but as a justification for divisive logics in geography, 
sociology, or psychology. 
E. de Martonne, Traite de Geographie Physique, 1948. 
1.2.7. from R.Hartshorne, The Nature of Geography, Ann Arbor, 1961 
and pages 142, 54, 55, 56, and 57. 
1.2.8. and from R.E.Dickinson 1969, Chapter 3, although Dickinson does 
not seem to give the correct references from Hartshorne. 
1.2.8. 
and 
1.2.9. 
Ritter was accused of presenting only a philosophical teleological 
viewpoint. Hartshorne gives reference to this (1961) in note 16, 
page 59, and pages 60 to 62, the recorded argument between Ritter, 
Frobel and comments by Leighly and Wisotzki, which culminated in 
the conclusions by Hartshorne that "His (Ritter's) consideration 
of the earth therefore logically centered on man." But one 
must take Hartshorne's point page 59 (1961) concerning the char-
acter of Ritter's work, from Ritter's own statement of ultimate 
purposes. His notions of geographic boundaries are variable 
and his commentators have translated his notions to their o\~ 
purposes. One does an injustice to the contributions of class-
ical geographers by using them as present referees in an ongoing 
debate, hence the quotes given here are abstracted with this 
qualification. For as Hartshorne continues, 'Columbus set out 
across the Atlantic for the purpose of finding a shorter route 
to the Indies, and died believing it.' He contributed to con-
fusion in geographic and ethnographic terminology, but does one 
use Columbus as a referee as to whether his journey was really 
necessary? 
Julius Frobel, Aus Amerika, Leipzig, 1857, Vol.l. p.79. A = ~ 
apt is the formula for the natural wage, engraved upon the tomb-
stone of J.H. von Thunen. The translation of 'von Thunen's 
Isolated State' Ed. P. Hall, Pergamon, is now used in schools 
for '0' Level candidates in geography, Enyironmental Studies, 
Rural Studies, and other social sciences. Central places are 
common-place academic items at an introductory level in the sec-
ondary school. The appeal comes from the host of questions that 
derive from simply searching for data, which the notion has gen-
erated, together with the ease with which teachers can institute 
the search for topic material in any school Vicinity, together 
with an adaptable set of methods. The depth of any study is 
limited by the time, space and ability of the pupils. An end-
result is some form of Zusammenhang. It is the German school's 
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1.2.8. contemporary justittcation, across the cultures, 
and *Ratzel was 'translated' into Aroertcan by Semple (see American 
1.2.9. contribution 1 which generated a dispute as to the accuracy of 
(Contdlher translation of meanings. Dickinson writes (1969 p.761 
'Singularly little attention is given to the works of Ratzel in 
Hartshorne's 'The Nature of Geography'. Hartshorne (in 1961 edt 
p.9l1 writes, 'In particular it is misleading to place Schluter 
in opposition to von Richthofen, Ratzel, and their contemporaries, 
as Dickinson does.' quoting from Dickinson's 'Landscape and 
Society. Scott. Geogr. Mag. 55, 1939.1. All this from Semple's 
translation of Ratzel's view of the man / environment or envir-
onment / man relationship, because Hartshorne claims that 
Ratzel's view changed during the writing of 'Anthropogeographie t • 
Vidal de la Blache, also joined in Cde Martonne, '26, p.7.f.2.1, 
The phenomena of human geography are ..• everywhere related to the 
environm~nt, itself a creature of a combination of physical con-
ditions as Ratzel wisely insists'. Ratzel contributed to all 
cultures. 
1.3.1. There is a tie with Lyle's Uniformitarianism here through the 
influence of James Hutton's 'Theory of the Earth' published in 
1788. Hutton refuted the notion of change through catastrophism 
and advanced the idea of change in terms of geological time. 
The earth "had no evidence of a beginning and no prospect of an 
end." There were consequences from this idea that appeared in 
the natural sciences, politics and ethics. The ties with Buffon 
_appear to be clear. 
From:- Armand; Geographie 3. 
ex vulgare; There is no French race. These people are all 
'white' but diverse, belonging to three different (anthropological 1 
ramifications ••.• very tall people with fair hair and a clear com-
plexion, with light eyes (Nordic types). - medium height men, 
thickset, large head and dark hair (Alpine types). - others are 
small, slim, and dark (Mediterranean types). 
The characteristics of the (original) French population belong 
to the 'Alpine ramifications', but in France, amongst the people, 
three variously different populations faded into an inextricable 
mixture where it is seldom one finds an individual of a distinc-
tive and pure physical type. 
There is no French race. 
There is a French nation. 
If the French are very different from one another by their height, 
skull formations, colour of hair or their eyes, they all however 
have a feeling of belonging to the same community, having in com-
mon, interests, habits, language and a common past.* They form 
one of the most ancient nations of Europe, amongst such nations 
as are aware of their unity. 
National unity in France appeared early in her history. 
It has existed since antiquity, it disappeared during 'the invas-
ions', but formed again at the beginning of the X Century, thanks 
to the Kings of France and to the early beginning of a national 
consciousness, the latter being obvious at the end of the 100 
years war, becoming glorified by the French revolution, which re-
created France by universal assent from its inhabitants. Remem-
ber the meaning of liLa fete de la Federation de 14 Juillet 1790." 
Language is one of the main elements of France's unity. All tts 
inhabitants speak French. Today there is not a single village 
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1,3.1. where .French.. ts not llnde;r$tood, COJ!Jl?lll~or~ $chool.ing and milit-
lContdLarj( service haye contributed to thi.s llni.ty! reol?les ot other 
countries across the ;frontier •• ••• speak. ,French too. 
1.3.2. Old ;formulations do not di~. In the 12th, edition o;f IGeo-
graphie t by A.Labaste, published by Armand Colin as the 1969 
revision, the introduction to 'La France, nation et Etat' ;for 
Classe de troisieme des Lycees, is through dividing France into 
these regions: Les massi;fs anciens, Les montagnes recentes, Les 
plaines francaises, Le littoral, and Fleuves et rivieres. Malte-
Brun died almost a century and a half before this text was issued, 
but his rationalised explanation that the variations of lands 
offer limited possible choices to their inhabitants, is still ac-
ceptable in text book. French geography. 
*also Dickinson 1969 p.20. 
1.3.3. 'Principles of Human Geography' by Vidal de la Blache, Edited by 
E. de Martonne, Constable, 1926. 
* ibid p.6. 
1.3.4. * ibid p.123. 
*It is also in this Chapter 4 that Vidal infers doubts upon the 
contributions of the determinist, such as E. Huntington; see 
footnote 11 on page 119. 
Vidal de la Blache, Annales de Geographie, 1913. 
*It is fascinating, but too extended to quote; to read Ch.5. of 
'Weber's Methodology' in J.Lewis, Max Weber and Value Free Soc-
iology: Laurence & Wishart. 1975 and to substitute Vidal for 
Weber. The imputs and influences appear to be similar, the pro-
blems akin, and the philosophical conclusions interchangeable, 
The advantage that was Weber's was that he could avoid the dif-
ficulties that were terrestrial and concentrate upon those of an 
environmental nature. 
*J.H.Abraham, Origins and Growth of Sociology, Penguin, 1973. 
1.3.5. D.Rarvey, Explanation in Geography, 1969, Arnold, p.402 
* ibid, footnote page 446. 
*1 apologise for the intrusion of social psychologisms, but there 
does not seem to be a more meaningful phrase at present available. 
14.1. R.E.Dickinson, The Regional Concept, 1976, R.K.P. 
14.2 ibid. '76, page 264. 
14.3.Hartshorne 1961 pages 120 to 129. 
* A.Hettner, Die Geographie des Menschen. Geographisches 
Zeitschrift, 13. 1907 pages 413 to 414. 
1.4.3. Hartshorne '61, page 122. 
1.4.4. A.Hettner, 'Das Wesen, und die Methoden der Geographie, Geor. 
Zr. 1905. 
Here Rettner points out that zwiespaltig may mean either or both 
dualistic and, or discordant. It does not do justice to the 
German notion to translate only one half of this duality of mean-
ing as apparently Semple did for her own good reasons. To take 
the notion of duality alone does not remove the option of dis-
cordancy from it. Any duality within a discipline, is accord-
ing to Rettner, a discordant attribute that can not be removed 
by just ignoring it. 
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1.4.4, C.O,Sauer, The Agency ot M~n on EaxtQ, Eepx~nted ~ Wagner & 
c..ContdlMikesell i Eead~gs in C:Ul tural Geogxaph¥, Cb...icago. 1962. 
*What .form o.f determinism requires an ethic? 
*C.O,Sauer, Land & Li.fe, Ed, J, Leighly. University o.f 
Cali.fornia Press. 1963. 
*Johnboy is one of the homefolks .from T.V. series 'The Waltons', 
1,4.5. O.H.K,Spate Geographical Journal, 1952, 
*Hartshorne 1961. page 175, and G,J,Martin 1973. 
1.4,6. Spate 1952. 
*K.R,Popper, Objective Knowledge, Oxford, 1972, page 222. 
Nagel op, cit. 
Consider the introduction o.f psychology into hazard studies by 
the research students of Prof. Gilbert White. Hazards were 
evaluated and then ranked, (see Kates et al.) This made the 
'results' more easily available as data for co~relating. But 
this gave the research a different dimension, it assumed that 
the residents of a flood plain: who were flooded, were moved by 
the same emotions as the researchers. Was this geography, or 
did these students have positivistic need stemming from some 
commitment to psychology? Or were there ideological reasons 
.for the quasi-positivistic quantified values given to 'fear', or 
'shock'? 
*The determinism of Huntington:'. was too obvious for those geo-
graphers who had moved towards social Darwinism. The ultimate 
outcome of a process had to appear to be open to choices during 
the process itself. 
*Hartshorne 1961 page 410. 
1.4.7. R.Hartshorne 1961 and Perspective on the Nature of Geography, 
John Murray, 1966. 
* ibid, 1966, page 7. 
* ibid 1961 page vii, II. 
1.4.8. ibid. 1966 pages 8 & 9. 
* ibid, 1966 page 172, 
1.5.1. Excepting four, every chair of geography in British Universities, 
has been created within my li.fe time, 
* J.H.Abraham, 1973 op. cit. writes (British Sociology) "followed 
an erratic course, more in keeping with the insular, independent 
and eccentric British temperatmnt. The early promise of a real 
breakthrough towards a new science of society was not fulfilled. 
If there is one area of interests which constitute the main pre-
occupation •.. it is the class structure of Britain in its various 
manifestations. It is understandable in view of the rigid class 
divisions that have characterized British society," from pages 
192 & 626. But this did not seem to apply to the R,G.S. where 
interest was taken in those who had information to contribute, 
* The 'classical' British geographers are those whom Dickinson 
considers merit an entry in his books; although most seem to be 
of Scottish extraction. I do not defend classical nor British, 
they were geographers in as much as their work was part of their 
lives. 
1.5.2. Quotations from Dickinson, 1976, Chapter 5. 
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1.5.4. E4J.Mackinder, \On the $co~e and~ethod$ o~ Geo9Xa~QX, \ 
Address to the Royal Geogra~htcal soctety, 1887, 
* Gunnar Myrdal, ODjectiv~ty in Soc~al Researc~, Ducksworth, 
1970. Myrdal argues that def~ition prior to explanation 
becomes mere assertion. 
* Dickinson, 1976 op. cit. page 39. 
1.5.5. H.J.Mackinder Chisholm, Research in Human Geography, Heinemann, 
1971, wrote; "in British Universities ••• the distinction between 
the two sides (physical & human I of the subject is of long stand-
ing and has in recent years been sanctified by the fact that 
human geography falls in the purview of the Social. Science 
Research Council whire the physical geographers are catered for 
by the Natural Environmental Research Council." 
*H.J.Mackinder, The Human Habitat, Scot. Geog. Mag. 1931. page 
323 and also ditto in Geog. Journal, 86, 1935 page 12. 
1.6.1. Louis Raveneau, L'Element Humain dans la Geographie, Annals de 
Geographie, No.1. 1892, pages 331 to 347. 
*W.Windelband, History of Philosophy, translated by J.H.Tufts, 
MacMillan, New York. 1901. 
*Ratzel always claimed that his work was experimental, but when 
various national authors quoted his work either as premises or 
as justification, they considered that his work was substantive. 
2.1.1. This is an obvious oversimplification, because of the need to 
: generalize. 
2.1.2. 'The Peninsular' was presented in three volumes. Only vol.l. 
is referred to here. In the foreword the authors are named as 
Prof. K. Mason, School of Geography; Oxford, E.W.Gilbert, Hert-
ford College, and R.P.Beckinsale, M.A. 
* ibid page iv. 
2.1.5. military, is underlined by self. J.E.G. 
2.1.8. E.Estyn Evans, The Personality of Ulster, being the Presidential 
Address delivered at the Annual Conference of the Institute of 
British Geographers, Belfast, 2nd. January 1970. 
* Sir Cyril Fox, The Personality of Britain, 1932. 
* P.Vidal de la Blache, Tableau de la geographie de la France, 
1903. the reference is from; Premiere partie; 'Personalite 
geographique de la France. I This is a statement of the geo-
graphic individuality of France; a statement of geographic uni-
queness, not a statement of personality per se, which is used 
by British geographers as an anthropomorphism in an attempt to 
relate human geography to human traits. Personality appears to 
be a deliberate mistranslation. 
2.1.9. E.Evans, op cit. note five, page 18. 
* does the 'closed' landscape equate with the personality and 
minds of the Ulstermen? of any faction? 
2.1.10. ibid page 1. 
127 
2.1.11 'Meaning' has become a key word within the social sciences in 
recent years, and has extended to an area of debate, much of 
which has derived from Max Weber's use of the word verstehen. 
Before me at present are;- Mary Douglas' Rules & Meanings, 1973 
Penguin: T.E.Hill's The Concept of Meaning, Allen & Unwin, 1974. 
F.A.Ranson's Meaning in Culture, R.K.P. 1975: A.Brittan's, The 
Privatised World, R.K.P. 1977. R.A.Gorman's The Dual Vision, 
R.K.P. 1977: W.Pelz's The Scope of Understanding in Sociology, 
R.K.P. 1974: A.Brittan's, Meanings and Situations, R.K.P. 1973, 
and there are many others in which meaning is not clearly given 
in the title. Yet meaning is open to many interpretations, and 
is frequently only explained within the terms that each definer 
has a-priori bounded his case. It seems that present etiquette 
in writing in the social sciences demands that an author defines 
the region in which his terminology of 'meaning' shall operate. 
Here the word is used as a tautology = what is meant. J.W.R. 
Whitehand, 'Innovation diffusion in an academic discipline: the 
case of the 'new geography:'TransactiohS 1973 0 Institute of Bri-
tish Geographers. 
* ibid footnote 15 
* ibid footnote 11 
~bid ~ootnote 17 
2.l.12.ibid final footnote 
2.2.1. This is the case also for Whitehand's paper. The politics con-
cerned the control of 'knowledge' in geography. 
2.2.4. There is neither sarcasm nor implied adverse criticism, ad hom-
enam, in this remark. ! read both of these authors with respect 
and consider that their respective contributions to the discip-
line are those of two totally sincere chroniclers. If the under-
standing of events in time have overtaken their contributions, 
this does not detract from their respective contributions to ex-
tend our knowledge. I do not believe that either was 'unconsc~ 
ious' of the past, as E.A.Wrigley suggested in 'Changes in the 
Philosophy of Geography' in Frontiers of Geographical Teaching. 
Methuen, 1965, with "The most complete prisoners of the past 
are those who are unconscious of it." 
*Dickinson 'Regional Concept' R.K.P. 1976 page 382. This state-
ment was made long after Whitehand and other quantifiers had 
written these notions off as redundant orthodoxy. 
2.2.5. Hartshorne, OPe cit. 1939, pages 466 - 468. 
and 
2.2.6. 
2.2.7. ibid page 469. 
*Dickinson 1976 OPe cit. pages xv - xviii. 
2.2.8. Hartshorne 1939 page vii. 
2.2.l0.Consider the difficulties found by the American troops in Normandy 
with the maps showing rivers. Many of these were merely 'creeks' 
by their definitions and so they crossed and confused the bounda-
ries of battle zones. 
*D. Harvey , Explanation in Geography, Arnold, 1969 pages, 16 - 22. 
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2.2.10 * From the covers and Introduction o~ Harvey\s books 
lContdL 
2.3.1. D.Harvey, 1969, OPe cit. pages 19 to 20. 
2.3.4. If these values are not to your liking, (they do not form a de-
finitive list) then try to list some of your own, and offer them 
to a relevant other for judgement. 
*It is not so long ago that W. Bunge was driving a taxi for a 
living, having written a contribution to contemporary geography, 
in which he posed the wrong questions. 
2.3.5. P. Haggett , Locational Analysis in Human Geography, London, 1963. 
*Ian Burton, The quantitative revolution and theoretical geo-
graphy, page 147 in "The Conceptual Revolution in Geography." Ed. 
Wayne K.D.Davies, U.L.P. 1972. 
*D.Harvey, 'Behavioural postulates and the consturction of theory 
in human geography.' Seminal Paper, Series A, No.6. Dept. of Geog. 
Univ. of Bristol, 1967. 
2.3.6. D. Harvey, 1969 op.cit. pages 122 & 123 explains further dif-
ficulties concerning crossing the knowledge assumptions between 
disciplines. 
*W.Bunge, Theoretical Geography, Univ. of Lund, Sweden, 1966, es-
pecially chapters 2, 8, & 9. 
D.Harvey, 1969, pages 125 & 126. 
W.Bunge, 1966 op.ci~. 
*Oh! What would Freud have read into this? 
*deviation being caused by nature, is a gross value judgement 
enclosed in a scientific explanation. Humanity is more complex, 
it would be a simple world for doctors if every ailment had a 
single, simple cause, for which there was single cure. 
*Bunge takes this quotation from Walter Christaller in Ekistics, 
Vol. 16, 1963, page 257. The underlings are mine, because they 
indicate to me the value laden nature of an objective scientist's 
certainty. 
*W.Bunge. 1966 op.cit. page 235. 
2.4.2. Footnote. 
A revolution is hardly real, if those involved with it ignore it. 
A publication such as Minshull's 'Regional Geography' published 
in 1967, should have seemed almost ludicrous at the time when 
geographers as students, were almost totally preoccupied with 
statistics. However R.E.Dickinson published the "Regional Con-
cept" in 1967 with the strong preface; "This book is an apprai-
sal of contributions to what has been regarded throughout the 
development of modern geography ••• as the core of its field of 
study ••• It seeks to understand the areal interrelation of phy-
sical and human spatially-arranged phenomena in terms of the 
concept of the region." In order to stress the notion that "the 
post war trends" in geography of a quantificatory nature derive 
from the strength of physical geographers (in numbers) in Britain, 
Dickinson presents, contributions "without comment". In a four 
hundred page book, a mere twenty pages from Chorley & Haggett, 
Stoddart and Chisholm represent the 'revolution'. A revolution 
with a seemingly low power base. 
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2.4.2. R.Minshull, Regional GEography, Hutchinson, 1967. 
* R.E.Dickinson, Regional Concept, R.K.~, 1976. 
2.4.3. Robert A.Gorman, The Dual Vision, R.K.P. 1977 page 1. 
*R.J.Chorley & ~.Haggett, Models in Geography, Methuen 1967, 
page 38. 
2.-4.4. D.Harvey, Explanation in Geography, 1969, First quotation is 
from page 16, subsequent quotations are from pages 69 to 83. 
2.4.5. Harvey 1969 op.cit. page 173. 
2.4.8. Ian Burton, The quantitative revolution and theoretical geography, 
1963 printed in The Conceptual Revolution in Geography, Edited 
by Waype K.Davies, U.L.P. 1972, page 140. 
*ibid page 150. 
*ibid page 148. 
2.4.9. Burton, op.cit. page 147. 
*ibid. page 141. 
*ibid page 142. 
2.4. 10. *R.Hartshorne, Perspective on the Nature of Geography, Rand 
McNally, 1959, page 161 quoted by Burton 1962 page 142. 
*R.Hartshorne, op.cit. page 170 
2.4.11.The von Richtofen quotations are from Dickinson, 1969, page 83. 
*W.Bunge. op.cit. page 213. 
*ibid Preface to the Second Edition. 
*ibid page 201. 
2.5.1. see 2.1.11. 
2.5.3. D.Harvey, Explanation in Geography, Arnold, 1969. 
E.Nagel, The Structure of Science, R.K.P.; Harvey, 1969 first 
uses his work as reference on page 4. 
* Nagel, page 485. 
*ditto, page 488. 
*ditto, page 4 
*ditto, page 4 
2.5.4. ditto page 20, This statement influenced Harvey to such an extent 
that he devoted most of Chapter 4 (1969) to expanding upon it. 
* quotation from Nagel, page 27. 
2.5.5. Burton, op.cit. pages 146 to 148. 
2.5.6. ditto, all quotations. 
Harvey 1969, 
*ditto page viii. 
*ditto page vii. 
2.S.J. Burton, op.cit. 
2.5.8. *Burton, op.cit. page 143, my underlinings. 
*Dickinson, 1976. 
*Alan Pred, Behavior. and Location, Vols. I & II, Lund, 1967 & 
1969. 
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3.1.1. Coates, Johnson and Knox, "Geograph.y and Inequality," 
Oxford, 1977. 
3.2.1: Don. Martindale. 'The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory,' 
R.K.P. 1961, page 27. This book offers a review of the theore-
tical problems attendant with sociology. It considers in detail 
the conceptual foundations of sociological theory, and also the 
philosophical foundations from which varying theories arise. 
It, is therefore pertinent to the theoretical loans that some 
geographers appear to have taken from sociology, without always 
understanding how they were misusing a fundamental construct. 
T.Parsons, 'The Structure of Social Action.' Free Press, N.Y. 
1968, page 48. 
*G.A.Lundberg, 'Foundations of Sociology,' David McKay, N.Y. 
1964, pages 81 - 82. 
3.2.5. My reading leads me to the conclusion that structural function-
alism is not adequate as an explanatory model of society. It 
appeals to the geographical quantophrenics as shown in R.E.Pahl's 
Chapter 7 in 'Models in Geography' Ed. Chorley & Haggett, Methuen, 
1967. As a model it fails to explain either revolution or social 
change. Parsons clearest exposition of this theory is probably 
in Parsons & Shils, 'Towards a General Theory of Action,' Harper 
Torchbooks, N.Y. 1962 (first published 19511. One must be care-
ful not to confuse Parsons social action titles 'with Max Weber's 
ideas of Social Action - Parsons translated Weber from the Ger-
man. The clearest setting out of an example of structural func-
tionalism, is probably in N.J.Smelser's 'Social Change in the 
Industrial Revolution' R.K.P. 1959. 
3.3.2. From D.Martindale, op.cit. page 380. 
3.3.6. Models in Geography Chorley & Haggett. Methuen. 1967. 
3.4.1. K.Marx & F.Engels, 'The German Ideology, '47, page 7. 
3.4.2. ibid page 20. 
ibid page 23 
3.4.4. K.Marx and F. Engels, nThe Communist Manifesto, n page 28. 
ibid page 26. 
3.4.5. H.J.Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," R.G.S. 1904. 
page 42. 
3.4.6. Charles Darwin, "The Descent of Man", 1880. 
*ibid pages 133 to 134. 
3.5.2. See Dickinson, 1969 op.cit.page 10. 
3.5.3. Dickinson, 1969, op.cit. page 11. 
*Chorley & Haggett, Models in Geography, Methuen, 1967, page 781. 
*Jan Broek, Geography its Scope and Spirit. 1965 Merrill, page 14. 
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3.5.8. A. Schutz and T. Luckmann, lIThe structures ot the Lile World," 
Heinemann, 1974. or 
A.Schutz, "Collected Papers" Vol.l,2,and 3, Nijhotf, The Hague, 
1962. 
There is a fairly balanced ;pa;per, "Phenomenological perspectives 
in Sociologylt, in "Approaches to Sociologylt, Ed. J.Rex.R.K.P. 1974. 
*David Ley et ale 
*From T.Luckmann, page xiii in "The Structures of the Life World." 
3.5.9. Yi Fu Tuan, "Space and Place,1t Arnold, 1979 page 203. 
3.6.3. Examples are from J.S.Maclure, "Educational Documents", Methuen, 
1971. 
*The Newsom Report, 1968, pages 61 to 62. 
*The Report on the Royal Commission on Oxford, 1852, pp 70 - 71. 
*The Newcastle Report (on the education of the independent poor, 
including pauper, vagrant and criminal children), 1861, pages 
168 to 169. 
*The Plowden Report, 1967, pages 50 to 63. 
3.6.4. R.J.Johnston, "Spatial Structures" Methuen, 1973, pages ix and 
pages 1 to 3. 
3.6.5. A.Cicourel, Method'and Measurement in Sociology, Free Press, 
1964. pages 221 & Q22. 
P.Berger & T.Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 
Penguin 1966. Chapters 2 & 3. 
B.Glaser & A.Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory, Aldine 
Atherton, 1967, page 161. 
3.6.7. R.J. Johnston 1973, op.cit. page 4. 
3.7.1. A.Deutscher, "Words and Deeds" in 'Social Problems', 13, 1966, 
page 241. 
3.7.2. A.Schutz, "Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences" 
in 'Collected Papers' No.1. Ed. M. Natanson, op.cit. 1962. 
*George Herbert Mead, who did not write a lot, but is ofter 
quoted. 
3.7.3. J.E.Gately, " The Idea of a Flood," Middlesex Polytechnic, 1973. 
*David Silverman, "The Theory of Organisations," Heinemann, 1970. 
3.7.4. David Harvey, "Social Justice and the City," Arnold, 1973. 
4.1.1. David Harvey, "Social Justice and the City," Arnold, 1973. In 
the Introduction. 
*J.Rawls, "Distributive Justice," 1969, in Laslett and Runciman, 
"Philosophy, Politics and Society," Third Series, Blackwell, 1969. 
4.1.2. E.A.Ackerman, "Geography as a Fundamental Research Discipline," 
Chicago, 1958. page 12. 
* ibid. page 36. 
4.1. 4. Mao Tse Tung, "Four Essays on Philosophy, " Peking, 1968, page 23. 
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4.1,4, * D,Harvey, 1973, o~.c~t, ~age 301 
CContdl 
4.1.5. D.Harvey, '73, o~.cit. ~age 120. 
* ibid. page 298. • 
* ibid. pag~s 122 & 123. 
4.1.6. D. Harvey, '73, page 147. 
* I have a bias towards those whom our society requires to be 
deprived. Especially for some of my fellow pupils at elemen-
tary school who suffered the deprivations of "The Slump". For 
my fellow soldiers who were maimed in limb, mind, or body, and 
for many of the pupils whom I have taught since, who falling 
into the lowest percentiles of academic ability have been de-
creed by society to justify the success of those endowed to be 
more able in the discrimination of competition. 
4.1.7. D.Harvey, '73. page 298. 
4.1.8. Saul B.Cohen, "Geography and Politics in a World Divided," 
Oxford. 1973. 
4.2.2. "It is a mistake to believe that there is one authentic, pure 
and correct interpretation of Marx's thought, which can be held 
up as what he 'really' meant." R. Kilminster, "Praxis and Method," 
R.K.P. 1979, page 3. 
* D.Harvey, "Explanation in Geography," Arnold, 1969, pages 482 
and 483. 
4.2.3. There are 34 references to E.Nagel in "Explanation in Geography." 
There is only one in "Social Justice" and that is a denial of a 
major Nagelian assertion. 
* Harvey,1973, op.cit. pages 121 to 124. 
* Kuhn, 1962, op.cit. page 10. 
4.2.4. ibid. page 162. 
4.2.5. The first part of "Social Justice and the City" is claimed to be 
a liberal formulation. Various cultures make many and varied 
claims to, and typifications of liberalism. 
* A.MacIntyre, "A mistake about Causality in Social Science," in 
"Philosophy, Politics and Society," Second Series, Basil Black-
well, Oxford, 1962. 
4.2.6. Harvey, 1973, op.cit. page 309. 
*The ideas and matters raised in this section stem from the pro-
blems faced when attempting to view the construction of reality 
from a Weberian (Max Weber) point of view. 
"Alan Dawe, "The Two Sociologies", 1970, in "Sociological Per-
spectives," Penquin, 1971. 
"Roland Robertson, in a half forgotten paper, "Towards the iden-
tification of the major axes of sociological analysis," in a for-
gotten book, "Approaches to Sociology,1I Ed.J.Rex,R.K.P. 1974. 
4.2.7. David Silverman, in an unforgettable book, "The Theory of Orgen-
isations ," Heinemann, .1970, Chapter 6. 
*L.Wittgenstein, "The Blue and Brown Books," Harper Row, 1958, 
pages 43 & 44. 
133 
4.2.7. *Max Weber, liThe Theory of Soci.al and Economi.c Organi.sation," 
lContdlO.U.P. 1947, page 94. 
*Meanings of Meaning require a special bibliography, 
The historical entry is liThe Meaning of Meaning," by Odgen & 
Richards, Harcourt Brace, 1923. 
The slick one is "Rules and Meanings," Ed. M. Douglas, Penguin, 
1973. 
The meaningful one is, "The Nature of Things," by A.Quinton, 
R.K.P. 1973. 
The dull one is "Paradigms and Fairy Tales," by J.Ford, R.K.P. 
1975. 
The outstanding one is, "Meaning in Culture," F.A.Hanson, R.K.P. 
1975. 
4.2.9. Coates, Johnston and Knox, "Geography and Equality," Oxford, 
1977 • 
4.3.1. ibid. page 19. 
4.3.2. During the 1940's and-into the 1950's, there began a genuine 
search in the social sciences, because of genuine problems, for 
a new nomothetic base to the disciplines. Ideographic studies 
slid slowly into disrepute, and thus the emphasis upon study 
through particularity dwindled. Search and movement was at an 
intellectual level that set out to negate those forms of scien-
tific enquiry that did not follow the methodologies of the nat-
ural sciences. This movement proceeded at three levels: in the 
Philosophy of Science, concerning the problems of value commit-
ment in the sciences, and in a wider social context, in that 
'science' was capable of solving all the problems of the worlds 
(then there were two worlds, east and west). The form of the 
philosophy of science at the centre of the movement is termed log-
ical positivism. J. Habermas, in 'Knowledge and Human Interests,' 
London 1972 shows how Comte's usage of the term defined a set of 
methodological rules: thus 
la reel: 'all knowledge has to prove itself through the sense 
certainty of systematic observation that secures inter-subject-
ivity. ' 
la certitude: 'Methodological certainty is just as important as 
sense certainty ••• the reliability of scientific knowledge is 
guaranteed by unity of method.' 
le precis: 'The exactitude of our knowledge is guaranteed only 
by the formally cogent construction of theories that allow the 
deduction of lawlike hypotheses.' 
l'utile: 'Scientific cognition must be technically utilizable. 
Science makes possible technical control over processes of both 
nature and society.' 
le relative: 'our knowledge is in principle unfinished and re-
lative in accordance with the relative nature of the positive 
spirit.' G.H.von Wright, in 'Explanation and Understanding, 1971, 
suggests that there are three basic modern tenets of logical pos-
itivism: these are, the idea of the unity of scientific method 
amidst the diversity of subject matter of scientific investigation, 
or methodological monism; 'the mathematical sciences, in parti-
cular mathematical physics, set a methodological ideal for all 
other sciences', and 'Causal scientific explanation which consists 
in the subsumption of individual cases under hypothetically 
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4.3.2. assumed general laws of nature. l 
(ContdlLogical positivism offers appealing strengths and inherent weak-
nesses. The strengths lie in its offer of theoretical unity· 
and methodological consistency, by apparently assimilating the 
rational and the empirical. The inherent weaknesses are argued 
by H.Schnadelbach, 'Erfarung, Begrundung und Reflexion, Versuch 
uber den Positivismus, Frankfurt, 1971; in that by affirmation 
knowledge is secured by methodological rules, but at the same 
time through criticism or scepticism, positivism rules out great 
areas of knowledge, because it must demarcate areas of knowledge 
that are not subject to its methodology. It establishes there-
fore a contrast between critical enlightenment and the defence 
of restrictive theory. Its history as shown in 'The Positivist 
Dispute in German Sociology,' Trans. Adey & Frisby, Heinemann 
1976, has therefore been orte of a search to establish more ways 
of extending hypercriticism and delimiting restrictive claims. 
At present the debate appears to centre about the semantics of 
the notion of scientism. 
The difficulty for the lesser disciplines considering logical 
positivism concerned values. In order to be scientific, one 
had to be objective, and in order to be objective, one had to es-
tablish claims to be value neutral. But in order to be posi-
tivistic in such a claim, neutrality could not be enough, one 
had to be value free. The spirit of the times was reflected 
in an era of unparalleled conformity in sociology and commitment 
" to the status quo. Positivism produced David Riesman's 'other-
directedness', William F.Whyte's 'organisation man' and Daniel 
Bell's pronouncement of 'the end of ideology'. This stage in 
sociology is shown clearly by Hermann Strasser, in 'The Normative 
Structure of Sociology,' R.K.P. 1976, especially in Chapter 6. 
There had been a shift in emphasis in sociology from the actor 
and his orientation of action to the situation in which the ac-
tion is placed. The notions of voluntaristic action, which had 
been formulated as a counter to positivism, had to be 'forgotten' 
because the needs of a unified theory of social action required 
a larger base, if the theory was to encompass several disciplines, 
which the widening social sciences drew upon in an era of growing 
awareness to social 'problems'. These wider notions of society 
required systematic knowledge concerning societies. The era of 
the forties and the fifties was set in prosperity for the west. 
As Strasser points out on page 148, "In this period, there was 
less need to rely on 'purely moral incentives' in the determina-
tion and maintainence of social order. The rising welfare state 
needed a social theory that focused, on the one hand, on social 
systems management in terms of fostering societal commitment 
through the integrative and socialization mechanism of such sys-
tems.. On the other hand, deliberate planning and increasing 
interventions on the part of the polity called for growing scie-
ntific readiness to offer solutions to social problems which make 
the system work better." 
Therefore in order to explain a system in terms of its structure 
and functions, the sociologists were prepared to relinquish their 
prior interests in confronting positivism as an anti individual-
istic force, and to turn from the view that social action was an 
expression of man's efforts to achieve moral values, and concen-
trate upon the need for institutional maintainence and continuity. 
Then cognition is expressed in terms of concepts of stability, 
equilibrium and effective functioning, as bases of social systems. 
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4.3 • 2. Thus a 'science 1 o:e societJ{ could be establi.shed, even i:e such a 
lContdl science draws heavily u,l?on logical ,I?osi.tiYism :eor its justi:eica-
tion. It is the same ideo1ogJ{ that lead to the treyo1ution1 in-
to~~ru1titative geogra,l?hy, at a time when the positivistic econ-
omic notion of t endless 1 growth seemed to have been socialized in-
to the majority of the population. 
4.3.3. James Bird, "Centrality and Cities," R.K.P. 1977. 
* ibid, page 39. 
* ditto. 
* ibid page 155. 
4.3 0 4. David Ley, in a lecture at Oxford Polytechnic, Summer 1979, 
4.3.5. Derek Gregory, "Ideology, Science and Human Geography," 
Hutchinson,1978; with a partial extension at the R.G.S. seminar, 
on 31: 1: 179. 
* ibid, back cover. 
4.3.6. ibid page 75. (see note 4.3.2. above). 
4.3.7. 
* There are no page notes in Gregory's "Ideology etc.", If it 
is the response to "Social Justice,1l that it is claimed to be, 
then all the book could be relevant. 
* ibid, page 167. 
"Radical Geography," 
succeed? 
*A1exander Pope. 
* M.Chisholm, "Human 
Ed. R.Peet, Methuen, 1978. But did they 
Geography," Penguin, 1975, page 175. 
4.4.1. D.Harvey, 1973, page 150. 
* 1952, Ed. Thomas, "Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth," 
Chicago. Page 987. 
* 1964, W.Bunge, "Theoretical Geography," op.cit. pages 5 & 6. 
* Dawson and Doornkamp, "Evaluating the Human Environment," 
Arnold, 1973, pages 162 and 163. 
* D.Gregory, 1978, op.cit. page 138. 
4.4.3. Homans, "Bringing the Men Back in." 
* humanity, science and ideas, not Ideology, Science and Human 
GeOgraphy. 
4.4.4. J .Piaget, "Structuralism," R.K.P. 1971. 
*Notes for item below: M.Chisholm, "Human Geography, Evolution 
or Revo1ution,Il Pelican, 1975, see page 13. 
Chisholm & Gregory talked at the R.G.S. January 1979. 
As an example of the change in attitude towards knowledge, there 
was a debate between Gregory and Chisholm at the R.G.S. in Jan-
uary 1979. This debate took on the features of 'revolution that 
Harvey had outlined. See section 4.1.5. Gregory arrived with 
clans of undergraduate supporters. Chisholm sought in vain how 
to argue to avoid a return to the conservative propositions of 
the qualitiative and the unique, to him an archaic notion that 
he believed that he had helped to destroy in "Human Geography, 
Evolution or Revolution?" After all the quantitative revolution 
had delivered to him the chair at Bristol - exactly upon White-
hand's axis of knowledge. Yet in the R.G.S. Gregory had arrived 
with a crowd of students with whom he appeared to be conversing 
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4.4.4, in terms o~ mutual knowledge, wbicQ had reversed the proposi-
(Contd}tions of tQe quantitative revolution. There was no evident emp-
irical base, and numbers were not required to explain the systems 
involved, Professor Chisholm did not appear to realise that 
if numbers and systems the:OJrY, the major tenets of logical posi-
tivism were no longer required for geographical explanation, then 
his chair might soon be under offer! Nor did he realise that he 
was just the first of the last generation of 'elder statesmen' 
of quantophrenia who was at that moment being pilloried, and 
that he was in the process of suffering a first broadside in an 
alternative revolution, identical to his own hungry youth. As 
he himself said, (page 13 above), "When one is actually living 
through events, and indeed participating in them it is difficult 
to take an entirely detached view ••• on the other hand, one can-
not stumble blindly along in the comforting belief that because 
there is plenty of excitement we must be going the right way." 
4.4.5. Geographers have declined the cases of their works, and the nom-
native and accusative have been dealt with: even the vocative 
has been expressed. It is suggested here that "human" geograph-
ers tend to a genitive presentation of their work. whilst "phy-
sical" geographers present a dative case. Harvey seems to be 
suggesting.that their dual case inflexion should be ablative. 
5.1.2. A.Quinton, "The Nature of Things" R.K.P. 1978. 
5.1.4. 
*Answers to Kant's third question, "For what may I hope?" are 
determined by ones values, aims and beliefs from the outset. 
Laws, in their degree~ from E.Nagel, op.cit. Rules in their 
natures from 'The Idea of a Social Science' P.Winch, R.K.P. 
and also a paper of the same title by Alasdair MacIntyre in 
Philosophy of Social Explanation," Ed. A.Ryan, O.U.P. 1973. 
latter may clarify the former. 
1958, 
"The 
The 
5.1.5. See K.Popper's 'Clouds and Clocks', Chapter 6 in "Objective Know-
ledge", Oxford, 1972. 
*Roy Ward, "Floods" Macmillan, 1978. 
5.2.1. Halford J. Mackinder, "The Scope and . Methods of Geography" 1887. 
and "The Geographical Pivot of History" 1904, Ed.E.W.Gilbert, 
R.G.S. 1969, page 18. 
* ditto page 20. 
* ditto page 30. 
* page 31 ditto 
* ibid. page 22. 
5.3.1. Ask a driver of a new Japanese car, how he equates his purchase 
with the 'Save the Whale' window sticker, when the Japanese in-
sist upon their 'right' to illegal whale hunting. A response 
runs through many theoretical justifications, because no logic 
can support the hypocrisy. 
5.3.2. J.R.Searle "How to get Ought from Is" in "Theories of Ethics," 
Ed. P.Foot, O.U.P. 1977. 
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5.3.2. *Chapter One ot this paper tx~ed to stress that there ~s not a 
necessary connect~on between national geogxaphtes. The state-
ments here rule out any obligation for outsiders to accept for-
eign rules concerning the foreigners needs to describe their 
earths, just as the use of my mother tongue by some of them en-
tails no obligation for me to accept their moral values. 
5.3.3. W.Bunge. in Annals Vol.69, No.1. March 1979 page 169. 
5.3.5. There are eight problematic concepts that revolve around geog-
raphy when the factors of the discipline are separated and analy-
sed. Within the discipline are the nature of space, the nature 
of scientific enquiry, the nature of theory or explanation and 
the nature of knowledge. Impinging upon the discipline from 
outside are the nature of chosen methods, culture, facts and 
values, and philosophy. 
5.4.1. Karl Mannheim, "Ideology and Utopia," R.K.P. 1936. 
* ibid pages 190 to 222. 
* ibid, page 64. 
5.4.3. K.Mannheim op.cit. page 206. 
5.4.4. B.B.C. T.V. 13: 10: '79. 
*H.Marcuse, "Reason and Revolution", R.K.P. 1941 page 322. 
5.4.5. The examples of values given in this paper were those that were 
'socially determined' by the ethos of those theories that were 
being considered in the relevant chapter section at that time 
and some were attempts to give examples that would be repugnant 
in all or some cases to all or some people holding beliefs from 
the spectral range available. A single concept has a wide range 
of-meanings to a wide range of believers, although each may only 
hold one form to be true. Mannheim, page 245 considers 'free-
dom' through a range of political beliefs. 'Truth' above (5.4.3) 
is included in a Marxist reference, because to Western socialised 
knowledge, such a juxaposition is pure contradiction. 
Mannheim page 247. 
5.4.6. 'Zeitalter des Ausgleichs' attr. to Max Scheler. 
*References to the sociology of knowledge are taken solely from 
Mannheim, because this is a point of beginning. Radical geog-
raphy in Britain has firstly to examine the sociology of contem-
porary knowledge in geography. It would be pointless to try 
to impose method, practice, theory and ph±losophy upon the pre-
sent forms of knowledge without first examining the meanings of 
present geographic knowledge and the purposes that these mean-
ings serve. 
*The present Government's 'overwhelming mandate' comes from 44% 
of those electors who turned up to vote without • spoiling , their 
ballot papers or 30% of the electoral roll. There is a contra-
diction here concerning the accepted meaning of democracy. 
5.5.1. Willi Brandt, in conversation, October 1979. 
5.5.2. R.Kilminster, Praxis and Method, R.K.P. 1979. page 3. 
*Richard Peet et ale op.cit. 
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5.5.2. This is because materiali~ is the stuff of history Geographers 
(Contdlmight require a different conceptual area to research. 
5.5.3. L. Althusser, "For l1an~Y, Allan Lane, 1965, vage 182, 
5.5.4. 'Humanistic Geography' Ed. Ley and Samuels, Croom Helm, 1978, 
page 301. 
"Dij dink sieker ek is cynical?" 
"God pellie, ek is serious." 
this is given as an example of phenomenological research findings. 
Kilminster, op.cit. page 268. 
*K.Marx, in Vorwarts, 1844 pages 22 - 23. 
5.5.5. K.Marx, 'The German Ideology' pages 14 - 15. 
*H.Marcuse, 'Reason and Revolution' op.cit. page 321. 
* This is not a quotation, but it seems familiar. 
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ZW];>ENDU 
A.l. 
The original research for this paper was under the title, "Problems in 
th~ conceptual and professional foundations of contemporary geography," 
The difficulties involved with equating geography to the notions of 
profession were either ~possible or ludicrous. Typification and re-
search into professions is frequently through reference to the legal 
and medical disciplines. The standard reference points within such 
studies concern the organisation and bureaucracy together with the car-
eer progressions within the relevant disciplines. Geographers find 
difficulty in relating their world to any discussion concerning their 
profession. 
Solomons * verifies the notion by stating; "we shall briefly review •.• 
the educational arrangements of five professions, namely solicitors, 
engineers, architects, surveyors and secretaries and administrators. 
This list covers the more relevant professions, though there are many 
others which would repay attention if time permitted."* Solomons then 
defines by tautology, *"It should be understood that the expressions 
laccountancy profession ' or 'the profession ' in this report refer throu-
ghout to all qualified accountants, whether engaged in public practice 
or in industry, commerce, finance or the public service." 
Solomons then qualifies all his findings, "However, many important ques-
tions are left unanswered by the statistics, and mo~t of them could not 
be answered by the professional bodies from information in their poss-
ession without ad hoc investigations or specially programmed computer 
runs. Some questions, such as those relating to the kind of work that 
accountants actually do, could not be answered at all, because the var-
ious bodies have only sketchy information about their members l occupa-
tions."* 
The concept of profession put forward here seems to lie in the trans-
cendental acceptance of the script. There is a sociology of the pro-
fessions * in use, but most literature concerning professions describes 
them as occupations that have assumed a dominant position in the division 
of labour, in so far as they tend to control the substance of their own 
work. Few geographers could see them selves in these terms, and those 
who are involved in geographical work tend to shy away from being given 
a professional label to characterise them. 
The Royal Geographical Society kindly published a research request upon 
my behalf in the Journal dated July 1977. It was addressed to all mem-
bers, who probably numbered about four and a half thousand at the time. 
The intention of the request was to present interested members of the 
Society, who by definition of membership could well be geographers, with 
the following letter by return. 
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A.2. 
Dear 
Thank you for showing in interest in the research that I am attempting. 
I began this study from considering the scientific nature of geography 
as problematic, seen by such contributors as Varenius and Mackinder. 
For example, how can the discipline successfully be both a natural scien-
ce and, at the same time, a social science? The sub-disciplines that 
fail to adhere to this formulation and seem able to explain their sub-
ject matter in terms of the natural sciences alone have created the 
Earth Sciences, whilst those areas of the discipline that have attempted 
to explain outside the formulation of natural sciences have been label-
led as ideographic. As these explanatory approaches do not represent 
a coherent thesis nor antithesis of geographic theory, it would appear 
at first sight that geography must be reducible to a set of ad hoc con-
cepts. 
I assumed that geographers concepts or ideas of reality were derived 
from concepts that they had brought to their discipline through their 
socialisation, education and in many cases from others disciplines that 
were in vogue during the time of their formative studies. Lf this were 
the case it would help to account for the presently accepted eclecticism 
of the discipline. Hence the recent generation of stUdies using refer-
ents from psychology, as in the Chicago studies; the anthropomorphic in-
puts from Lorenz, the reduction of man to plant comparisions through 
ecology, the reduction of both human action and inaction to the umbrella 
term of behaviour, and the urge to reduce both data and capta to numbers, 
when this has already failed in sociology. Although these formulations 
attempt genuinely to bring humanity back into geography they only create 
secondary barriers to the explanation of reality by working through 
false metaphors or setting up false similies. 
-~ 
In order to test the problematic concepts that concerned geographers, 
a pilot study was attempted amongst a group of academics whom I consid-
ered were involved in the transmission of geographic knowledge. A 
version of this pilot is included in this letter. Instead of a quest-
ionnaire, they were faced with a number of statements taken from the 
writings of contributors to geographical theory, and were requested to 
write remarks in response to these statements. Although many of the 
responses were returned in the form of questions, a surprising number 
of respondents read the statements as questions, although this could 
be due to their professional habit of setting questions for students to 
answer. But the most surprising outcome of this pilot study was the 
high number of respondents who denied that they were either geographers, 
or who were involved in dealings that give them any allegiance to geo-
graphy as a discipline. In each case this was untrue by the nature of 
their work, yet the reasons given always appeared to be reasonable and 
in each view logical. The causality for arriving at these reasons was 
difficult to establish, but in every case was tracable to the inade-
quacies of the ideas and beliefs that underly geographical theory, and 
problems in the morality of the profession. The stated causes ranged 
from the extremes of "When I realised that geography depended totally 
upon statistics, I nearly gave up my degree.", to "There is not chance 
of unbiased academic advancement when the free-masonry of the I.B.G. 
distribute the appointments in advance, behind closed doors." 
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As a rellow of the R.G.S. these '~roblems' are probably not immediately 
relevant to you, assuming t~t you do not deny that geography is a ser-
ious discipline within its own right, Therefore your responses may 
help to extend my research by eliminating some of the -variables of the 
pilot study and offer valuable evidence of a certain consensus group from 
within the discipline. 
The statements below appear to be basic to present geographical 
theory: 
a} 'Geography exists only for the purposes of consultation by 
other disciplines. ' (Vidal de la Blachel 
b) 'Geomorphologists are not at the centre but on the margin 
of geography. The geologist looks at the present that he 
may interpret the past; the geographer looks at the past 
that he might interpret the present.' (Mckinder) 
c} 'Physical and social scientists want to know what the geogra-
pher contributes distinctively to the realms of knowledge. ' 
(Dickinson) 
d} •.••• 'that the distinctive aim of the scientific enterprise 
is to provide systematic and responsibily supported explan-
ations. ' (E.Nagel) 
e) Quantitative techniques have offered to geographers either 
'a precise methodology through which the discipline may be 
regenerated' (Burton), or 'a shabby entry into the post-war 
concern of planning.' (Harvey) 
f) 'Geography, coming late to:±he paradigm race, has the com-
pensating advantage that it can study at leisure the 'take-
off' paradigms of other sciences.' (Chorley & Haggett) 
g) 'Science ultimately depends upon man's perception of order 
h) 
in the universe, the individual disciplines being distin-
guished not by the particular objects they study but by the 
questions they ask and by the integrating concepts, proposi-
tions and perspectives that their workers use.' (W.K.D.Davies) 
'But geographic problems cannot be solved by the 
tion of some logically consistent methodology. 
more is needed ...• (which) amounts to an adequate 
of geography.' (Harvey)! 
mere selec-
Something 
philosophy 
These statements attempt to reflect beliefs concerning· the purpose, dis-
ciplinary boundaries, ontology, epistemology, theory, methods, scope, 
utility, future and philosophy of ' geography. I would be grateful for 
your views as to the present nature of the discipline as you see it, as 
part of or as a reaction to the views that are at present circulated. 
This is not a request for a personal 'Hartshorne'; brief opinions, or 
comments upon the above statements would be most welcome, or directions 
as to where you have already made contemporary comments upon ideas, ex-
planations and theory within the discipline. I will attempt to answer 
questions as far as my research will allow. 
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My present commitment to geograpLLy arises ;1;ro;m having read sociology. 
My research for a Master's degree into 'Problems in the conceptual and 
professional foundations 0;1; contemporary geography' leads me to believe 
that geography (e.g. in the terms of Davies abovel has failed to escape 
from the double bind of attempts to be both a natural and a social 
science. It further seems that the questions asked by the discipline 
stem from an archaic socialisation of geographers, and that the inte-
grating concepts used arise not from geography but from disciplines 
that have already integrated their concepts withinan acceptable para-
digm, theoretical propositions are often those of the natural sciences 
alone, and research proposals are often collected eclectically across 
cultural boundaries without considering the cultural values that are 
carried with them. 
My empirical research leads me to believe that the unnecessary disinte-
gration of the discipline that has already begun in the U.S.A. is beg-
inning internally in this country, due partly to the funding of the 
discipline from different research sources, but mainly due to confusion 
of ideas concerning the direction of the professional control, and the 
future scope, amongst some of the practioners of geography, within aca-
demic circles. Yet Mackinder's notion that geography should be the 
philosophical bridge between the two forms of science still appears to 
be the most logical aim for the discipline. 
I shall be grateful to receive your views. 
Yours sincerely, 
John Gately 
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A.3, 
The pilot study circulated amongst people involved in the teaching 
of geographical material had generated strong clatros of denial that 
these people were geographers or laid claim to any ~professionalt 
status in geography. Members of the Royal Geographical Society might 
find difficulty in advancing such claims, but might provide indications 
of amateur or professional attitudes towards the discipline. In the 
event the request met with a response from one member only, and upon this 
rock my intended research into professionalism foundered. This was not 
due to statistical reliability nor validity but because it seemed that 
geographers did not exist. 
A.4. 
The pilot study had been forced upon the respondents through academic 
interactions. The capta generated covered a wide range of tones from 
superb abuse to Aquinasian reversals. The presentation of statements, 
instead of questions, appeared to many as a breakdown of the normative 
rules for the transactions involved in information gathering. A num-
ber of respondents worked very hard to define the rules for normative 
questionaires and formulated their responses as answers to questions. 
When a statement involved their consciousness of what they considered to 
be of value in their involvement in geography, then this brought forth 
moral judgements, upon either the method or content of this form of pro-
cedure, and a few rather well formulated examples of remarks ad hominem. 
A.5. 
The pilot study as an exercise in social science, sought to discover 
geographers real interests in geography. It sought to discover why 
some geographers were deceived by the statements of others, in what 
terms facts were described, and how respondents used these facts. The 
intended search was for geographers practival moral reasonings as rule 
following normative persons, who would then become the subject matter of 
investigation. 
By presenting them with a wide range of political statements used by 
other geographers, the respondents' views took on moralistic meanings 
and the values defended offered the range of rules that confined each 
one. There are no 'results' because the material was requested in con-
fidence, and the only outcome would be a list of returns in each Utopia. 
Appendix Notes. 
A.L D.Solomons, "Prospectus for a Profession," Publ. Advisory Board 
of Accountancy Education, London, 1974. 
* ibid page 53. 
* ibid page 1, note 1. 
* ibid page 165. 
*An outline of the !Sociology of Professions' is given in 
T. J. Johnson, "Professions and Power," MacMillan, 1977. The eq-
uation of profession and power indicates that the sociology of 
the professions is still at a more primitive stage than the soc-
iology of geographical knowledge, that those elusive geographers 
are certainly aware of. 
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